NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PROGRESS REPORT

by

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

on the implementation of

UNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN (NSC 132/1)

September 10, 1953
SUMMARY

First Progress Report on NSC 132/1 "United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin".

This report indicates that substantial progress has been achieved in implementing NSC 132/1 and that efforts are continuing to achieve a fuller implementation. The development of the Berlin stockpile, the inauguration of tripartite airlift planning, the growth of the Berlin police force, additional economic aid to the city, and our repeated assurances that Berlin will be maintained, have all aided in decreasing West Berlin's vulnerability. Tripartite study of other measures and a variety of politico-military aspects, despite some inevitable disagreements, are progressing and will continue.

As will be noted in paragraph 5 of the attached report, the recent disorders in the Soviet Zone and the success of the United States food assistance program have provided further confirmation of Berlin's influence as a western outpost and strengthened that influence, but may also have increased the Soviets' basic incentive to rid themselves of the Western presence in Berlin.
September 10, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 132/1, "United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin."

1. NSC 132/1 was approved as Governmental policy on June 12, 1952. It is requested that this Progress Report, dated September 10, 1953 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

2. The key policy decisions of NSC 132/1 is the conclusion that, in the view of the United States, the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin is of such importance to the Western powers, and the consequences of its loss would be so serious, that the Western powers should not voluntarily abandon the city under communist pressure even though the resulting situation may involve great risk of general war. Collateral to this is the decision that the Soviet Union should be held responsible for any communist action against the Western position in Berlin.

3. NSC 132/1 prescribes a number of courses of action to be taken in preparation for, or to counteract, Soviet or satellite measures against Berlin and our position in, and access to, the city. These courses of action are divided into groups related to hypothetical situations of progressively increasing severity, ranging from a situation in which Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded, through a blockade situation, finally to a Soviet or satellite armed aggression against our forces in Berlin. The present status of these courses of action, or of preparations therefore, is taken up in this report.

4. NSC 132/1 requires that the recommended courses of action be reviewed should the Soviets take steps to give East Germany the semblance of autonomy. Although the Soviets have taken steps to increase the satellite character of East Germany, there does not appear to have been so far a sufficiently great transfer of authority to justify the required review at this time for this specific reason. The tendency of the Soviets to grant to the East German regime
an increasing measure of apparently autonomous authority is, however, under observation, and our authorities in Germany have been requested to study its development and implications for our Berlin position and otherwise. It is not clear yet what effects the separation of Soviet political and military authority in Germany, announced on May 28, 1953 will have in this regard.

5. The riots, demonstrations, and strikes which have occurred in the Soviet Zone since June 17 and the success of the United States food assistance program to the East Germans, may have a bearing on NSC 132/L and its implementation. The disorders would appear to make any latent possibilities of eventual attack upon West Berlin by East German para-military forces even more remote. The disorders and the food program have underscored the profound long-term importance of Berlin's continued existence as a Western outpost. Conversely, the disruptive and irritating influence of the Western presence in Berlin upon the implementation of Soviet policy in the Soviet Zone has been more fully demonstrated. It is significant that despite this fact, of which the Soviets are well aware, no action of any consequence has been taken against Berlin or against access from Western Germany, since the outbreak of disorder on June 17. One or more of the following reasons may account for the failure of the Soviets to increase pressure at this time upon the Allies in Berlin: (a) undue damage to the current Soviet "Peace offensive"; (b) fear of West German reaction and the realization that action against West Berlin might give new impetus to Western defense measures; (c) the deterring effect of publicly announced commitments of the Western Powers regarding Berlin; (d) fear of failure as in the case of 1948-49 Berlin blockade. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the Soviets' basic incentive to rid themselves of the Western presence in Berlin is any the less and this incentive has probably been strengthened.

The United States and its Allies in Berlin, on the other hand, have adopted certain measures to safeguard our Berlin position during this period. United States propaganda to the East Germans has been kept under reasonable control. They have been advised inter alia to refrain from full-scale riots which would cost many lives. In addition, the food program has been carried out in a manner avoiding outright provocation.

6. Specific action taken, or being taken, to carry out the measures prescribed in NSC 132/L is set forth below, the corresponding paragraph of the NSC paper being indicated in each instance.
7. Paragraph 5. Obtaining Allied Agreement to Courses of Action. Such agreement has been obtained regarding the twelve month staggered stockpile. Some difficulty is still being encountered, however, in persuading the Federal Republic to contribute its share. While no firm Allied commitments have been made with respect to participation of their aircraft in the event another airlift becomes necessary, both the British and French have indicated in general terms what their expected participation would be. As described below detailed tripartite discussions in Germany on airlift planning have been initiated and discussions of other military and politico-military courses of action envisaged by the NSC document are expected. Allied agreement will be sought as necessary. Both the British and French have shown reluctance in planning countermeasures and in agreeing in advance to specific reprisals. They also have opposed the use of countermeasures proposed by the United States on several occasions. Generally speaking, however, the Allies have responded well to our proposals for joint planning for Berlin, and in regard to airlift planning have even shown considerable initiative. The Federal Republic, likewise, after resisting the concept of a twelve month stockpile, now appears to favor the idea although still quibbling over finances.

8. Paragraphs 6 and 7. Measures to Decrease Berlin’s Vulnerability. The situations considered and action recommended in NSC 132/1 are confined to those relating to possible Soviet or satellite interference with access to, or aggression against, the city. The progressive isolation of West Berlin from the surrounding Soviet Zone, and to a lesser extent from the Soviet Sector of the city, is not discussed in NSC 132/1. This process of sealing off West Berlin is now so far advanced that practically none of the city’s normal traffic with its hinterland has survived, and while access to the East Sector is still relatively unhampered, strict controls imposed by the Communists have reduced shopping across the boundary, in both directions, to a bare minimum. While this growing isolation, which is being further developed despite ostensible conciliatory gestures on the part of the Soviets in other areas, has had some undesirable effects on the economy and morale of West Berlin, it has not in the opinion of our authorities seriously affected the security of the city or our position there. In fact, it may well be that the progressive severance of economic and other ties with the surrounding area has actually made Berlin less vulnerable to the shock of a renewed blockade or other disruptive changes in the status quo, such as the recent upheaval in the Soviet Zone, and has made possible a gradual adjustment, economic and psychological, to isolation and self-sufficiency supplemented by Western support. Measures carried out in accordance with NSC 132/1 to decrease West Berlin’s vulnerability to blockade or attack, include the following:
(a) **Stockpile Expansion.** Stockpiling targets have changed several times in the past year. In compliance with NSC 132/1's directive, they were changed in the summer of 1952 from a 6-month "balanced stockpile" goal (which assumed no airlift), to a "staggered stockpile" goal designed to maintain West Berlin's population for a year if supplemented by an airlift as planned. Coal and other items required in large quantities, or otherwise difficult to transport by air, are being stockpiled up to the level of a full year's requirements. Other less bulky essential provisions are being accumulated for lesser periods, depending upon their cost, air transportability and other factors. Assessment of the city's requirements in both categories have been revised upward in the last few months, in view of population changes and increased industrial activity. In general, food and fuel stocks are approaching their revised targets. According to the report on Berlin stockpile, dated May 16, 1953, controlled coal stocks totalled 1,365,000 metric tons, or 68% of the new 12-month target. In addition, there are private coal stocks amounting to 833,000 metric tons, exceeding the 650,000 metric tons established program by 28%. The status of the food stocks as of May 16, 1953, based on the 12-month staggered program is as follows: Fat, meat, dry skimmed milk and salt range between 94% and 111%; dehydrated potatoes 81%; dry whole milk, 71%; grain and flour, cereals, sugar, coffee substitutes average about 50%. Medical supplies on hand are about 77%. Some difficulty has been encountered in persuading the Federal Republic to fulfill its obligations with regard to the financing of 12-month stocks of grain and certain other items, as well as storage is being overcome; it is anticipated that United States financing of the raw material stockpile out of FY 1953 funds, now virtually assured, will be particularly effective in persuading the Federal Republic to shoulder its part of the burden. Because priority was given to the food and fuel stockpiles indispensable for the city's survival in the event of a blockade, the stockpiling of industrial raw materials and construction materials has lagged. To a lesser extent the difficulty of assessing the needs of the city's industry under blockade conditions, and of selecting the most appropriate materials for stockpiling in terms of bulk, cost, need and air transportability contributed to the delay. The delay and uncertainty in relation to the raw materials stockpile caused some concern because of the growing conviction that the Berlin population, particularly in view of the marked economic recovery during the past year would, for psychological reasons, find it more difficult than in 1948-49 to endure a prolonged blockade unless considerable industrial activity were maintained and unemployment were kept within bounds. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the very capability of maintaining the city's economic activity
at almost present levels would serve as one of several possible deterrents to imposition of a new blockade, or that the demonstrated ability to keep the city going would help to persuade the Soviets to withdraw a blockade if one were imposed. With the necessary funds available, the stockpiling of industrial raw materials and construction materials is expected to move ahead rapidly. The Departments of State and Defense have authorized HICOG and the appropriate military authorities in Germany to study the possibility of increasing the stockpiles of the United States garrison and Allied garrisons in Berlin, so that the personnel of the three Allied powers would not, in the event of a blockade, be obliged to draw upon the stocks accumulated for the city's population. An unforeseen, but extremely valuable, use of the stockpile occurred when food stocks were drawn upon to distribute food parcels to the East Germans. Not more than 8% of these stocks are to be so used and immediate replacement is being made.

(b) Airlift Capabilities. There has been some increase in the number of aircraft available for an airlift, and plans to use British Zone bases soon after an airlift is instituted will have the effect of increasing airlift capacity and of reducing both flying time and hazards. According to present calculations of our military authorities in Germany, an airlift having a capacity of 12,483 tons daily could be instituted on short notice. Allied expected capabilities, as communicated to us recently, are as follows: The French stated that they could make available six DC-4 aircraft, which could be made available immediately for "passenger evacuation purposes", but would take some time to convert to cargo carriers, an operation that would be further complicated by the fact that these are not French Air Force airplanes but chartered aircraft. The French have indicated definitely that they have no plans for furnishing military cargo aircraft. The British have stated that, according to present RAF planning, 25 Hastings aircraft would be put in operation by the end of the first six weeks of blockade. They would have a combined minimum capacity of 34,000 tons per month. If available commercially, other aircraft would be obtained under charter, principally for tanker service. Further attention is being given to these estimates of Allied participation in the forthcoming tripartite discussions of politico-military courses of action. As to present capabilities in general, there is every indication that, barring effective Soviet interference with an airlift, or other presently unforeseen demands on our air transport potential elsewhere, an airlift capable of supplying Berlin adequately for about a year, once the twelve-month staggered stockpile target has been reached, could be instituted immediately and reach peak strength in 180 days. Even if
Soviet interference or other circumstances should prevent utilization of half of the projected airlift, Berlin could, with its existing stockpile, hold out for several months. This would, however, mean a lower level of subsistence and industrial activity, and rapid depletion of the stockpile. The Defense Department and its representatives in Germany are implementing the recommendations of NSC 132/1 regarding maintenance of the airfields in Berlin, and making surveys with regard to their improvement.

In the current quadripartite air safety talks in Berlin, the representatives of the western powers are taking care to accept no Soviet proposals or conditions that could hamper the operation of a full-scale airlift.

(c) Airlift Planning. CINCEUR (now CINCUSAREUR) has prepared two plans for the reestablishment of the Berlin airlift. One of these is known as the European Command Alternate Operations Plan for Berlin Airlift (Reduced), and is a capabilities plan based upon the utilization of forces and facilities presently available in the theater. This plan is capable of being implemented on short notice and envisages an airlift capacity of 1248 tons daily. The second plan is known as the European Command Operations Plan for Berlin Airlift, and requires considerable augmentation of forces and facilities from the United States. It envisages a full scale airlift operation comparable to that of "Operation Vittles" which supplied Berlin during the 1948-49 blockade. This plan provides for a build-up to approximately 6500 tons daily. Both of these plans are reviewed periodically and are capable of being implemented should the need arise. It is envisaged that in an emergency the Reduced Plan will be implemented immediately and continue in operation until such time as forces and facilities are available for full scale operations. On January 16, 1953, USCINCEUR was directed to assume the responsibility for airlift planning and at the same time was furnished copies of an Air Force concept for the air transport phase of an airlift operation. This concept envisages conducting full scale operations from airfields in the British Zone of Germany into Gatow and Tegel Airfields in Berlin using C-124 aircraft. USCINCEUR is studying this concept and surveying the facilities required with a view toward revising the current airlift plans. In the event this new concept is considered feasible, plans will be revised accordingly. The existence of this concept does not, however, in any way affect the capability of implementing either of the two existing plans. On the recommendation of U. S. authorities in Germany, the Departments of State and Defense are reviewing the correlation of airlift magnitude to the Berlin stockpile and allied participation in an airlift. Further planning will be based on the conclusions reached.
(d) **Berlin Police Force.** The strength of the West Berlin police force has been steadily increased during the past year, and now stands at over 15,000. Force "B", an emergency police unit created in October 1950, is nearing its planned strength of 3,000 men in three mobile units equipped with vehicles and arms. The completion of barracks for this special force will make it possible shortly to recruit the last 300 men from among many applicants. Training is progressing well, and includes instruction in the use of mortars and bazookas. As a result of the kidnapping in July 1952 of Dr. Linse, a prominent anti-communist in West Berlin, a number of steps have been taken by the Allies and the Berlin Government to strengthen precautionary and other security measures designed to protect the West Berlin population.

(e) **Berlin Command.** On June 24, 1952, the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Minister agreed in London that a simplification of the military command structure in Berlin should be sought. The necessity of unifying the military command in Berlin, at least during periods of crisis, has long been recognized, and is now again being considered by the Defense Department and our authorities in Germany with a view to strengthening and better coordinating the military defense organization of the three Allied powers in West Berlin. The Defense Department has taken up the matter at a high level in Washington with British military representatives, and it is an item on the agenda of the forthcoming tripartite politico-military discussions regarding Berlin. The question of Berlin military command is related to three other interrelated unresolved issues now being explored by the Defense Department and the United States military authorities in Europe, namely (1) the status of the Western Allied forces in Berlin in relation to SHAPE, (2) the relationship of the Berlin Command to NATO commanders with regard to questions of planning for Berlin, and (3) the role of the Berlin forces in the event of general hostilities. Question (1) is being studied in the Department of Defense. The United States position regarding points (2) and (3) has been that (1) West Berlin is a special area for which the United States, the United Kingdom and France are responsible and is not, nor should be made, subject to NATO authority; (2) the forces in Berlin are to defend the city in the event of hostilities, and are not to attempt operations outside the city in support of Allied forces to the west. The British and French, according to our military authorities in Germany appear to hold opinions opposing the United States positions in each instance. While there seems to be some chance that these issues will stand in the way of the politico-military planning for Berlin, an effort will be made to persuade the Allies to accept the United States positions, and if this proves difficult to proceed with as much as possible of the planning not affected by differences of opinion.
(f) **Berlin's Economy.** With nearly 235,000 unemployed (approximately a quarter of the city's labor force) and with exports out of Berlin covering only two thirds of the value of imports, Berlin is understandably still in need of external aid. An investment program to which the United States has contributed substantially over the last four years has done much to accelerate Berlin's economic recovery, to inspire confidence in Berlin's future, and to deter the flight of capital and industry to Western Germany. A decision of the NSC on April 28, 1953, which determined the manner in which aid would be distributed between countries, did not provide further funds for this purpose. The United States High Commissioner for Germany in commenting on this decision raised the question whether United States participation in the program might actually be brought to a halt some time in 1954 with possible unfortunate political consequences affecting the strength of our position in Berlin. He feared that this development might be taken as evidence of a decline in United States interest in the city.

Subsequently, the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security agreed that $15 million of the $50 million allocated for Berlin from 1953 appropriations should be used for the Berlin investment program. (This is subject to possible change in the course of negotiations with the Federal Republic.) In the judgment of our authorities in Germany, it will still be possible to fulfill with the remaining $35 million the major portion of the raw materials stockpiling program in Berlin.

The Federal Republic has taken measures, in connection with tax rebates and otherwise, to give preferential treatment to Berlin exports and to seek commercial opportunities for Berlin in negotiating trade agreements with other countries. The Defense Department and other agencies of the United States are examining the possibilities of government procurement in Berlin and have agreed to support offshore procurement up to $25 million.

The influx of thousands of refugees from the Soviet Zone into Berlin, which reached its peak of over 2,000 per day early in March of this year, and later levelled off at about 1,200 per day during May, again began to increase. Since the disorders in the Soviet Zone on June 17, the refugee influx has declined sharply, but this reduction may only presage the possibility of a greater influx in the future. The care and processing of these refugees is an additional burden for Berlin, and many thousands are not evacuated but remain in the city as "non-recognized" refugees or as Berlin's quota for assimilation, in either case adding to the ranks of the unemployed, homeless and recipients of
relief in Berlin. The requested appropriation of $15 million for refugees, — the only new money being requested for Germany, — will be used, at least in part, to assist Berlin's refugee problems.

While the measures described are expected to aid Berlin substantially insofar as its more pressing needs are concerned, it is possible that there will be serious deficiencies in the financing of these programs in the coming year. If this should occur, an immediate review of resources and needs will be undertaken to inform the NSC as to the weaknesses that may develop and remedies that should be sought. Since Berlin's needs are mainly for Deutsche Marks, the provision of adequate funds calls for a strong negotiating stand on the part of this government in dealing with the German authorities and consideration of the German financial position, including its capacity to borrow abroad.

The United States is endeavoring in the case of Berlin, as in the case of the Federal Republic, to liberalize credit and trade practices, to expand productive capacity, and to improve marketing techniques with respect to Berlin and its products. It endeavors also by assistance, advice, and specialized consultations, to assist Berlin in the reception, processing, care and evacuation of refugees from the East.

With respect to the investment program, in order to assure smooth operation and gradual adjustment to declining United States aid, continued consideration will need to be given to securing adequate DM funds for the second half of 1974, and increased participation by the Federal Republic will have to be sought through negotiation.

In regard to refugee problems, plans must be developed to contend with any renewed upsurge in the rate of arrival and to expend effectively the $15 million grant referred to earlier as well as any other funds made available for this purpose, such as the large loan now being sought by the Federal Government; such plans should give particular consideration to the exact nature of the responsibilities of the different agencies involved. While the position that the refugees are basically a German responsibility should not be abandoned, the magnitude of the problem, its international implications and its bearing on United States policy objectives, make outside assistance imperative. The proportions and nature of such aid do, however, require further clarification. One aspect of the problem is the need, for psychological strategy reasons, to keep Berlin open as a door to freedom despite the burdensome economic, political and sociological consequences for Berlin and the Federal Republic and resulting demands for aid from the United States.
(g) Berlin Morale. Recognizing that maintenance of our Berlin position depends to a great extent upon sustaining the will to resist and confidence in the future of the city's population, our own authorities and those of our Allies have engaged in a series of morale-building efforts, important contributions to which have been statements in regard to our firm resolve to stay in Berlin and to assist the city. Those have been made publicly (and also in private to such persons as Mayor Reuter of Berlin during his visit to Washington in March 1953) by the President, the Secretary of State, the Director of Mutual Security and our High Commissioner in Germany. Public opinion surveys and the reports of our political observers confirm the Berliner's opposition to totalitarianism in any form, and trust in Western intentions and capabilities. During the recent disturbances in the Soviet Zone, and especially on June 17, the Berliners showed great self-possession and in a dangerous situation cooperated thoroughly with Allied authorities, while at the same time making clear their support of the East Germans. A psychological strategy plan for Berlin, in which considerable attention is devoted to actions designed to bolster the morale of the Berlin population, has been prepared by an interdepartmental committee, approved by the Psychological Strategy Board, and distributed to the field for guidance.

To offset the possible adverse effects on Berlin morale that knowledge of a reduction in United States aid might provoke, it will be particularly important now and on appropriate occasions in the future, to reassure the Berliners of the continued interest of the United States in their security and welfare, and to make them aware of the relatively favorable support through foreign aid they will be receiving in comparison to other countries.


(a) Countermeasures. A tripartite study of potential reprisals applicable in Berlin and Western Germany has been continuing in Germany for several months. The Transport Committee of the Allied High Commission has held discussion with the Allied Kommandatur concerning the countermeasures plan of the latter relating to Soviet interference with surface access to Berlin. British and French reluctance to consider and to agree in advance to projected reprisals was noticeable during these months in the face of diminished Soviet harassment of the means of access to Berlin and the relatively quiet and economically resurgent conditions within Berlin itself; it is anticipated that perhaps even greater Allied resistance to considering and approving such measures will be encountered while the Soviets continue in
their present tactical phase of conciliatory gestures. HCOCG will continue, however, to press for further planning in this field and will relate its findings and tripartitely agreed measures to those considered in the report on world-wide countermeasures prepared in Washington by the Economic Countermeasures Working Group of the interdepartmental Economic Defense Advisory Committee. The EDAC report concludes that the economic reprisals available to the Western powers may be more effective as demonstrations of solidarity and firmness of purpose than as economic deterrents. It gives full re-
cognition to the risk of precipitating stronger Soviet counter-actions against Berlin, to the unwieldy nature of reprisals as instruments of policy, and to both the essential need for Allied participation in the application of counter-
measures and the difficulty of securing Allied support par-
ticularly in the field of trade embargoes and retaliatory actions against Soviet bloc transport and other energetic measures.

(b) Efforts to Develop Western Strength and Unity. In discussions with the British and French, and with officials of the Federal Republic of Germany, representatives of the United States have emphasized the need for prompt, firm and united action in strengthening and protecting our Berlin position, and related the question of Berlin to broader efforts to increase Western strength and unity. The United States High Commissioner for Germany and our Commandant in Berlin and their staffs have sought to develop a stronger cooperation among the three Western powers and between them and the Germans. The unfolding program of comprehensive planning to implement NSC 132/1 may provide a broader and more solid basis for such joint efforts. The previously mentioned interdepartmental psychological strategy plan for Berlin re-
commends specific courses of action designed both to give Berlin the benefit of increased Western strength and unity, and to make use of the Berlin situation to develop such strength and unity on a broader scale.

10. Paragraph 8. Convey to Soviets Western Determination to Remain in Berlin. The courses of action prescribed in this paragraph are already being actively carried out. The determination of the Western powers to remain in Berlin, already expressed clearly in the May 27, 1952 Tripartite
Declaration at Paris, has been further conveyed to the Soviet rulers in a number of statements and speeches of high officials of the United States Government, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the present, as well as past, United States High Commissioners in Germany. The firm attitude of the Western powers has also been given expression in notes of protest to the Soviets regarding impositions and harassments affecting our position in, and access to, the city. A reaffirmation of western resolve with regard to Berlin may be desirable in the near future.
11. Paragraph 10. Possible Partial Evacuation of Berlin Population. The Department of Defense has taken the position that any major attempt to evacuate a part of the Berlin population (as distinguished from the emergency evacuation of certain key individuals) would be impractical because it could not be hoped to reduce the population of West Berlin to a significant extent, would interfere with the operation of the airlift supplying the city and, Furthermore, would have undesirable political and psychological effects.

12. Paragraph 11. Joint planning for defensive, retaliatory and other countermeasures. As mentioned previously, the Department of Defense, acting on a JCS recommendation, has initiated tripartite discussions in Germany with a view to reaching agreement, as a basis for specific military planning, on several common courses of action, all of which are prescribed in NSC 132/1. The items on the agenda prepared by the JCS are as follows: (1) Both a token and a full-scale airlift to Berlin, to include provision for utilization of combat air units for protection if required, the token airlift to be susceptible of immediate implementation; (2) Use of alternate routes into Berlin, to include provision for immediate request to the Soviets for such routes and an offer for the provisions of necessary facilities to make the alternate routes usable; (3) Expansion of stockpiles in Berlin; (4) The placing of the Western powers' Berlin garrisons under the operational control of a single commander for certain specified contingencies, e.g., reinforced or general alert; (5) augmenting military capabilities to meet the increased threat of general war; and (6) use of military force to the extent necessary to establish Soviet intentions and to demonstrate the Allied refusal to relinquish the right of access to Berlin, even at the risk of general war. This might take the form of military forces to escort civilian convoys through border check points, or it might take the form of military action to clear the blockaded lines of communication between Berlin and the Western Zone. Initially this use of force should be undertaken by units of the Allied garrisons in Berlin, thus emphasizing the essentially defensive nature of the operation. In any event, the determination of the size and composition of the military units to be employed should be governed primarily by the proviso that no military action should be taken that would jeopardize the defense plans of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Any military action in regard to Berlin should be taken by the combined forces of the three Western Occupation Powers acting together. (Once agreement was reached on the common courses of action, the proposed United States position would be that in collaboration with designated military representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the Berlin Commandants, would be directed to prepare plans for specified courses of action. Upon completion of these plans, according to the United States position proposed by JCS, CINCUSAREUR would forward them to
USCINCEUR for the latter's approval and for subsequent transmittal by USCINCEUR to the several national Chiefs of Staff for the approval of their respective governments. According to the United States position proposed by the JCS, the decision to execute the plans would have to be made by the three governments in the light of political and military circumstances prevailing at the time.) The discussions under reference are being carried out as a supplement to the other discussions (on stockpiling, countermeasures, etc.) already in progress among the three High Commissioners, the Berlin Commandants and their staffs. Moreover, the new discussions among the military representatives will be taken up in closest coordination with NICOG, inasmuch as the agenda subjects (and particularly items 2 and 6) will concern essentially politico-military questions.

13. Paragraph 12. Preparations for additional reprisals. A search for possible additional reprisals, not limited to the economic field, will be continued by the Department of State and appropriate representatives abroad (jointly with the other powers concerned) and by other interested agencies and interdepartmental groups.

14. Paragraphs 14 and 15. Review of Courses of Action in Light of the Berlin Situation to Increase Western Unity and Strength. A continual review of courses of action which could be taken, in light of the Berlin situation, to accelerate the Western defense effort and increase Western unity, is being carried out by the Departments of State and Defense, CIA, NSA, the NSRB and other interested agencies, as well as by such bodies as the Ad Hoc Committee on Berlin and the Psychological Strategy Board. It is understandable that in the absence of any severe harassment of the city, as at present, Berlin is not as effective a stimulus for such courses of action. Nevertheless, the planning exercises discussed in this paper themselves possess the virtue of setting in motion joint consideration of defense and other security problems, cooperative efforts to meet these, and an awareness of dangers inherent in Berlin's continuing precarious situation.

15. Paragraphs 17 through 20. These paragraphs prescribe the implementation, if and when the Berlin situation becomes more serious, of the courses of action discussed earlier in the NSC document and in the paragraphs preceding this one in the present report.
16. **Paragraph 21.** Approach to the Soviets. The Soviets have already been presented in Germany with a demand for advance notice of interruptions in transport facilities to Berlin and the provision of alternative facilities if and when such interruptions do occur. An approach to the Kremlin has not been considered necessary up to now.

17. **Paragraphs 22 and 23.** Possible Use of Force if Berlin Position Becoming Untenable. If the circumstances are considered to be propitious by HICOG, CINCUSAEUR is to discuss this problem with the British and French military representatives under item 6 of the proposed agenda, and subsequently, undertake the necessary military planning.

18. **Paragraphs 24 through 30.** Ultimatum and Force. The graver situations envisaged in these paragraphs and more extreme course of action prescribed to meet them will continue to be studied by the Departments of State and Defense and other agencies as appropriate.

/s/ JOHN FOSTER DULLES

John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State