Intelligence Report

THE ROLE OF THE RED GUARDS AND REVOLUTIONARY REBELS IN MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

(Reference Title: POLO XXXIII)
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GROUP I
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"... what dark passions and inflammable credulities do we find, sometimes accidentally released, sometimes deliberately mobilized."

--- Hugh Trevor-Roper, The European Witch Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
THE ROLE OF THE RED GUARDS AND REVOLUTIONARY REBELS IN MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

Among China analysts, no event in the history of Communist China has provoked greater debate than the national convulsion which Mao Tse-tung calls the "great proletarian cultural revolution." Divergent viewpoints concerning the origins, purposes, character, and dynamics of the Cultural Revolution are likely to persist.

One of the most confusing aspects of the scene has been the activities of the bands of student fanatics that served as shock troops for the Cultural Revolution—the Red Guards and the Revolutionary Rebels. This report describes the origins and role of those groups and their ultimate demise as the vanguard of the Cultural Revolution to be replaced by teams composed of workers, peasants, and soldiers.

This staff study will not lay to rest differences of view among knowledgeable China analysts. It is written from a base of research and analysis which holds that the Cultural Revolution is Mao's creation and his vehicle for attempting to build a new revolutionary order, and that the Cultural Revolution did not end with the destruction of the Red Guards. Rather, the first major phase of the Cultural Revolution ended, and that phase was a massive purge which led to the virtual destruction of the traditional political and administrative apparatus. Mao's chosen instrument for purposes of the purge—the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels—outlived its usefulness and proved unequal to the tasks of the next stage of the Cultural Revolution, i.e., the building and consolidation of a new Maoist revolutionary order. Consequently, he ordered the destruction of the
Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel movement and has now turned to a phase of the Cultural Revolution which will be primarily constructive, the creation of a new political and administrative apparatus, while maintaining a spirit of permanent revolution.

This thesis of the Cultural Revolution does not hold, nor does it require, that Mao has at all points been in full control of events, that he is following some inflexible scenario worked out in advance, that he is unresponsive to advice, or that he is being or will be successful in his broader purposes.

The thesis does hold that Mao is and has been in command throughout the Cultural Revolution, that the major shifts in emphasis have been at his decision, that he has not—at least not yet—been successfully manipulated or forced in one policy direction or another by some coalition of conservatives, moderates, or pragmatists. The thesis also holds that Mao's Cultural Revolution has seriously disrupted and weakened the fabric of Chinese society and, consequently, bred vast problems for the future, that Mao's chances of creating a new Maoist man or nation are hopelessly utopian, and that his fears of tendencies toward "revisionism" are well-founded.

The members of the Special Research Staff are in general agreement with these propositions; however, this study of the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels is the work of one research analyst, Dennis J. Doolin.

John Kerry King
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff
THE ROLE OF THE RED GUARDS AND REVOLUTIONARY REBELS IN MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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THE ROLE OF THE RED GUARDS AND REVOLUTIONARY REBELS IN MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Mao Tse-tung's "great proletarian cultural revolution" can best be understood as the aging dictator's reaction to real and imagined opposition to his will within the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese society at large. In the purge that has convulsed China for the past two years and more, certain members of the Party elite were clearly pre-targeted and beyond saving, no matter how "correctly" they responded to later developments. Others were purged because they failed the "test" by responding incorrectly to Mao's vague and ill-defined directives. Still others, much fewer in number, survived by effecting an early mea culpa, turning against Liu Shao-chi, and scourging themselves of "bourgeois" traits with a heavy application of "the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

The shock troops of this purge have been the Red Guards, publicly surfaced at a Peking mass rally on 18 August 1966, and the Revolutionary Rebels, who swung into action later in the year as reinforcements for the youthful fanatics. These groups, from whose ranks some new Party and government cadres were to be selected, were themselves deliberately led to be steeled and purified in the course of this artificial revolution.

It is the purpose of this report to describe the origins of these groups, the range of their activities, the role they have played at various stages in the cultural revolution, and the organizational structure which was intended to hold them together as unique extra-Party instruments of Mao's purge. As will be seen, a revitalized nation--populated by the new Maoist man, of one mind and intuitively responsive to the old man's will did not emerge--nor could it, being a hopelessly utopian scheme contrary to human nature. What did emerge was a China bereft of many of the instruments of authoritarian control, with a younger generation motivated in many instances not by Mao's thought and visions of self-sacrifice, but by considerations of political self-advancement and material well-being.

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II. FALL 1965 TO MID-AUGUST 1966: "READY, GET SET..."

A. Initial Red Guard Selection and Organization

Although the first public appearance of the Red Guards was at the aforementioned 18 August rally, preparations had been underway for some months. Open sources generally identify the No. 2 Middle School attached to Peking's Tsinghua University as the birthplace of the Red Guards, although "Combat Corps" from Wuhan University were praised by Wuhan Radio in mid-June for attacking "reactionary teachers." Japanese correspondents, for example, were told (in September) by students of the No. 2 Middle School that there had been talk of forming the Red Guards "ever since the end of May," and that a unit was established on 1 August (Army Day). The unit had a membership of 152 students (total student body: 1,045) and four teachers (faculty: 100). The parents of those accepted had to belong to one of the so-called "five red classes": workers, poor or lower-middle peasants, soldiers, revolutionary cadres, or revolutionary martyrs.

Overall command of the Red Guard movement was to reside with the Party Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group (CRG), headed by Chen Po-ta (member of the Politburo Standing Committee) and his first deputy Chiang Ching (Madame Mao Tse-tung), assisted by some thirteen other CRG members (appointed later) and two advisers, Tao Chu (head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department)
and Kang Sheng (also of the Politburo Standing Committee). Below the Central CRG, similar groups were established in the Party committee of each province, autonomous region, and special municipality. The chain of command then extended down to CRGs in cities, counties, and (at least in some areas) villages, towns, and communes. At the local levels, CRGs were set up initially in universities and schools, and later in businesses, factories, and government ministries and departments. All of these groups were to be ultimately responsible to the Central CRG. (The PLA was to be given its own CRG and was to carry out the cultural revolution separately.)

The first Red Guard recruits, generally in their late teens or early twenties, were hand-picked by the CRGs of certain schools during early summer and were to serve as the core when their ranks were greatly expanded in August and September. (In one school, for example, only twenty students out of 1,000 were initially selected to be Red Guards.) After 18 August, however, the Red Guards were not chosen according to a standard procedure. In some schools, students elected their own Red Guards (who in turn elected their own leaders, along the lines of the Paris Commune), with the nominees then screened by the school's CRG and forwarded for final approval to the provincial CRG, acting on behalf of Peking. In other schools, final approval of candidates for Red Guard membership remained with the CRG of the school (sometimes simply the Party committee under another title).

In still other areas, local Red Guard headquarters were established first, and these headquarters in turn helped schools to organize Red Guard units. However, the usual pattern appears to have been the reverse; i.e., after the formation of various Red Guard units, the local Party committee or CRG would call a Red Guard mass meeting in order to establish a general headquarters. In both cases, it appears that no one headquarters in a given province or autonomous region was assigned general control over the others, although headquarters in the counties and smaller communities tended to follow the lead of their counterpart in the provincial capital.
According to a Red Guard defector, the functions of these headquarters included: 1) furnishing subordinate battalions or (after 18 August) visiting Red Guards with propaganda material and copies of documents concerning the cultural revolution; 2) instructing subordinate battalions whom to attack; 3) (after 18 August) informing visiting Red Guards of the local situation (e.g., whom should be attacked and why); and 4) (again, after 18 August) making arrangements for board and room for the visitors and travel arrangements for local Red Guards.

Each Red Guard was given a machine-made, serially-numbered red armband with the characters hung wei-ping (Red Guard) enstamped in yellow, as well as an identification card containing the bearer's name, age, native place, school, class background, and a photograph stamped with the unit chop. As the cultural revolution developed, however, elaborate identification cards became the exception and the regular school ID cards were used.

During the Spring and early Summer of 1966, certain future Red Guards were sent to Peking for secret classes in "cultural revolution tactics." These classes were limited to a very select number of individuals, and help explain the militant activities of such persons as Nieh Yuan-tzu of Peking University (Peita) and Tsinghua's Kuai Ta-fu prior to Mao's public endorsement and encouragement of such activities. A Tsinghua Red Guard compilation, The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: A Record of Major Events, September 1965-December 1966, published in February 1967, reports that in late March, Mao had told Kang Sheng, Chiang Ching, and others that "we must protect the leftists and cultivate the leftist column in the course of the great cultural revolution."*

*In his 25 October speech at a Party Work Conference, Mao stated that, prior to 1 August, "Red Guard organizations were formed throughout the country."
On the left, two quotations from the writings of Mao Tse-tung. On the right personal information:
first line, student’s name (ironically, this girl’s given name is “cultural delight”); second line, age; third line, date of birth; fourth line, address; fifth line, status (“student”); sixth line, class origin (“worker”). The “chop” or seal identifies the bearer as a Red Guard from the Peking No. 54 Middle School.
students from other educational institutions in Peking arrived at Tsinghua for "tactics" classes in late March and early April. Later, groups from universities in other parts of China were billeted at Tsinghua and received similar instruction, then to return home to serve as leaders when the Red Guards took to the streets in greatly increased numbers. The duration of the classes at Tsinghua is not known, although some students from the Tientsin Engineering Institute were reportedly away from their formal studies for six months prior to the start of overt Red Guard activities. Similar accounts from Kwangtung state that Red Guards from that province received instructions in Peking in late May or early June.

Later, in describing the first mass rally, the official People's Daily reported that the participants included 100,000 Red Guards from Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Sian, Canton, Wuhan, Lanchow, Harbin, and Urumchi. These students also received instructions while in Peking on how to proceed (in some cases including whom to attack) when they returned home. Furthermore, the size of the non-Pekingese contingents at the rally provide further evidence that a substantial CRG/Red Guard-related apparatus was operational prior to the youthful fanatics' 18 August "declaration of war against the old world."

B. Peking's Campuses (Spring-Summer 1966): "Lighting the Fires"

All those who oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought, ...should be exposed, criticized and knocked down,... no matter how famous they are, what influential positions they hold, by whom they are directed or supported, or how numerous their flatterers are.
"On 'Three-Family Village': The Reactionary Nature of 'Evening Talks at Yenshan' and 'Notes from Three-Family Village','" (Shanghai) Liberation Daily and Wen-hui pao, 10 May 1966.

The above article by Yao Wen-yuan (soon to be identified as a ranking member of the Central CRG), read and approved by Mao, was a lengthy attack on the "gangster inn" run jointly by three key officials in the administration of Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Committee. Demonstrating (it is believed accurately) that works authored by these men contained extensive, albeit implicit, attacks on certain of Mao's policies, the article set the stage for not only a purge of Peng and his "defective" Party apparatus, but also an expanded assault against the "bourgeois scholar-tyrants" (i.e., intellectuals) in educational and cultural circles.

Yao's attack was followed on 16 May by a more authoritative and even broader indictment in a circular issued upon the conclusion of a Central Committee Work Conference. This circular singled out Peng Chen for condemnation with regard to his issuing an earlier report ("fundamentally wrong") on the status of the cultural revolution "behind the backs" of Kang Sheng and other members of the so-called "Group of Five." The circular ordered the earlier report revoked and the "Group" dissolved and replaced by the Central CRG.

The most serious crime attributed to Peng was that he proceeded intentionally to divert the cultural revolution in a "bourgeois" direction, "instead of encouraging the entire Party boldly to arouse the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and the fighters for proletarian
culture so that they can continue to charge ahead." And in a scarcely-veiled threat that other highly-placed officials could expect to suffer a fate similar to Peng's, it was stated that the aim of the cultural revolution was to criticize and repudiate Wu Han and the considerable number of other anti-Party and anti-socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie (there are a number of these in the Central Committee and in the Party, government and other departments at the central as well as at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region level. (emphasis in the original)

This indicated clearly that Mao envisaged a major purge, at all levels and with many victims.

The Red Guards (at this time identified as "revolutionary students and teachers"), the ton ton macoute who were to carry out this "criticism and repudiation" throughout the society, were informed by the circular that, in effect, the wraps were off. Peng had attempted to "channel the political struggle in the cultural sphere into... so-called pure academic discussion...," to use it "as a shield for...reactionary representatives of the bourgeoisie" and "not allow the proletariat to 'open wide' and hit back." He had also put forward the slogan, "Everyone is equal before the truth," in "opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought," ignoring the fact that, in the class struggle, "there is absolutely no such thing as equality." The circular ordered a return to the correct policy, "explicitly put forward by Chairman Mao, of protecting and supporting the Left and giving serious attention to building up and expanding their ranks." It further noted that, concerning the "anti-bourgeois" struggle, "most Party committees concerned have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle and their leadership is far from conscientious and effective."

Finally, the circular warned:

Above all, we must not entrust these people (i.e., "representatives of the bourgeoisie"
who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and all spheres of culture'] with the work of leading the cultural revolution. In fact, many of them have done and are still doing such work, and this is extremely dangerous.

As could be anticipated, the momentum of the cultural revolution increased rapidly after the circular was disseminated to Party organizations at all levels on 18 May. On the 25th, a wall poster composed, at Mao’s command, by Madame Nieh and six others was put up on the Peita campus denouncing Lu Ping, university president and secretary of the university’s Party Committee, as well as two officials of the Peking Municipal Party Committee’s department in charge of university affairs, for conducting the cultural revolution at Peita in ways condemned explicitly in the work conference circular. Madame Nieh (an instructor in the Department of Philosophy and the Peita counterpart of Berkeley’s Bettina Aptheker) called for a mass uprising against Lu’s “sinister anti-Party, anti-socialist gang,” an end to “academic discussion,” and recognition that the cultural revolution was a "serious political struggle" in which Mao had "long since shown us the correct path" --i.e., no further direction ("interference") by either the Peita administration or the Peking Party Committee would be tolerated by the campus militants.

The initial reaction at Peita to Madame Nieh’s poster was a mixed one. Some students, recalling the purge that had followed the brief liberalization of the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" period, concluded that the situations were similar (inasmuch as Lu was secretary of the Peita Party Committee) and came to the defense of the president. Others followed Madame Nieh’s lead and continued to press the attack against Lu; for a brief period, the student body was divided into two distinct groups: the pro-Lu Scarlet Guards (chih wei-tui) vs. the anti-Lu Red Guards (hung wei-ping) led by Nieh. However, this particular polarization was short-lived. On 1 June, Peking domestic service broadcast an attack that repeated Nieh’s charges, and the following day People’s Daily reprinted the 25 May poster, accompanied by an authoritative
article by "Commentator" praising "the proletarian revolutionaries at Peita." On 3 June, the new Peking Municipal Party Committee (Li Hsueh-feng having replaced Peng Chen) announced that Lu Ping and his deputy, Peng Pei-yun, had been removed "from all functions and duties" and that a work team headed by Chang Cheng-hsien had been assigned to Peita to "carry out the functions of the Party Committee during the period of reorganization." It was now clear to all that Madame Nieh's attack was approved at the highest level, and Peita's Scarlet Guards hastily dissolved their organization.

According to several reports, the work team assigned to Peita did not arrive on the campus until after the 10th. Prior to that time, the students were in control of the campus and closed the gates of the university, allowing only fellow militants from other schools to enter. After closing the gates, the young Maoists turned their attention to the faculty, many of them elderly scholars, who served as the "living targets" upon whose persons they would sharpen their terrorist skills. Teachers were beaten, made to wear dunce caps and bow to the students' insults. Some had their faces daubed with paint; others committed suicide (at least ten are reported at Peita alone).

After the work team arrived, it tried to reassert Party control over the cultural revolution at Peita—to guide and channel the student agitation, as per the 3 June directive. Team members censored wall posters (covering offensive ones with their own), convened day-long student assemblies in an attempt to introduce some order into the proceedings, and directed students to stop their outrages against faculty members or be declared counterrevolutionaries. The campus gates remained closed, but this time in order to "rectify the rightists [i.e., the true leftists], catch the roaming fish [students from other campuses], and suppress harassment [physical violence]." This phase reportedly lasted for some twenty days at Peita, and even longer at Tsinghua, Peking Normal College, Peking Aviation Institute, and other schools. There were some student suicides during this period, and many students later complained that they had been forced by work team members to write confessions repudiating their earlier "revolutionary
struggles in defense of the cultural revolution." What the Peita work team (or its counterparts on other campuses) did not know was that Mao did not want order restored and traditional Party control reasserted. The work teams did not know this because Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who were responsible for managing the cultural revolution and assigning the teams, didn't know it either; Mao hadn't told them.

In point of fact, the campus fanatics read the key indicators (the 16 May circular, Mme. Nieh's poster and "Commentator's" praise, the 13 June Central Committee/State Council decision to close institutes of higher education for six months, and the rash of militant student "demands" reprinted with favorable comment in the official press) more accurately than the work teams. They were infuriated by work team opposition to their bloodletting, and condemned team members as rank outsiders completely divorced from the "revolutionary masses" (i.e., themselves). Madame Nieh, although accused of being a counterrevolutionary for demanding the execution of certain Peita faculty members, continued to lead the students; however, during the latter part of June and into July, she incited them with increasing ferocity against the work teams rather than faculty members (the latter having been debased by that time, anyway). A similar situation obtained at Tsinghua, where the militants were led by Kuai Ta-fu, and at other universities across the country. However, the work teams were more formidable opponents than helpless educators, and the "revolutionary students," while able to evict the teams from some schools, were effectively suppressed at others (probably a majority) for some weeks.

On 20 June, a report by Chang Cheng-hsien dealing with the activities of the Peita work team in its first week on campus was disseminated to other teams throughout China. In a prefatory note, Liu and Teng are reported to have stated that Chang's actions were "correct and prompt," and that "upon the discovery of similar phenomena in other areas, they can be handled according to the measures taken at Peita." This was followed by Liu's 3 July directive to criticize and repudiate Kuai Ta-fu, a 10 July ban on
all inter-school revolutionary liaison (chuan-lien), together with a refusal to permit "revolutionary students to appeal [this decision] to the central authorities," and a 14 July directive from Liu to the middle school attached to Peking Normal College: "Teachers and students are not permitted to hold meetings in secret. The Red Guard is a secret organization and is illegal."

Not a few of the provincial Party leaders were quick to move against the militants. For example, Li Pao-hua, Anhwei First Secretary, addressed an activists' rally on 14 July and informed them that work teams were already busy rectifying cultural and educational circles. Li stated that the "masses" should be given free rein, but that "simple and crude" methods (corporal punishment and forced confessions) must not be employed. Four days later, Yeh Fei, First Secretary in Fukien, warned his listeners at a Foochow rally that a "strict distinction" must be made between anti-Party elements, on the one hand, and those whose "minds were with socialism" but had unintentionally made mistakes. Yeh also forbade corporal punishment and forced confessions, and warned against those "class enemies" who "fish in troubled waters [and]...call black white... We must handle their assault and murder of leftists [i.e., Party incumbents such as himself], arson, poisoning and other...crimes according to the existing measures against counterrevolutionaries." Other provincial Party leaders issued similar pronouncements.*

*Chao Tzu-yang (Kwangtung First Secretary), for example, forbade street parades by Cantonese students. He further stated that any "revolutionary teachers and students" who agreed with the "correspondence from Peking" (no further information) were to be condemned as "rightists." This reference (21 July) to "correspondence from Peking" suggests an early channel of communications between students in the capital and their fellows in the provinces. The inference is strengthened by the fact that Red Guards from Peking (Tsinghua and Normal College) were active in Canton as early as 19 August--i.e., one day after the first mass rally in Peking.
Meanwhile, the Central CRG had turned its attention to the immediate problem of the work teams on Peking's campuses. In mid-July, Mao returned to Peking (from Wuhan) and found the cultural revolution in the capital to be "cold and dead." "Some schools have even closed their gates," Mao complained, "...[as an] excuse to prohibit the display of big-character posters." He then gave the green light to the campus militants:

This situation is intolerable and shows a mistake in direction. We must quickly change it and smash all restrictions. We must not merely sit in an office and listen to reports. We must be prepared to promote revolution, even if it means to revolutionize ourselves.

Subsequently, Mao instructed Madame Mao, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and others (including Liu and Teng) to visit various universities to "learn from the revolutionary students." At Peita, the Madame accused Lu Ping of insulting her (his recent letter to her had been typed instead of handwritten!), and authorized the students to criticize the actions of the work team over the past five weeks. Attempts by members of the team to defend themselves proved futile (pleas that they had been appointed by Chen Po-ta were denied), and the militants carried the day; on 18 July, the Peita cultural revolution preparatory committee was established under the leadership of Madame Nieh.

The ubiquitous Madame Mao and her lieutenants (Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and others of the Central CRG) made numerous speeches at Peking campuses during late July and early August. Egging the students on ("I am with you and will not leave you; your revolutionary zeal and vigor are excellent"), the Madame, in effect, gave them a carte blanche to purge the "anti-Party and anti-socialist bourgeos authorities" ("...it depends on you...Who knows more about them?") and minimized the dangers involved:

Follow us. If you want revolution; get out if you don't...Confusion and order are unified. Without confusion, where does order come from? Without suffering from oppression,
how can you know the difficulties of revolution? Suffer much oppression and you will be able to resist and to become revolutionary successors.

Chiang Ching's general exhortations were fleshed out a bit in speeches by her CRG colleagues. Chen Po-ta's 26 July speech at Peita, for example, indicated that the Maoists placed great store in the organizational structure of the short-lived Paris Commune (1871) as a model for the Red Guards. Calling for a removal of work teams as "stumbling blocks on the broad road of the great proletarian cultural revolution,"* Chen "suggested" that the new "supreme organ" on campus should be a "cultural revolution congress," with members elected "by the masses from among the masses" by secret ballot. Those elected should be "of a widely representative character" and include teachers, staff members and workers, as well as students. Further, the members should be "public servants who serve the people" and not (as did the work teams) "ride roughshod over them." Tenure would depend solely on performance: "Any member found to be incompetent shall be removed at any time and a new member elected to replace him." Similar endorsements of the Paris Commune model were to be heard through early 1967, but it proved to be a hopelessly impractical exemplar. Calls to "rebel" and "smash all restrictions," the plethora of competing Red Guard organizations that would soon emerge within each school, and the characters involved (it is inconceivable that such as Nieh and Kuai would passively assent to an adverse vote), precluded any adherence to orderly processes of initiative and recall. Furthermore, the basic aim was to instill an aggressive, fanatical zeal in the students and, as such, proselytism rather than organization-building had priority.

*On 28 July, the new Peking Municipal Party Committee ordered the withdrawal of all work teams from institutes of higher learning.
One further Red Guard pronouncement should be mentioned for two reasons. First, of all the pre-18 August avowals of undying support for Mao, it was far and away the most militant. Secondly, in a 1 August letter to the authors, Mao himself praised the declaration and gave the students his "warm support for their spirit of revolutionary rebellion."

Dated 24 June, and ostensibly composed by Red Guards from the No. 2 Middle School attached to Tsinghua University, the declaration was a clear harbinger of things to come. Declaring that "rebellion is the soul of Mao Tsetung's thought" and that their school had been under "revisionist control" since 1949, the students informed the school authorities:

Since we want rebellion, the matter has been taken out of your hands: We are going to make the air thick with the pungent smell of explosives. Toss them over, grenades and stick bombs together, and start a big fight. 'Sympathy' 'all-sidedness,' out of the way! [This prophecy was to prove all too true.]

Declaring themselves to be "high and mighty" ("How can we not be...?") , "rude" ("We should be rude") revolutionaries with "supernatural powers" and "omnipotent magic" (Mao's thought, naturally), the youngsters promised to "turn the old world upside down, smash it to pieces, pulverize it, create chaos and make a tremendous mess, the bigger the better!" Using the appropriate jargon, it can be said with certainty that they overfulfilled their quota.

The month of August opened with repeated assurances by members of the Central CRG that Red Guard organizations were "legal" and should be encouraged to expand (Kuan Feng at Tsinghua, 2 August). Of greater importance was the fact that, for a time, the militant students were elevated to a privileged status second only to that of Mao himself. On 5 August, Chen Po-ta informed them, "No organ, not even the Central CRG, may exert ideological pressure on students, nor can it impose its views on others." This theme was reiterated on 10 August in an editorial in the authoritative
Central Committee journal, Red Flag:

...each unit must carry out cultural revolution work by relying on its own masses and should not depend on arrangements by higher-level organs. Under general conditions, each unit should carry out cultural revolution work without the help of work teams dispatched by higher-level organs.

Thus, it can be seen that the lack of clear guidelines was intentional on Mao's part. The Party apparatus not only was bypassed, but also enjoined from interfering with non-Party organizations involved in cultural revolution activity, such as the Red Guards.

This is not to say that all of the students welcomed these open-ended, no-holds-barred calls to demolish the existing order. Although many students were of worker-peasant background, others were the children of (or otherwise related to) the very officials who would soon be attacked, paraded, "struggled," and, in many cases, purged. As such, love of family (or, at least, vested interest) moved them to oppose or attempt to deflect such strident appeals. Numerous instances of such opposition ("differences of opinions among the students...[causing] one group to mobilize against another") can be documented, the most serious ones involving the rival Red Guard headquarters which appeared in late August and early September.

In early August, the dispute centered around a couplet apparently composed by Tan Li-fu, a Peita student whose parents had at least some status:* "If the father is a hero, the son is a brave man; if the father is a reactionary, the son is a rotten egg." This couplet was clearly open to attack from two directions: first, the

*It has been suggested that Tan Li-fu is the son of Vice Premier Tan Chen-lin; however, no evidence is available to support the suggestion.
militant students of "five red" backgrounds who were soon to set out after bigger game; second, those students of "impure" background who, by their militancy, hoped to establish the fallacy of the couplet's final line.

After being asked for his opinion regarding the couplet, Chen Po-ta suggested that it be recast to read: "If the father is a revolutionary, the son should be his successor; if the father is a reactionary, the son should rebel." Clearly, this version would satisfy those students who were attempting to dissociate themselves from the "sins" of their parents, but even Chen's formulation came under attack by the militants. They severely criticized him ("I knew I was in trouble," Chen said later) and changed the couplet to read: "If the father is a revolutionary, the son should strive to be a hero; if the father is a reactionary, the son should rebel." (This version would satisfy all save those who agreed with the initial wording, and they did not have to be mollified as they were soon to fall into disfavor along with their parents.) The dispute over the various renderings of this couplet, which continued for several months, might appear esoteric and little more than a problem of semantics. Far from it—it clearly indicated that, with precious few exceptions, the cultural revolution was to be a political crucible that would give little attention to past records of meritorious service compiled by those undergoing the "test."

A warning that this "test" would be administered even to persons of Politburo status was contained in Mao's big-character poster of 5 August, "Bombard the Headquarters." After praising Nieh Yuan-tzu's 25 May poster and "Commentator's" article ("Superbly written"), Mao proceeded to castigate "some leading comrades from the [Party] Central down to the local levels" whose actions over "the last fifty days or so" had been "diametrically opposite" to these two documents. These persons, Mao charged, were guilty of having "enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the...cultural revolution,...suppressed revolutionaries,...[and] imposed a white terror." Then came the punch line regarding the actions of these "leading comrades": "Viewed in connection with the Right deviation...
in 1962 and the wrong tendency of 1964 which was 'Left' in form but Right in essence, shouldn't this make one wide awake?' This was unmistakably an attack directed against Liu Shao-chi for his 1962 criticism of Mao's earlier great leap forward and people's commune programs, as well as Liu's mistakes in carrying out the 1964 rural "socialist education campaign." Chinese officials, well-versed in determining the arcane meaning of Maoist criticisms, were given fair warning as to the potential scope of the purge. Likewise, the Red Guards received yet another incitation to carry their attacks to the highest levels of Party officialdom. As one Red Guard publication commented four months later, Mao's poster "personally sounded the bugle charge to launch a fierce attack against the reactionary bourgeois line and its black headquarters."

From August 1 to 12, the Party Central Committee's Eleventh Plenary Session was held in Peking. At the plenum, Lin Piao was chosen (by Mao) as the new heir apparent, replacing Liu Shao-chi. The plenum also adopted a "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (the so-called "sixteen points," a mixture of militant and semi-conciliatory statements, with emphasis on the former), and issued a communiqué hailing Mao as "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era" and approving all of his policy decisions since the 1962 Tenth Plenum.

The keynote address, at once both fawning in its adulation of Mao and sombre in its warning to those attending the plenum, was delivered by Lin Piao. Lin decried the fact that the Party was permeated with bureaucratism and self-seeking cadres who "always try to please everyone, offend no one, do nothing and participate in nothing," and demanded "a general examination, general realignment and general reorganization of cadre ranks." To this end, he put forward three criteria (approved by Mao):

1. To hold high or not to hold high the red flag of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Those who oppose the thought of Mao Tse-tung are to be dismissed from their posts;
2. To undertake or not to undertake political-ideological work. Those who upset political-ideological work and the great cultural revolution are to be dismissed from their posts;

3. To possess or not to possess revolutionary zeal. Those who do not possess revolutionary zeal are to be dismissed from their posts.

In addition to those who were to be purged, others, even if they have committed "serious mistakes," could be "given a chance" and "tested in future work, provided they accept education [i.e., criticism and "struggle"] and resolutely repent." (emphasis added) However, Lin's choice of words seems to indicate that some Party members would not be given an opportunity to be tested, but were to be summarily dismissed. "Incorrigibles must be removed from their positions," Lin stated, "[otherwise], we shall not break the situation of stalemate."

Thus, the stage was set; Party members had been given some idea of what was in store. It was now time to exhibit and unleash the instrument of Mao's purge.
SECRET

RED GUARDS
III. 18 AUGUST 1966: "...GO!"

A. Early Red Guard Outrages

When the Red Guards launched severe attacks, they attracted attention for the first time. When the struggle spread right over their own heads, people started paying attention to it.

---Mao Tse-tung, 25 October 1966

Well, this really is a mass movement!"

---Mao Tse-tung, 18 August 1966

We believe that, in the course of struggle, they [Red Guards] can distinguish right from wrong and realize what they should do and what they should not:

---People's Daily editorial, 23 August 1966

Ask anybody in the world who has the power to let things remain as they are or to destroy them. We!! We!! We!!

---Peking Aviation Institute Red Guards, 26 August 1966

On 18 August, the Red Guards were publicly consecrated as the shock troops of the cultural revolution at a mass rally at Tienanmen Square. Dressed in a baggy green military uniform replete with Red Guard armband, Mao reviewed his minions—a phantasmagoria of hysterical marchers, banners, "little red books," and balloons reminiscent of a psychedelic light show. In addition to those from the capital, Red Guards from the two other special municipalities and at least ten provinces and autonomous regions participated in the parade.*

*Shanghai and Tientsin; Heilungkiang, Hupeh, Kansu, Kiangsu, Kirin, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Ningsia, Shensi, and Sinkiang.
The assembled throng of some one million persons was addressed first by Lin Piao, then by Chou En-lai.* Lin, speaking on behalf of Mao and the Central Committee, called for a "general offensive" against "bourgeois ideas and all other exploiting classes":

The great proletarian cultural revolution is aimed precisely at eliminating bourgeois ideology, establishing proletarian ideology, remolding people's souls, revolutionizing their ideology, digging out the roots of revisionism, and consolidating and developing the socialist system.

Enumerating the targets--"those in authority who are taking the capitalist road, reactionary bourgeois authorities, bourgeois royalists, ghosts and monsters"--Lin called on the Red Guards to "sweep out all the vermin and clear away all obstacles!" He also declared that the cultural revolution would last "a very long time" with alternately "big campaigns and small campaigns...So long as bourgeois ideology exists, we will fight on to the end!"

Chou's speech was much less inflammatory; although he called on the Red Guards to "respond to the call of Comrade Lin Piao," Chou emphasized the study of Mao's writings, "learning from and supporting one another," and Red Guard revolutionary liaison as a means of strengthening unity. Whereas Lin's speech was tantamount to a blanket indictment, Chou specified that the "main task" of the Red Guards would be to carry out the cultural revolution in their own schools and made only a perfunctory reference

*Important leadership changes were publicly revealed at the rally. Liu Shao-chi was displaced by Lin as the second-ranking leader and heir apparent. In addition, Liu, Chu Teh, and Chen Yun were dropped from the Politburo Standing Committee and replaced by Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng. Chou retained third place in the Party hierarchy, but with considerably less prestige than Lin.
to "struggle, criticism, and transformation" (tou, p'i, kai) in this context. In short, Chou seemed to be attempting to balance Lin's inflammatory remarks by limiting the legitimate area of Red Guard activity to the educational system in general and one's individual school in particular. If this indeed was Chou's intention, he was clearly unsuccessful.

Lin's call evoked an immediate and ugly response throughout China. Timed to coincide with the rally, Red Guards from the aforementioned No. 2 Middle School issued a "declaration of war against the old world" on 18 August. This "ultimatum," which enumerated the early victims of Red Guard outrages, was directed against barbers and tailors who ostensibly specialized in Hong Kong styles, bookdealers that stocked "pornography" (such as the seventeenth century classic, Chin Ping Mei), and "degenerate" photographers. Declaring that they would "show no mercy" toward their opponents, the ultimatum concluded:

You bourgeois rascals, you hooligans: We give you one week to destroy your Hong Kong style clothing, to change your odd hairdos, and throw away your pornographic books and degenerate photographs. Those hoodlums who have financial difficulties may trim their cowboy pants and make them into shorts... The pointed tips of shoes may be cut off... and high-heeled shoes may be cut down to flats. Bad books and photographs should be thrown away. We won't stand on ceremony with those who violate these orders. Mend! Cut! Destroy! Burn!

According to eyewitness accounts, verbal criticism rapidly turned into concrete action. Many shops were closed down and their owners humiliated; "insufficiently revolutionary" signboards were destroyed. By 22 August, Pekingese in non-proletarian dress were set upon by roving bands who cut their hair or slashed their clothing. The violence reached a new high when it became clear that the PLA and the public security forces were under instructions not to interfere with the Red Guards.
The following day, many posters appeared listing "suitable" victims by name. Houses were entered and searched, and often plundered. There was a tremendous amount of physical brutality, and old men were seen being led through the streets, their arms bound with rope, heads shaved, and notices listing their "crimes" hung around their necks.

(Among the suicides was Lao She, the famous author best known in the West for his novel, Rickshaw Boy.)
"SMASH THE OLD WORLD!"
Such was the human reaction. The official press, on the other hand, hailed the Red Guard savagery as "a delightfully good thing and happy news. Red Guard revolutionary fighters, you have done the right thing! You have done well!" Furthermore, the Red Guards clearly liked the taste of blood. As one Peking middle school student wrote to relatives abroad concerning an attack on a college professor in which he participated, "We dragged the old parasite out and he was really scared. He was more than 70 years old. He committed suicide the next day." Another stated with pride that he and his fellows had broken the hands of a famous pianist because of his "worship" of Western culture.

Still another case gives some idea of the extent to which the "Establishment" was clearly shaken, even in these early days. Jung I-jen, Vice Minister of Textiles and concurrently Deputy Mayor of Shanghai, in an attempt to escape the onslaught, reportedly enlisted the help of his wife and children to move airconditioners, a television set, refrigerator, and rosewood furniture from their home into the street, where Jung smashed them. As he was destroying his possessions, Jung shouted:

I have committed the crime of national capitalism and know only pleasures. I must be criticized and punished. I hope that the Red Guards, the loyal generals of Chairman Mao, will punish me. [Jung got his wish.]

Similar Red Guard excesses were noted throughout China by the end of August. Of especial interest, however, is that in certain provinces (Anhwei, Fukien, Szechwan, and Yunnan for certain, and probably a few others), the Red Guards zeroed in almost immediately on the Party apparatus, rather than beginning with attacks on "bourgeois" targets. As none of the first secretaries of those provinces survived the purge, it seems clear that they were pre-targeted by Mao and the Central CRG.

As might be expected, Red Guard excesses in Shanghai were especially severe and xenophobic, and there were apparently even more suicides there than in the capital.
Chinese Christians, relatives of overseas Chinese, and foreigners, as well as the "five black classes," bore the brunt of the Red Guard attacks. One detailed eyewitness account seems particularly credible (inasmuch as phenomena reported by the source have been noted in accounts of Red Guard abominations in other cities), and will conclude this section on early Red Guard outrages.

In late August, two sisters, the only members of a wealthy Shanghai family to stay behind on the mainland, were classified as "undesirable elements" along with most of their neighbors and friends. Red Guards virtually destroyed their home, among other things, smashing all the thermos bottles in the house and pouring the glass shards into their rice supply along with the kitchen sauces and spices. The sisters were then deprived of their ration books and forced to surrender their clothing to the Red Guards in exchange for ragged peasant dress.

Shortly thereafter, the sisters and several friends were pulled by ropes through the city streets wearing signs branding them as "social parasites." Beaten with belts by the Red Guards, and spat upon and jabbed by onlookers, the parading was continued for several consecutive days. On the final day of this particular indignity, and at a point in the city furthest from their homes, the women were stripped of their outer garments and forced to walk home in their undergarments. The Red Guards had earlier cut their hair short, and the most attractive woman had had the right side of her head shaved because she had previously affected "fancy hair styles."

The following week, the sisters and two friends, all Roman Catholics, were attacked for their religious beliefs.

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*ti-fu-fan-huai-yu: i.e., "imperialists, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists."
women were forced to kneel on overturned rice bowls, hold their arms outstretched, and stare at a portrait of Mao while the Red Guards tried to force them into renouncing their faith. When their arms dropped or their eyes wavered, they were beaten. The women refused to recant, and the Red Guards were still torturing them. Such were the trials visited upon one family during the early days of the Red Guard movement.

B. Further Instructions: Attempts at Control and the Carte Blanche Reaffirmed

In the week following the 18 August rally, Red Guards from Peking and other cities were received by Chou En-lai, as well as Tao Chu and other members of the Central CRG. This tactic had the desired effect of circumventing the conventional Party apparatus which was about to come under attack, but it also increased Red Guard pretentiousness and pugnacity (as both Tao and Chou tended implicitly to reaffirm, even expand upon, Chiang Ching's carte blanche of late July), and was antithetical to the move also under way at this time to establish control squads and introduce some discipline into the ranks of the young Maoists. As the Red Guards fanned out from Peking into the provincial capitals and other major cities, the overwhelming majority cited these interviews as justification for ignoring or opposing the specific instructions of local CRGs. Furthermore, as verbatim of the interviews were soon disseminated throughout much of China, they were seized upon by militant Red Guards in other cities as similar justification.

Tao Chu's 21 August talk with Red Guards from Kansu, Kirin, Shantung, Shensi, and Szechwan is noteworthy in several respects. For openers, Tao informed the students that he only knew "a little" about the situation in their areas, thereby opening the way for a flood of detailed complaints by the visitors. The Red Guards from Sian's Chiaotung University, for example, declared that they had "basically no faith in the (Shensi) Provincial
Committee" under Hu Yao-pang, and "demanded that the Provincial Committee and the Northwest Bureau" under Liu Lan-tao "be reorganized." Tao replied (to understandable applause), "That is for you to decide,"* and added that "at the present time, only Chairman Mao and the Party Central led by him [i.e., those members of the Central Committee still in good odor] are correct."

Other students complained that the Party committees in their localities had circulated telegrams, ostensibly from the Central Committee, calling on the Red Guards to pledge to defend the Party Provincial Committees and Regional Bureaus "with their lives." Tao declared that the telegrams were fabrications, inferring that the hoax had been perpetrated by local officials. (Such statements would mean that you cannot stir up the cultural revolution). He further authorized the Red Guards to "drag out" and "struggle" any provincial Party secretary who "stands in the way of the great cultural revolution," and informed them that

Chairman Mao has said that anyone from anywhere in the country may come to Peking, and anyone in Peking may also go to any place in the country...Transportation is free.**

Thus, Tao confirmed that the Red Guards were the true revolutionaries, that all of their actions (unspecified) in defense of Mao and the cultural revolution were correct, and that they could be assured of support.

*Both Hu and Liu were purged early on.

**Tao was not attempting to buy off the youths with empty promises. As of 5 September, for example, all sleeper cars from Canton to Shanghai and all hard-class seats from Canton to Peking were ordered reserved for the Red Guards for an "indefinite period." The logistical problems involved in "revolutionary liaison" will be discussed in the next chapter.
Initial Public (i.e., unclassified) References to Red Guards

- 18 August 1966
- by 28 August 1966
- by 25 August 1966
- by 30 August 1966
On the following day, Chou spoke to students at Tsinghua, reaffirming most of the points made by Tao, but stating that all Red Guard actions "must be undertaken with the attitude of curing the disease to save the patient." Chou "welcomed" Tsinghua posters criticizing himself ("...much too few...I also have to steel myself in the storm"), and sanctioned a wide range of Red Guard activities, but informed the students that the responsibility for the "errors" committed by the work teams rested with the "new Municipal Committee and those Central Committee comrades who work in Peking" for "not sufficiently informing [the teams] of policies and tasks." As was the case four days earlier, Chou's caveats went unheeded.

One reason for this was that the astute Premier's moderate counsel was neatly counterbalanced with protestations of militancy--"You ought to rise up in revolution, and I came to light the fire"--promises that if any student demands the campus appearance of former work team members, "they will come right away," and expressions of confidence that Red Guards throughout the country "can solve their problems by themselves." Again, Chou reiterated that the Paris Commune should be the organizational exemplar for the Red Guards, but rendered this a meaningless endorsement by noting that five distinct Red Guard groups already existed at Tsinghua and that any kind of organization is all right, as long as it is in the name of the great cultural revolution. The organizing of different opinions is the freedom of organization.

In sum, neither Tao nor Chou imparted clear instructions or guidelines to the Red Guards. Rather, the students were encouraged to attack whomever they pleased (save for a sacrosanct few), go wherever they wished on expense-paid revolutionary liaison, and organize as they saw fit.

At the same time, Mao apparently felt that the inchoate phase of Red Guard excesses in Peking had served
its purpose. The young fanatics had blooded and been bloodied and, it was believed, toughened up for the coming assault on more formidable targets. Apparently, Mao also believed that Party officials would offer little or no resistance, having been given clear warning of the fate that awaited those who opposed the Red Guards.

On 25 August, the first posters were noted in Peking (and soon after in Tientsin) announcing the establishment of control squads* composed of elite Red Guards in their 'twenties. These squads were readily identifiable, with their military style uniforms and distinctive armbands, and they showed considerable training by their relatively disciplined behavior. Moreover, they were authorized to tear down offensive posters and expel "disreputable elements" from the rank and file. On 28 August, a People's Daily editorial endorsed this development and called on the Red Guards to take the PLA as their model, but then blurred the endorsement by "warmly supporting the revolutionary actions" of the Red Guards in general, in much the same way as Chou had hedged it six days earlier.

On 31 August, the date of the second mass rally, a Red Guard control squad directive was posted throughout Peking forbidding the use of force in the cultural revolution, and ordering Red Guards to respect the "supreme authority" of the Central Committee and the Peking municipal committee. The directive criticized the Red Guards for committing the following errors:

1. shaving the heads of those suspected of opposing the cultural revolution;

2. attacking some "revolutionary families" in the course of their mass onslaught;

*The term chiu-cha tui has also been translated as picket corps, investigation teams, and provost teams. They all refer to the same groups.
3. commandeering official cars;

4. searching officials' residences and jeopardizing state secrets;

5. failing to respect foreigners; and

6. molesting Hong Kong Chinese.

The thrust of this directive was echoed by Lin Piao and Chou at the second rally, attended by some 500,000 Red Guards, most of whom were visitors who had come to the capital to receive instructions. Chou emphasized "reasoning, not force in struggle" and called for "all-out efforts" to build the Red Guards into a "highly organized and disciplined" organization that would serve as "the reliable reserve of the PLA." Lin, wearing a control squad armband, repeated Chou's appeal for non-violent struggle ("Don't hit people") but, unlike Chou, made the point by using language hardly calculated to calm anyone down: "Only by reasoning... is it possible to thoroughly show their [i.e., the class enemy's] counter-revolutionary features, isolate them to the fullest extent, discredit them, pull them down, and smash them..." Nevertheless, the net effect was a calming, albeit temporary, of Red Guard activities in the capital. Outside Peking, however, violence was still the order of the day and, in fact, tended to increase as revolutionary liaison began in earnest. The calls for order and discipline had clearly been qualified (or, at least, they were so construed by the Red Guards, who soon exhibited an uncanny knack for selective quotation to justify their actions), and emphasis was placed upon the terror that has always been a basic ingredient in Mao's purges.

C. Conflicts Between Locals and Outsiders

Guests from Peking, please be a little more humble.

--A big-character poster, Chengchow, 4 September 1966
Even prior to the first mass rally on 18 August, provincial Party leaders began to prepare for the Red Guard deluge that would soon be upon them. Some, including Pan Fu-sheng (Heilungkiang), Liu Chien-hsun (Honan), and Chang Ti-hsueh (Hupeh), did everything they could in the short period of time remaining to accommodate the outsiders. Chang, for example, declared on 24 August that "chaos should not be feared" and that "there must not be any set rules... The Red Guards should do what they want to do." One week later, he stated:

Large numbers are coming to Wuhan from fraternal provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, especially from Peking... to assist in our struggle... We should give them a warm welcome... listen to their views and criticisms, learn from their progressive experiences, and make every effort to arrange for their livelihood and care for their health...

Liu Chien-hsun scored his points where they really counted, with an 18 August big-character poster in praise of the cultural revolution. He subsequently received the Chairman's accolades for this "revolutionary act". In addition, he took the lead in organizing "bombardments" against his own administration, personally contacted Red Guards in Peking inviting them to liaise to Honan, and expended considerable sums of money to finance their activities in the province. However, other officials, such as Li Ching-chuan (head of the Southwest Regional Bureau), Yen Hung-yen (Yunnan), and members of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, followed an opposite course and organized their forces in an attempt to defend their areas against the imminent onslaught.*

*Pan, Liu and Chang, as of this writing (November 1968), have survived the purge and been retained in positions of authority (Pan and Liu as chairmen of the revolutionary committees in their respective provinces; Chang as vice-chairman). Li and the Shanghai elite were purged; Yen took his own life in January 1967.
Several factors help to explain the clashes between outsiders (primarily from Peking) and local Red Guards that soon erupted in many provinces, even those where Party leaders were willing to permit or submit to personal attacks. First of all, the Red Guards were little more than young toughs—a Maoist version of the Hell's Angels—and, as such, ill-disposed toward settling their differences by pacific means. Secondly, this very belligerency, often coupled with ideological rigidity, fostered the disagreements and splits that partly occasioned the fantastic proliferation of competing Red Guard groups. Third, the arrival of Peking Red Guards in another city was nearly always followed by demands on the part of the visitors that the Party committee be reorganized and, upon being refused or opposed, by calls to "bombard the headquarters" and physical violence. Fourth, the Peking Red Guards (as well as locals who had been to Peking), having met with Central CRG members or other leaders, took the vague "instructions" that they had received as an imprimatur to organize and direct Red Guard activities in the areas to which they liaised. This led to charges (usually justified) that students from the capital, rather than acting as model Red Guards, behaved like masters and attempted to lord it over local groups. Fifth, many Red Guard and Scarlet Guard (usually workers) organizations had been set up by local CRGs for the express purpose of defending the Party apparatus against outside attack.* Conflict in such cases was unavoidable. Finally, the innate suspicion of some Chinese toward their fellows from other areas of the country occasioned suspicion and mistrust from the outset. The parochial attitude of the Cantonese and the hostility of the Tibetans and other minority nationalities toward the Han (ethnic Chinese) are good examples.

*Such machinations were explicitly prohibited by Mao in a directive promulgated on 7 September. The prohibition was reiterated in a Central Committee decision of 11 September, as well as a People's Daily editorial of the same date.
By the end of August, clashes between rival Red Guard groups were reported in the three special municipalities and at least thirteen provinces. Some of these were relatively minor (such as fist fights between members of hostile organizations in the same school); others, however, were portents of pitched battles to come.

Good information concerning these early clashes. One such is a letter from a Peking student recounting his revolutionary liaison to Kwangsi during late August and early September. Upon arriving in Kweilin, the writer stated that his team spent "a few days on fact-finding" to determine the identity of Kweilin's "capitalist roaders" and then mounted a "bombardment" against them. "The local Party authorities were especially afraid of us Peking students," he wrote, "because we knew the instructions of the Party Central in Peking and brought their spirit to Kweilin." However, even though the authorities may have been "badly shaken," the Peking contingent did not have an easy time of it. According to the student, they organized local workers and peasants to "surround and attack us" and mobilized "the entire propaganda machinery under their control to smear us as counterrevolutionaries.... confusion exchange teams, and treachery exchange teams." The entire outfit was put under surveillance, and some team members were beaten and arrested. Finally, the students left Kweilin after an eighteen-day stay, proud of their revolutionary activities, and leaving as their legacy (according to other reports) a real donnybrook between their local supporters at the Kwangsi Normal College and their worker-peasant opponents.

*Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin; Anhwei, Heilungkiang, Hopeh, Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsu, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Kwei-chow, Shantung, Shensii, Szechwan, and Yunnan.
In the Southwest, during the confusion that followed the arrival of Red Guards from Peking and other areas, Li Ching-chuan (according to his critics) tried to blunt the militants' offensive by forbidding revolutionary liaison and inciting the Red Guards to fight among themselves. On 30 August, Li allegedly telephoned Chia Chi-yun (Kweichow First Secretary) and told him how to proceed with regard to the suppression of the activities of liaising Red Guards. A favorite tactic of Peking Red Guards was apparently to hide in local Party offices, claim they had been forcibly detained, and then incite people to "bombard the headquarters." Li suggested that Party committees organize their own Red Guards for defensive purposes, and if the militants argued that they were merely following Mao's "instructions," Party officials should reply that they also were doing exactly that. Li also recommended that his subordinates monitor communications and suppress outgoing Red Guard messages to Peking that reported adversely on the situation in the Southwest.

Yen Hung-yen (Yunnan First Secretary), one of Li's men, followed his superior's instructions, condemned the Red Guard hellers as counterrevolutionaries, and described their activities as nothing less than "Hungarian-style incidents." When Peking Red Guards arrived in Kunming on 28 August, Yen ordered his public security personnel to "take on a battle posture and heighten their vigilance," and sent some of his cadres (disguised as workers and students) about the city distributing leaflets and pasting up posters praising Yen's administration for "defending Mao and the Central Committee." In addition, he sent two public security cadres to Peking to collect information on the students liaising to Yunnan and forward the data to Kunming. Yen is said to have compiled a blacklist consisting of nearly 1,000 names and to have successfully opposed the outside Red Guards until late September, at which time a "revolutionary cadre" made it to Peking where he exposed Yen's "towering crimes." (Yen was in all likelihood a dead duck by the time of the October work conference.)
The major trouble in Shanghai during the first days of revolutionary liaison resulted from the hostility that developed between the Peking contingent and local Red Guards, especially those from Futan University. On 2 September the latter injured several Pekingese in a melee outside the Mayor's office, and the visitors criticized the Futan unit for not acting correctly in following the lead of the Peking Red Guards. A few days later, a poster signed by the Futan University Red Guard Struggle Committee appeared, accusing the Pekingese of bad conduct, of lording it over the local Red Guards, and of "generally irresponsible and unnecessarily violent actions." The Futan group claimed that they were as capable as the Peking group of running Shanghai's cultural revolution. The dispute continued for some weeks, with both sides securing local allies.

In Kwangtung, trouble soon developed after Peking Red Guards appeared in Canton on 19 August. Red Guards from the South China Technical Institute, for example, criticized the behavior of the Pekingese (inter alia for not paying their fares when riding public transportation), and demanded that they leave Canton. Gang fights between contending Red Guard groups armed with wooden spears were reported in late August, and on 4 September, the Peking Red Guard Southern Liaison Squad "ordered" all private handicraft shops to cease production, all "small merchants" to suspend their business activities, and all joint state-private concerns to close down. The following day, local Red Guards visited all such enterprises and told them to stay open; "the cultural revolution cannot be monopolized by Red Guards from Peking." Such activities tended to exacerbate the historical animosity felt by Cantonese toward outsiders, and the tensions thus created were a major contributing factor to the state of war that would befall Canton the following summer.

From these various examples, it can be seen that jealousy, suspicion, and open conflict plagued the Red Guard movement from the very outset. These phenomena were to be greatly intensified in the months ahead.
IV. SEPTEMBER: "WE'RE OFF TO PEKING!" -- REVOLUTIONARY LIAISON ACCELERATES AND THE PLA BECOMES A DEN MOTHER

"Don't quarrel. This is the thing the leaders in Peking fear most... It is not permitted to start your conversations with such insults as 'rotten egg' and 'son of a bitch.' You don't understand and then you punch people -- this won't do."

-- Chou En-lai to Red Guards, 10 September 1966

"Allow the youths to commit errors. If their general orientation is correct, it is permissible for them to have some little flaws. We believe that they will rectify them in due course."

-- Mao Tse-tung, quoted by Hsieh Fu-chih, 13 September 1966

"Theoretically, we realize that...we must struggle by reason and not by force. However, once swept up into the swirl of the heated class struggle, some of us became emotionally detached from Party policy... We sometimes could not control ourselves in the course of struggle..."

-- Canton Number 1 Middle School Red Guards, 13 September 1966

"The Red Guards' authority was given by Chairman Mao himself. This means they will not be committing any crimes by conducting the revolution and that their uprising is entirely a righteous one."

-- Letter from a resident of Canton, 25 September 1966
A. Revolutionary Liaison Begins in Earnest

During September, the main target of Red Guard attacks continued to shift from "bourgeois" citizens to Party officials at the provincial, regional, and central level. September also saw a drastic increase in revolutionary liaison activities, with wave upon wave of Red Guards descending on the capital to register their complaints, soon to return to their home provinces and more hell-raising.* Further contingents of Pekingese Red Guards left their schools for other areas, while still other groups engaged in intra- or inter-provincial liaison.

On 5 September, a joint Central Committee-State Council directive was promulgated containing the regulations that were to govern liaison to Peking. First, it was stated that "all students of institutes of higher education" were entitled to liaise to the capital, with every fifty students to be accompanied by one faculty or staff member chosen by the local authorities. With regard to middle-school students ("there are so many"), the directive stated that "it is only feasible to pick one out of ten," in this case with a 1:100 faculty-student ratio. Groups from both categories would be allowed to stay in Peking for four days.

The directive further instructed that the groups visit Peking at different times, according to "the unified plan mapped out by the central authorities regarding the number of visitors and the time of visit." Local authorities were ordered to "put everything in good shape beforehand" and charged with "making overall preparations in accordance with the different situations at colleges and middle schools and with the various situations in towns and villages." The students and teachers were reminded that they "must bring rice coupons and simple baggage" with them. A later (16 September) directive

*The Red Guards soon began to air their dirty laundry in journal form. The first Red Guard paper, the hung-wei-ping pao, commenced publication in Peking on 1 September. By July 1967, FBIS listed 192 separate Red Guard titles; by April 1968, the list had burgeoned to 468 titles.

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from the Ministry of Railways instructed the students that, halfway through their stay (i.e., two days before embarkation), they were to send a representative to the Peking Municipal Party Committee's reception center to obtain tickets for the return trip home.

For a number of reasons, plans for orderly "revolutionary liaison" were doomed from the outset. First, the local authorities who were to make the "overall preparations" were themselves coming under severe attack from the Red Guards and, hence, increasingly unable or unwilling to handle the arrangements. Second, as the perquisites of Red Guard status became apparent, many students who had not been chosen in the original selection simply established units on their own initiative, were outside the control of the responsible CRGs (many of which were also coming under attack, along with the local Party apparatus) from the start, and did pretty much as they chose (including liaising to the capital and other areas). Third, the veritable carte blanche handed the Red Guards in Peking by Madame Mao, Tao Chu, Chou En-lai, and others was seen by Red Guards throughout the country as applicable to them also, and thus, the invitation to anarchy soon came to be interpreted as a nation-wide mandate. Fourth, and a corollary to the previous point, it became clear in short order that 90% of the middle-school Red Guards would not acquiesce in staying home while 10% of their fellows liaised to Peking (the first trip of any moment for most of them), caught a glimpse of the god-head, and generally had the time of their lives. Finally, the sheer magnitude of China's student population precluded orderly liaison. Rough projections indicate that China's college enrollment in 1966 was some 650,000-700,000 while the middle schools had approximately 13-15 million students. If the 5 September directive had been obeyed, liaison to Peking would have involved a grand total of 2-2 1/2 million students visiting the capital. Several reports, however, estimate that a total of ten million Red Guards liaised to Peking, with as many as two million of them (the anticipated total) in the capital at one time.
Rail transport conditions in Peking steadily deteriorated, reaching a critical state on 15 September and resulting in the suspension of commercial operations at all Peking railroad stations three days later. Simultaneously, transport outages began to appear throughout the country.
SECRET

"REVOLUTIONARY LIAISON"
Confusion also reigned concerning exactly what amenities were to be provided for the peregrinating students. Initial regulations stipulated that while transportation and lodging were free, the Red Guards were to be responsible for buying their own meals.* However, many students embarked on their adventures with little more than the clothes on their backs, and any official who refused them food did so at his peril. Other officials went one better, providing free food, cloth and other supplies, and, in some cases, pocket money to the Red Guards from the outset.

Still others allowed Red Guards to sign for their meals, with their schools to pick up the tab, and at least one department asked the youthful travellers to "serve notice of the rules to all stations" located along their line of march -- hardly the way to ensure uniformity. In short, revolutionary liaison was less than a standardized undertaking from the start.

*In Swatow (Kwangtung), for example, the price for three meals a day was .15 yuan plus one rice ration coupon (i.e., 6¢ -- one yuan equals approximately U.S. $.40). In Shanghai, the comparable rate was reportedly .40 yuan.
B. Further Instructions from the Center

During September, additional directives were promulgated in a further attempt to regularize and delimit the activities of the Red Guards. However, such instructions were mitigated by the freewheeling interviews of the previous month, by further accolades from Mao and Lin, and by the very magnitude of Red Guard activity itself.

One directive, issued jointly on 8 September by the Central Committee and the State Council, concerned the safeguarding of Party and state secrets. After reminding the Red Guards that they "have the responsibility for safeguarding codes, cables, confidential documents, archives and confidential data," the directive stated that no unauthorized persons may use such data or enter areas where such data are housed -- a clear implication that important materials had been or were in danger of being compromised. On the following day, in a speech at one of the Red Guard headquarters in Peking, Chou En-lai ordered the students to desist from entering government bureaus (he specifically deplored a sit-in of several
days duration in the Ministry of Geology) and "interfering in the activities of others" -- "You promote the movement all day long, but they have work to do."* A further directive (14 September) forbade urban Red Guards from liaising below the county (hsien) level and, conversely, prohibited sub-county students from liaising to other areas. However, this directive had little practical effect, for the "long marches on foot" that came in for official approval the following month (in an attempt to ease the burden placed upon the transportation system), as well as the practice of urban Red Guards to recruit rural youths in order to augment their ranks, made it impossible to seal off the boon-docks from the disruptive effects of revolutionary liaison.

As was the case during August, the principal statements declaiming the precipitous behavior of overzealous Red Guards were made by Chou En-lai. In a major pronouncement on 10 September (to students about to liaise to other areas), Chou expounded at some length on the problems then afflicting the Red Guard movement.

On this occasion, the Premier emphasized that the young militants were the reserve of the PLA and, as such, they were to "attack with reason" rather than force ("pledge that you will assume your role in a disciplined and organized manner"); that Red Guards from Peking should learn from local Red Guards and not interfere with them ("don't destroy what they do not want to destroy"); that those on liaison may seek assistance through channels from the Central CRG if they find themselves unable to solve problems on their own; that they should not interfere with production ("have confidence that the workers can solve their own problems") or insult "foreign friends;" that those bound for Sinkiang must not liaise to areas near the frontier; and that the three Peking Red Guard

*As a portent of things to come, the participants in the sit-in resisted the demands that they clear out of the Ministry by reciting appropriate banalities from Mao's writings to support their intransigence.
headquarters should stay out of each other's affairs.* He further cautioned them against going off half-cocked ("...your knowledge of society and Party policy is still limited...; if you do not investigate, you have no right to speak"), for this would lead to "committing mistakes as you did in the past." One mistake specifically deplored by Chou was the Red Guards' scatter-gun assault on authority, even though "only a few leaders want to follow the bourgeois road."

However, as he had done on earlier occasions, Chou removed much of the sting from these criticisms by larding his remarks with militant statements and qualifications that, by a process of selective quotation, could be cited by the Red Guards to justify the very actions so deplored by the Premier. For example, Chou did not order the Red Guards to seek instructions from Peking with regard to liaison-related problems, but merely said they might consult with the Central authorities if they deemed it advisable. Again, while he stated that Red Guards must not "barge in," but rather "gain permission from the local revolutionary committee if you want to make an on-the-spot investigation," he also said that liaising students "must struggle" with those authorities who "do not welcome your visits and attempt to obstruct and oppress you" -- thus, if such permission were denied, the Red Guards could (and did) cite the refusal as an act of oppression and commence "struggling" the official or officials responsible. Finally, Chou reminded his audience at several points that they must become a "fighting squad," and that the "primary task" of revolutionary liaison was "not to visit, but to struggle." Such hortatory statements would stick with the Red Guards long after they had forgotten or conveniently set aside Chou's detailed accounting of their

*At this time, Chou did not give the nod to any one headquarters; the following month (3 October), however, Chou backed the Third Headquarters, claiming that "bad elements" were in control of the other two. All three headquarters continued to operate into early 1967, but the Third Headquarters was clearly the most powerful and influential.
defects and mistakes.* Furthermore, Chou himself soon returned to a semi-"anything goes" stance. On 27 September, in a letter to the Peking Third Headquarters, he stated, "If you deem a course of action to be correct, you should persist in it," the implication being to persist even though others may disagree. Thus, Chou reaffirmed the Maoist position as stated by Lin Piao on 15 September at the third mass rally in Peking:

Red Guard fighters and revolutionary students! The general direction of your struggle is correct from beginning to end. Chairman Mao and the Party center resolutely support you!... Those in authority taking the capitalist road, those reactionary bourgeois "authorities," those blood-suckers and parasites -- all of them have been greatly disturbed by you. You have done right and fine!

C. Attempts at Greater Organizational Control and Calls for Help

During the month of September (probably partly due to the impending harvest), additional tactics were introduced to bring the Red Guards -- especially those on or

*On a similar occasion (in late September or early October), Chou met with a visiting Red Guard contingent from Harbin Engineering Institute, and read them the riot act for attacking Pan Re-sheng, arresting their opponents, and using the press and communications media to publicize their accusations. At the same time, Chou ordered the Red Guards "not to go and reproduce my words all over the place," and stated five times during his speech that it was "permissible" for the Red Guards to make mistakes, that such mistakes were "unimportant" anyway, and that his critical remarks "do not mean that you should put fetters on your hands and feet."
about to begin revolutionary liaison -- under greater organizational control. Several sources report Red Guards assisting in production work, such as gathering in crops or being utilized on water conservancy projects. The control squad mechanism, first noted in Peking on 25 August, was established in other areas, and some groups of Red Guards were reported to have been billeted with PLA units in order to receive some military training. It was suggested by one source that the young revolutionaries were to be organized along lines somewhat similar to the militia and under the general supervision of the PLA.

Such provincial data as are available for this period suggest that the usual practice was for the Red Guards (ostensibly) to take the initiative in setting up Joint Commands or Corps to exercise general control over Red Guard activities in a given area. One or more schools (usually universities or colleges) would put forward the original proposal, to which the other Red Guard units would quickly respond, elect representatives, and establish a preparatory committee. After a brief discussion, the preparatory committee would "decide unanimously" to establish a Joint Command for the locality, elect officers, and "order" a ranking PLA commander in the area to serve as the Corps' chief instructor. The commander would agree and a mass rally would follow, with Red Guard representatives making standard pledges to turn their organizations into a "highly organized, disciplined battle force" and the "strong reserve of the PLA." Their instructors in turn would profess "unlimited confidence" in the Red Guards and state their "resolute support" for the "revolutionary actions of the little generals."

Of greater interest is the fact that the Corps were under the immediate control of local authorities, either through the PLA "instructors" or through the local CRGs. Ranking Party officials, some of whom were already under attack and many of whom would soon be purged, attended several of the inaugural rallies (for example, in Hupeh, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Sinkiang, Szechwan, and Yunnan), and addressed the assembled students, interspersing statements in praise of the Red Guards with reminders that their "revolutionary activities" were to be carried
out under Party (in this context, local Party) leadership. Thus, many of the Corps embodied a fundamental contradiction -- a militant membership responsive to such Maoist concepts as "destruction must precede construction" and "bombard the headquarters," but with local control over the Corps exercised by Party incumbents who were viewed as epitomizing the stagnant, bourgeois order that had to be destroyed. Furthermore, the contradiction was accentuated by the constant flow of liaising Red Guards, especially those from Peking, who came to attack the local Party apparatus and were loath to accept the authority of anyone save Mao and his coterie at the center. In those areas where the newly-established Red Guard Corps were generally responsive to local authority, the contradiction still existed. In these cases, the contradiction would take the form of intra-Corps dissen*ion, an open split and the establishment of a rival Corps, or conflict between the defensive actions of a given Corps and the attacks mounted by liaising Red Guards against the local Party apparatus. During October, several Corps in this latter group were attacked as "monarchist" or "emperor-protecting" organizations, and they either folded, re-organized with the "support" of non-local militants,* or lapsed into desuetude.

Hunan and Sinkiang-- geographically and ethnically distinct -- have been selected to provide some idea of how the fractious pursuits of liaising and local militants created a climate completely antithetical to the regularization of Red Guard activity under Party-controlled

*In Swatow, for example, it is reported that a "few score" Pekingese Red Guards reorganized the city's Red Guard movement in late September. They had access to the resident registration files maintained by the Swatow Public Security Bureau, expelled local Red Guards who possessed unfavorable backgrounds, and recruited replacements from the ranks of the "five red classes."
The September imbroglio in Sinkiang is especially interesting, inasmuch as reports are available describing the conflict as seen by Pekingese Red Guards in Urumchi as well as their local opponents.

The brief for the Pekingese was contained in a mid-September telegram signed by liaising units from the capital (including the International Relations Institute, Tsinghua, People's University, and Peita) addressed to activists in various schools throughout the country, calling upon them to support the militants in their struggle against the "King of Sinkiang."**

Although Wang had been entrusted with the responsibility for this sizeable and most strategic border region, his "unexpectedly wicked" actions soon showed that he had betrayed Mao's trust. His primary goal was to establish an "independent kingdom" and, to realize this goal, Wang intended to "conspire with the revisionist Soviet Union." Fortunately, seven Pekingese Red Guard units, "numbering 5,500 men," arrived in Urumchi in time to foil this heinous plot. However, their pristine labors to establish a "red Sinkiang" were "immediately upset" by the pernicious Wang, who ordered the "brutal suppression" of the visitors' activities. Many of the "unarmed"

*It would be impossible to cover the activities of the Red Guards on a province-by-province basis, even just hitting the highlights, and keep this study within manageable limits. Thus, an attempt will be made (where possible) to select one or two provinces that illustrate the point under discussion, remembering that, in the final analysis, no province is truly typical.

For other provinces, detailed information can be found in the OCI China Division publication, China Political Monthly. The present study has utilized data contained in this useful series.

**i.e., Wang En-mao, long-time Sinkiang First Secretary and concurrently Commander as well as Political Commissar of the Sinkiang Military Region. The title "King of Sinkiang" is a play on words; the surname Wang means "king."
stalwarts were wounded in the fray; however, they were undaunted and proceeded to stage a hunger strike in front of the Sinkiang Party headquarters. Then a further heresy -- upon asking the soldiers guarding the headquarters for a photo of Mao "in order to arm themselves against hunger and cold," the students were queried in return, "Which Chairman's photo do you want?"

Wang also organized Worker Control Squads to oppose the Pekingese contingent, and instructed his minions to follow the visitors around the city shouting slogans such as "We must protect the local Party committee to the end" and "Kick out the little rascals who seek to spoil the socialist revolution in the sacred Northwest." Such activities, the plaintiffs conclude, establish clearly that "the unpardonable" Wang En-mao is "anti-Party, anti-Mao Tse-tung, anti-people, anti-cultural revolution, and anti-Red Guards."

An entirely different (and more credible) accounting of the affair was provided by "revolutionary teachers and students" from six Urumchi schools.* According to this version, the true culprits were a "handful" of Red Guards from Peking, Shanghai, Lanchow, and Urumchi who were acting without any authorization as the "revolutionary representatives" of some thirty-four institutes and schools. The most obnoxious groups, as could be expected, were those from "Peking and several other fraternal provinces and regions." Such units, it was asserted, involved "a great many Red Guards" and they had begun arriving in Urumchi as early as 22 August (i.e., only four days after their public debut at the first mass rally);

During the two-week period since 22 August, the Urumchi complainants averred, the local Party and governmental organs and the "revolutionary masses of all nationalities" had accorded the Red Guards an "enthusiastic

*Sinkiang University, Sinkiang Engineering Institute, the Sinkiang 1 August Agricultural Institute, Sinkiang Medical Institute, Sinkiang Government and Law Cadre School, and the Sinkiang Rural Socialist Construction School.
welcome and sympathetic treatment." Wang En-mao himself received them on eighteen separate occasions, and indicated repeatedly that he welcomed "great blooming, contending, and big-character posters...exposing and criticizing the Party committee and himself."

On 2 September, Wang addressed a rally of some 50,000 people convened to celebrate Mao's August meetings with the Red Guards. The liaising militants immediately condemned the rally as a counterrevolutionary affair, Wang's remarks as a "black speech," and descended upon the Sinkiang Party Committee's CRG office to demand a draft copy of his address. It is unclear whether or not a draft was given to them, but it is clear that the explanations offered by the local CRG officials were dismissed out of hand, for the students demanded the summary overthrow of Wang and the Sinkiang Party Committee.

The following evening, over thirty Pekingese Red Guards broke into the Party building, shouting "Hey you, Wang! Get your --- down here!" When Wang did not appear, the students began a search of the premises. Staff personnel on duty tried "time and again" to "persuade" them to stop, but the students refused ("dogs...bastards...We are cursing demons and monsters, and this is quite proper") and gave the staff an ultimatum to hand Wang over to them within thirty minutes. During the night, Sinkiang Party Secretary and Vice-Governor Wu Kuang met with the dissidents on three separate occasions in an attempt to conciliate them, only to be bombarded with similar abusive language. A sit-in and fast ensued outside the Party offices, with the students refusing official offers of food and overcoats ("revolutionaries, stand fast; non-revolutionaries, butt out").

The next morning, over twenty of the demonstrators crashed the Party Committee's living quarters in their continuing and unsuccessful search for Wang En-mao. After "beating up thirteen PLA officers and men," they returned to Party headquarters, resumed the sit-in and fast ("facing Chairman Mao's portrait"), and claimed that their fasting had received support from Central CRG head Chen Po-ta "by return wire." This latter claim may well be true, for
Wang finally met with the visitors; however, he could not make himself heard over the din.* Here the account ends, with protestations of undying support for Mao and the Cultural revolution.

A similar situation developed in Hunan, although in this case the malcontents appear to have been local Red Guards, with liaising students adding fuel to the fire as the conflict developed.

Although the Changsha materials provide no definite time sequence for the chronology of events described, internal evidence indicates that the initial clash took place in early September, and it is clear that the conflict remained unresolved at the end of October.

Although the earliest complaint on the part of university Red Guards in Changsha was simply that the cultural revolution there had been "cālm and unimpressive" to date, it is possible that their appetites were whetted by the flow of liaising Red Guards transiting the Hunanese capital.** In any event, some two hundred local students marched to the Municipal Party Committee office to demand an explanation for the Committee's failure to get the cultural revolution off the ground. The local officials, fearing trouble, mustered "thousands" of workers to stop the marchers. A fight ensued and many students were reportedly injured, three of them seriously. The outnumbered protesters withdrew, regrouped, and set out again, this

*It appears that Wang attempted to address those sitting-in from the "safety" of the Party building, for the demonstrators continued to shout, "Get your --- down here!" (kun-hsia-lai)

**Changsha is one of four major cities on the Peking-Canton railroad. Reports from other areas indicate that it was common practice for Red Guards to harangue onlookers at stations along the line, exhorting the locals to follow their "revolutionary" example.
time to the Provincial Party Committee building where they were received by the "Party Secretary."* The Secretary, however, supported the Municipal Party Committee and blamed the students for the entire affair.

The Red Guards, determined to make a fight of it, again took to the streets, making speeches and passing out leaflets denouncing the two committees. The latter responded with leaflets of their own as well as radio broadcasts, and ordered their subordinate units not to support the militants. The sub-unit leaders were unable to make this edict stick, however, as many of the rank-and-file declared their support for the student militants.** By around the third week of September, the two committees held self-criticism meetings, but the students were not satisfied by this ploy and, as the law of rising expectations would have it, demanded that the committee members be removed from office. The demand was naturally refused, and thus the Red Guards sent representatives to Peking to appeal their case before the Central CRG. In the capital, the visitors were received by "leaders" (unidentified) of the Central CRG. After ticking off their grievances, the CRG told them to have no fear and "ordered the students to return [to Changsha] and continue the struggle, assured ...that the final victory would be theirs."

The Provincial Party Committee got the message and admitted its errors. All sub-units were ordered to punish counterrevolutionaries in their employ, publicly apologize to those who had been wrongfully accused (i.e., the militants), and restore them to their positions. The Red

*The identity of this official is not known; however, both First Secretary Chang Ping-hua and Acting First Secretary Wang Yen-chun (who had assumed the post when Chang was in Peking) were later purged.

**This is credible. One of the earliest, major anti-Chang Red Guard organizations in Changsha, the Higher Headquarters or kao-szu (full title: the Changsha Institutes of Higher Learning Red Political Power Defense Army General Command Post) had allies in Party and government offices.
Guards, however, continued to press the attack against the "capitalist roaders" at all levels: "provincial, municipal, county, government unit, and factory," aided by an order from Peking that the "PLA, police and public security forces cannot be used in the campaign...[and] have refrained from taking any action."

As of 30 October, however, the Hunan problem remained unresolved. Tao Chu, speaking to a Hunanese contingent in the capital, defended Chang Ping-hua ("Let him correct his mistakes during his work... Do not purge him"), stated that Chang had been criticized on two occasions by the Central Committee and sent back to his Changsha post "this morning," but added that if he did not "revolutionize" himself, he would be purged -- however, by the Party center, not by the young toughs.

Tao, of course, was himself devoured by the purge some six or seven weeks later, and it is likely that statements such as these helped to grease the slide. As the former boss of the Party's Central-South Regional Bureau (covering Honan, Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung), Tao appeared to have little taste for the way the Red Guards had done grievous damage to his many years' labor -- thus his attempt to preserve what he could of the old apparatus, including officials such as Chang Ping-hua who were in serious trouble, to be sure, but not yet adjudged by Mao to be beyond saving. Earlier on, Tao had attempted a similar salvage operation with regard to Kwangtung. In an 11 September letter to Provincial Party Secretary Ou Meng-chuah, he warned her that Red Guards were to be sent to Kwangtung "to fight for a new kingdom:"

The "old man" [Mao] is in a very bad mood, and "the tiger" [Lin Piao] wants to change history. All the old things will be destroyed and more and more new things will appear. There will be conflagrations everywhere, and the whole world will watch them eagerly.
Turning specifically to the question of Kwangtung, Tao expressed his hope that Madame Ou would cooperate with Chao Tzu-yang, use her discretion in "destroying the old and fostering the new," and avoid "blindly following the crowd or those who would act recklessly:"

Kwangtung is a base established by us and all our old friends. It would be a disaster if it were totally destroyed by fire. The excellent state of light industry in Kwangtung was not built in a day. I fear that the revolutionaries may destroy our industry, rendering future restoration difficult if not impossible. Do not hesitate to organize worker Red Guards to protect the factories and uphold the red flag of industry.

With precious few exceptions, Canton suffered more destruction and bloodshed than other Chinese cities. Chao, Madame Ou, and others tried to minimize the losses and were purged for their efforts. The Red Guard juggernaut, unleashed by Mao, could not be stopped by "lesser" men.
V. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER: A PERIOD OF ADJUSTMENT

A. The October Work Conference and Augmenting The Revolutionary Left

We will triumph in the end, although we did not expect it to be this complicated. Maybe you didn't expect it either:
---Chang Chun-chiao to Fukienese Red Guards, 7 October 1966

Chairman Mao noted this state of affairs and decided to call you together to discuss the situation.
---Lin Piao at the Work Conference, 25 October 1966

A communist who has committed an error of line should be courageous enough to admit his errors, critically examine those errors, and join the masses to criticize and repudiate his own errors.
---Red Flag, 1 November 1966

By early October, it was clear that all was not going according to plan. In many areas, the violent Red Guard assaults on the Party apparatus during the previous month and more had produced little save increased resistance on the part of those officials under attack. If Mao had expected a relatively easy victory via his Red Guard blitzkrieg, with the provincial Party elite surrendering early on, he had been proven wrong by recent events. Certain correctives were required, and Mao approached the problem on two levels—proffering "forgiveness" to those who corrected their "errors," while at the same time sharpening the weapon that would cut down those who continued to oppose his cultural revolution.

From 9 to 26 October, a Central Committee Work Conference met to deal with the problem. In a major speech on 23 October, Central CRG head Chen Po-ta summarized the
course of the movement over the past two months. Noting that "the struggle has become very acute and very complicated," Chen complained that "certain comrades on the Central Committee" refused to carry out Mao's policies and had, in fact, established mass organizations to protect themselves rather than to promote the revolution. These people, he charged, were "still instigating the worker-peasant masses and organizational cadres to fight with the students" and "in many places" had corrupted the Red Guards themselves. They were now to be given one last chance to redeem themselves and return to the correct line.

On the 25th, Mao and Lin addressed the Work Conference. Lin condemned Liu and Teng for "sabotaging the spread of the thought of Mao Tse-tung," stated that the "mistaken policy line in the cultural revolution was mainly proposed by them," and admitted that this line was "carried out to some extent in every locality." However, Lin drew a distinction between the proponents of a mistaken policy and those who implemented that policy ("...the majority of the comrades acted unintentionally, and they were not intentionally resisting Chairman Mao's line"). Mao made the same point ("there will always be some people... who will set themselves up in opposition, but I am confident that the majority will understand"), expressed his satisfaction with the meeting ("...turning this state of passivity into one where the initiative is regained"), and stated that hitherto the "test" had not been administered fairly ("the comrades cannot be blamed, as the time has been too short"). He then ordered 3-level (provincial, district, county) Party meetings to be convened to "explain questions clearly" (i.e., correct past errors and offer self-criticisms) and to "disseminate the spirit of the Work Conference."

*On the 28th, Chou told the Red Guards to cease their attacks on Party officials until these meetings had been concluded. Several officials later purged (such as Li Ching-chuan) were accused of using these occasions to prepare further resistance against Red Guard attacks.
On 1 November, Red Flag spelled out the line laid down by Mao at the Work Conference. Praising the "mobilization of the masses" as a "great spur to comrades... whose leadership has been far from conscientious or effective," the editorial warned that "there are still a considerable number of muddle-headed people inside the Party whose world outlook has not been remolded or has not been effectively remolded," and that "a process is required for these comrades to return...to the correct line," but made it appear that the vast majority could still save themselves:

Distinctions should be made among those who have committed errors of line. Those (there are only one, two or several persons) who have put forward the erroneous line should be distinguished from those who put it into effect; those (these are a minority) who have consciously implemented the erroneous line should be distinguished from those (there is a large number of these) who have done it unconsciously...

Provided that they can correct their errors, return to the correct stand and carry out the Party's correct line, it is not only possible for them to become cadres of the second category [comparatively good] or of the third category [those who have made serious mistakes, but have not become "anti-Party, anti-socialist rightists"], it is also possible for them to develop into cadres of the first category [good]. Nevertheless, these comrades must be sharply told that no matter who they are, and no matter how great their past achievements, if they cling to the erroneous line, the nature of the contradictions between them and the Party and the masses will change...

While Mao was dealing with problems involving the Party elite at the Work Conference, a move was under way simultaneously to both expand and purify the ranks of the
revolutionary Left. On 5 October, an "Urgent Directive" of the Military Affairs Commission's General Political Department, endorsed by the Central Committee, complained that the cultural revolution in military academies and schools had become a "dreary affair" because of the activities of a "handful of anti-Party" persons in these schools. These people, the directive ordered, "must be dragged out, thoroughly struggled and criticized." At the same time, those who had been condemned earlier by the schools' Party committees and the work teams should be "publicly vindicated and rehabilitated" and all charges against them declared null and void. Further, Red Guards from these schools were permitted to establish ties with non-military Red Guards and to liaise to other areas, but they were ordered not to "interfere with, or intervene in, the local cultural revolution"—i.e., the "bombardment" of civilian Party committees.

The following day, Kuai Ta-fu (militant leader of Tsinghua's Chingkangshan Red Guards) was publicly rehabilitated at a mass rally sponsored by the Peking Third Headquarters (endorsed as the leading Red Guard organization). Chou En-lai informed the assemblage that the 5 October directive was "not only a directive for the PLA, but also applies to universities and middle schools." He also declared that liaising Red Guards were not to be "persecuted, illegally detained, or interrogated under torture" upon returning home; moreover, they were to continue to receive their monthly stipend, even though the schools were closed.

A matter of some concern to the Maoists at this time was the dissension among the Red Guards themselves, and attempts were made during October and November to eliminate the sources of conflict. On 17 October, Central CRG member Wang Li admitted that some Red Guard organizations were controlled and manipulated by "capitalist roaders;" indeed, Wang's call to his audience to "win over and unite with the great majority" implied clearly that the radicals were still in the minority.

Close upon Wang's exhortations, meetings were convened in Peking to "revolutionize" the First and Second
(Red Guard) Headquarters. On 21 October, Red Guards representing some forty-seven organizations met to censure the "revisionist Red Guards" who had occupied the "dominant positions" in the First Headquarters. After what was reported to have been a "violent debate and struggle," the representatives resolved to "thoroughly reorganize" their organization, invalidate all certificates of membership, and reissue them only to "those who are truly revolutionary." However, this move was opposed by some groups excluded in the reorganization, and led in turn to a seizure of the official "chop" on 7 November by the "revolutionary minority."* Five days later, Chi Pen-yu, another member of the Central CRG, spoke at Peita to members of the Second Headquarters. Chi acknowledged the existence of "contradictions" in each of the three headquarters and stated that, if some member groups disagreed with others, the proper tactic was to "establish a new organization" rather than to disband the existing one. Chi was attempting to stop inter- as well as intra-headquarters conflict, but the actual effect was to perpetuate the splits among Peking Red Guard groups. As indicated earlier, the Third Headquarters emerged as the most powerful organization as a result of the official favor accorded some of its members (including Peita, Tsinghua and Peking Aviation), but the other two headquarters continued to function. Further efforts to effect a consolidation were noted in December 1966 (Chou) and January 1967 (Madame Mao), but the three rival bodies maintained their separate identities until 22 February 1967, when all three headquarters were dissolved and their member groups incorporated into the Capital Universities and Colleges Red Guard Congress.**

*Including Red Guards from Peking Aviation Institute, Normal College, Geological Institute, and Forestry Institute.

**For a detailed listing of the major Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups in each province, autonomous region, and major city, see POLO XXX, Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel Organizations in Communist China (A Research Aid).
Soon after the conclusion of the October Work Conference, the Maoists turned their attention to the establishment of Revolutionary Rebel organizations in industrial, mining, Party, and governmental organs throughout the country in order to 1) bolster the Red Guards, and 2) erode the bases of support for local authorities.

On 11 November, Central CRG members Chang Chunchiao and Chi Pen-yu in effect revoked the September order prohibiting Red Guards from liaising to plants and factories. In a discussion with members of Peking Aviation's Red Flag, Chi stated that it was now permissible for Red Guards to "liaise with the workers and peasants" and "go to the factories and live with the workers," and Chang added that "it is our plan to make revolution in the factories during the next stage." Other Central leaders made similar statements during the rest of November (including a 28 November call from Madame Mao to "gradually expand and strengthen the ranks of the left in the course of struggle"—a speech hailed later as the "pledge of a general offensive"), culminating in a 10-point Central Committee directive of 9 December entitled "(Draft) Provisions on Grasping Revolution and Stimulating Production." Inter alia, the directive: 1) authorized the workers to use all of their available time outside working hours to participate in the cultural revolution, to "discuss, improve or re-elect" their superiors, and to set up their own "revolutionary organizations;" 2) forbade officials from "deducting wages and dismissing workers because the latter have criticized them;" 3) authorized liaison and the establishment of "revolutionary ties" between workers' mass organizations "within their municipalities;" and 4) permitted students to liaise to factories and the workers in turn to send representatives to the local schools. These provisions were applicable to all "factories, mines, businesses, and scientific research and development bodies" at the county level and above.

Actually, Revolutionary Rebel organizations were already quite active in several of the major cities; furthermore, certain of the favored Red Guard groups (e.g., Peking Aviation, Peita, and Tsinghua) had liaised to factories
on many occasions prior to Chang and Chi's sanctioning such activity on 11 November. However, the magnitude of worker (and, to a lesser extent, peasant) participation increased greatly after November.* Such participation would be resisted by incumbent officials (as they had already resisted—often successfully—the initial Red Guard onslaughts) and culminate in a bloody confrontation at the turn of the year, when Mao called upon the militants to "seize power" from those who remained recalcitrant.

B. The Anting Incident

The first major conflict involving the Revolutionary Rebels arose in Shanghai during the second week of November. Referred to as the "Anting Incident," the clash was triggered by opposition on the part of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee to the establishment of the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters (hereafter referred to as the Workers' GHQ). On 8 November, representatives of the Workers' GHQ requested an appointment with Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu to discuss the holding of the GHQ's inaugural meeting on the following day. Tsao, who had closeted himself in a hotel, sent a subordinate to meet with the rebels who, in turn, presented three demands: 1) recognition of the GHQ as the revolutionary organization of Shanghai's workers, 2) material support, and 3) Tsao's attendance at the inaugural meeting. Tsao refused, countering with a so-called "three-no black directive"—"no participation, no recognition, no support"—and an order to production heads to dissuade their workers from attending the meeting.

*On 15 December, another Central Committee directive extended the cultural revolution to the villages, authorized the exchange of "revolutionary ties" between production brigades and between communes, and rescinded the earlier regulations prohibiting Red Guard activity below the county level.
The next day, as a result of Tsao's refusal, some 3,000 members of the Workers' GHQ commandeered a train bound for Peking in an attempt to plead their case before the Central CRG. At Anting (some twenty miles west of Shanghai), the train was stopped by railroad authorities. Central CRG head Chen Po-ta fired off a telegram to the workers which stated that they should return to work immediately, but could send a delegation of "not more than twenty people" to Peking if they had "most urgent business." The workers criticized Chen's telegram as "revisionist," blocked all rail traffic on the line for at least two days, and submitted an expanded list of demands that they said must be accepted before they would leave the train and return to Shanghai.* On the 13th, Chang Chun-chiao (who had been sent to Anting by Mao himself to deal with the situation) met with the workers, apologized on Chen's behalf for his telegram ("he was very busy that day and didn't have the time to properly study the situation"), accepted their demands, and ordered his acceptance posted in every Shanghai factory.

Tsao, the Shanghai Party apparatus, and the East China Bureau were thus identified publicly as fair game for the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels. Soon after the Anting Incident, leading Peking militants Nieh Yuantzu, Kuai Ta-fu, and many of their followers arrived in Shanghai to organize a "revolutionary headquarters" and join with the Workers' GHQ in "bombarding" the Municipal Party Committee. On 22 November, Madame Nieh spoke before a Shanghai Red Guard rally and condemned Tsao as an accomplice of Teng Hsiao-ping. Her address was followed

*The demands were: 1) recognize the Workers' GHQ as a revolutionary, legal organization; 2) recognize the workers' actions as revolutionary and correct; 3) assign full responsibility for the Anting Incident to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the East China Bureau; 4) order Tsao to make a public self-criticism of his actions; and 5) provide "full facilities" for activities of the Workers' GHQ.
by daily demonstrations against Tsao and his administration, but the Mayor still had the support of a sizeable majority of Shanghai's workers and municipal Party and government employees. Posters appeared criticizing Chang Chun-chiao for his "chicken-hearted" recognition of the demands of the Workers' GHQ, described as a "small group of people who have usurped the name of the Shanghai working class,"* and Liberation Daily (the Shanghai Party paper) refused to reprint Madame Nieh's 22 November vituperations. Nevertheless, the days of the Shanghai apparatus were numbered. In early December, attacks on Tsao reached a peak, with massive demonstrations around the clock. On about the 4th, armed PLA forces stationed in the municipal offices disappeared just before the militants took over the building, and did not return until the Red Guards were in full control. Shortly thereafter, Tsao entered a hospital and had not reappeared as of 22 December. Tsao was formally removed from office and publicly "struggled" the following month. The revolutionary Left had demonstrated its increased effectiveness as an instrument of the purge.

C. Revolutionary Long Marches: Problems and More Problems

By the end of September, as indicated earlier, Red Guard activity had inflicted very severe strains on China's transportation system (maritime as well as rail and bus). More ships were assigned to transport the Red Guards, *The posters had a point. The Workers' GHQ reportedly had a membership of 25,000 young workers and students, whereas their opponents, the Worker Scarlet Guards (disbanded by the new order the following January), had a rank-and-file of some 800,000 older workers.
cattle-boat style, on revolutionary liaison; freight trains were pressed into passenger service; and additional buses were transferred to the major cities from outlying communities. Given the volume of human traffic to be moved, such ad hoc correctives would have provided only partial relief under the best of circumstances; the Red Guards, however, did not "travel well," and would rather throw their fellows off the train than wait for the next one. Not only were schedules impossible to meet, for the Red Guards embarked and disembarked as they chose, but on several occasions they were noted either extending or changing the runs of trains and ships to suit themselves.

Other logistical problems plagued the revolutionary liaison movement. Most of the Red Guards from the south of China were unprepared for the rigors of a north or west China autumn, let alone winter. There were not enough padded jackets and warm bedding to go around, and many Red Guards fell ill. In Peking, at least, the problem was aggravated by the number of visitors and, by late October, several reports indicate that the ration for liaising Red Guards had to be cut to one roll for breakfast and a single bowl of rice for lunch and again for supper. The combined effects of poor diet, inadequate clothing, and overcrowding posed a serious health problem in the Chinese capital.

An attempt was made to ease the burdens on overland and maritime transport by touting "revolutionary long marches" or "revolutionary liaison on foot" as a "fine undertaking" for the Red Guards. In mid-October, fifteen Red Guards from the Marine Transportation Institute marched from Dairen to Peking, and their "revolutionary action" was widely hailed. For example, People's Daily on 22 October praised walking as preferable to liaising by train or bus, as did Mao and other leaders in coming days.
The shank's mare approach raised as many problems as it solved. First, it weakened further the injunctions to limit revolutionary liaison to the county level and above, and had an adverse effect on production in some rural areas. Second, assuming that anyone really cared, it made it next to impossible for a Red Guard unit to account for the whereabouts of its members. Third, most Red Guards appear to have embarked on their long marches with great enthusiasm but little or no pre-planning. As shoes began to pinch and blisters began to pop, many of the young revolutionaries called it a day and caught a bus or train, either continuing on their journey or returning home. Fourth, long marches did not appeal to some Red Guards, who clearly expected to travel in a style more befitting the Chairman's chosen. Chen Po-ta's comments on the salutary nature of liaising on foot ("You may fall ill and be unable to find a doctor..., even die..., [but] some things are hardly avoidable... You must walk the road in the same manner as Chairman Mao") were hardly calculated to appeal to non-masochists, and his remarks (as well as the aforementioned People's Daily editorial) were criticized by Red Guards from several of Peking's more august units.

The long march technique was both disregarded and obeyed; either way, it compounded the difficulties. Fortunately, the coming of winter served as a natural break on revolutionary liaison, and reduced the movement to more manageable proportions. Central leaders were quick to take advantage of this, for the Red Guards were even disrupting the daily routine of the Chairman himself.*

*In an important speech to liaising Red Guards on 11 November, Tao Chu criticized them for "storming the seat of Chairman Mao every day." ("Have we not vowed to defend the Party Central and Chairman Mao to the death? But how can we defend them by storming the place?") In particular, Tao decried the fact that the young militants were attempting to bypass channels and gain direct access to Mao. The proper approach was first to submit problems to the cultural revolution reception center (in this case, (footnote continued on page 64)
A 16 November joint directive of the Central Committee and the State Council declared that Peking would be a closed city to all provincial Red Guards after 21 November, that any Peking-bound trains carrying Red Guards would be turned back after that date, that those who came anyway would "receive no free food, no shelter, etc.," and that all must return home "directly without making any stopovers." (The deadline was later extended to 20 December.) Those Red Guards who had not yet been to Peking were assured that they would be allowed to liaise to the capital next spring. Many (if not most) Red Guards made an effort to return home before the deadline.

It is important to note that, as was the case with later directives delimiting Red Guard activities, certain units were not bound by them. In the main, these were Red Guard organizations from Peking* that were responsible and responsive to Mao, the Madame, Lin, and the Central CRG. These elite units continued to liaise after the 16 November directive (the Shanghai case will be recalled).

(footnote continued from page 63)

the center at Chungnanhai run jointly by the State Council and the Central Committee's Administration Office). If the center was unable to solve the problem, it was to be forwarded to Central CRG officials who, in turn, would submit what they could not settle to Mao, Lin, and Chou. However, Tao made it quite clear who had the final say in important matters such as appointments and dismissals: "How can we give you an answer in writing when you want to remove a provincial Party secretary? We cannot solve such a problem; it can only be solved by Chairman Mao."

*e.g., Peking Aviation's Red Flag, Tsinghua's Ching-kangshan (under Kuai Ta-fu), the New Peita Commune (Madame Nieh's outfit), the Geological Institute, and one or two more.
and often directed or were major participants in, together with local Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels, the "power seizures" of January 1967. The period of adjustment—the lull in Mao's purge—was nearly over.
VI. DECEMBER 1966-JANUARY 1967: "SEIZE POWER!"

"It's good to have internal rebellion."
---Mao to Central CRG, 9 January 1967

"When I come into contact with the students, I find that some of them are not quite right."
---An "elderly revolutionary worker," 6 December 1966

"Only the leftists are allowed to rebel; the rightists are not allowed to turn the universe upside down."
---Fukien Daily, 22 January 1967

A. The Exhortations of Madame Mao

In December, while Mao was wintering in Hangchow, the cultural revolution came under the immediate direction of his quarrelsome, vindictive wife. On the 4th, People's Daily front-paged the Madame's 28 November speech to literary and art workers, in which she called for an expansion of the ranks of the revolutionary Left and "really penetrating and extensive...exposure and criticism" of the former Peking Municipal Party Committee. During the early hours that same day, Red Guards, reportedly "inspired" by the speech, went to the residence of Peng Chen, secured the cooperation of the guards, dragged the ex-Peking First Secretary from his bed, and hustled him off to an "appointed place." The same routine was repeated at the homes of several other officials who had served under Peng. According to some accounts, the captives were then taken before a Red Guard kangaroo court. The "defendants" were found guilty, and on 12 December, a mass rally was held to condemn Peng and his luckless subordinates. The public abasement of former officials (as well as their relatives),* often involving considerable physical brutality, became a regular feature of the purge, and Red Guards from Peking Aviation Institute's Red Flag as well

*Madame Mao has evinced a particular interest in seeing that the wives of many of these officials are also given (footnote continued on page 67)
as Tsinghua's Chingkangshan were especially active in "dragging out" prominent figures.

The Madame and other members of the Central CRG continued to spur on the Red Guards during the rest of December. On the 16th, she called for the "destruction of all capitalist power-holders." Two days later, she was more specific. Addressing a Red Guard rally, Madame Mao blamed the Peking Public Security Bureau for recent fighting in the capital, said that the Bureau, the Procuratorate, and the Supreme People's Court were "bourgeois," and urged the Red Guards to "rise up in rebellion" and "take over" these three departments. On the 19th, the Madame turned her malevolent attention to the Peking staff offices maintained by the various provinces and major cities. "In fact, these staff offices are engaged in espionage activities against us," she said, and ordered the Red Guards to "chase the personnel away and take back the buildings." One week later, Madame Mao and Chen Pota endorsed a 25 December takeover of the Ministry of Labor by "revolutionary workers," and also approved a similar takeover of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. The movement to "seize power" was under way.

B. The "January Revolution" in Shanghai and the Evils of 'Economism'

The Anting Incident (discussed earlier) and the takeovers in Peking demonstrated the power of the revolutionary Left, expanded and revitalized, to bring down

(footnote continued from page 66)
the business. On one occasion, for example, after having been assured that several purged officials had been worked over, she asked, "Have you struggled their landlord wives? Have you really struggled them?" Wang Kuang-mei ("...that crone"), Liu Shao-chi's wife, was a special target of the Madame's wrath. On 27 December, Madame Mao told a Peking Red Guard rally that Wang Kuang-mei was a "dishonest person," and added, "I support those who would seize her." Wang Kuang-mei was "dragged out" for the first time 10 days later.
officials accused of opposing the cultural revolution. In one important sense, the leftists succeeded all too well. Following the Maoist dictum that "destruction must precede construction," the Revolutionary Rebels and Red Guards established that they could tear down established structures very effectively, but they proved to be woeful failures when it came to working together to construct a new order.

Nowhere is this shown more clearly than in Shanghai, regarded by Mao to be second in importance only to Peking itself. Following the resolution of the Anting Incident in mid-November, at which time Mao ordered the Shanghai Party apparatus to accept the demands of the Workers' GHQ, the municipal administration was powerless to resist further Rebel attacks and maintain order. Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu and First Secretary Chen Pei-hsien, although not yet formally dismissed, were clearly through, and by the end of December, China's largest city was in chaos. Competing Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups held mass demonstrations; local officials were publicly "struggled;" public security and military forces did little or nothing to control the situation; production and essential services ground to a halt.

A major cause of the turmoil in Shanghai was the nature of the opposition to the Tsao-Chen administration. First, there were the fanatics from Peking, such as Nieh Yuan-tzu and Kuai Ta-fu, who were determined to establish a new, Maoist order. As was the case in other areas, many local Red Guards resented the superior attitude often shown by these outsiders, especially inasmuch as the Shanghai groups considered themselves to be just as "red" as the visitors, and certainly more knowledgeable with regard to local conditions. Second, there were groups with essentially political grievances, personified by the Worker Scarlet Guards, who resented the claims of the much smaller Workers' GHQ that the GHQ was the spokesman for the Shanghai working class. (This was a major factor in precipitating the Scarlet Guards' general strike in late December.) Third, many residents of Shanghai and its environs took advantage of the disorder to press a welter of economic demands.
SECRET

RED GUARDS HUMILIATING "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES"
The caption at the top of the pamphlet reads: "On 10 April in Peking, a general meeting was convened to struggle against reactionary element Wang Kuang-mei and to declare the death sentence on the Liu-Yeng black headquarters. In the course of the meeting, Wang Kuang-mei was dragged out three times to face the masses. Before the indignant condemnation of the revolutionary masses, Wang Kuang-mei was forced to kneel and beg pardon before the portrait of Chairman Mao."
These complainants included industrial workers (who sought higher wages, shorter hours, improvements in the welfare system, and better housing), contract/temporary workers (who demanded that they be covered by existing wage and welfare scales),* and peasants.

A poster dated 14 January, entitled "An Appeal to All Revolutionary Commune Members and Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants," gives a clear indication of the kinds of demands -- totally unrelated to the priorities of the cultural revolution, but of overriding concern to a majority of the population -- that, if allowed to continue unchecked, could have spelled disaster for the Maoists. Composed by peasant Revolutionary Rebel groups from the Shanghai area whose representatives had gone to Peking to complain about the inequities of rural life, the poster listed thirty-five specific grievances. Naturally, all of the grievances were said to have resulted because of the nefarious activities of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee ("...followers of the Liu-Teng line"). What is most interesting, however, is that, of the thirty-five grievances, only the last seven had any relation to cultural revolution matters (e.g., "Why is it that the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung are unavailable in the countryside?") and appear to have been added almost as an afterthought in an attempt to add a suitably "revolutionary" touch to a very detailed accounting of material privation.**

*Contract/temporary workers are paid for their labors on a piece-work basis. In her 26 December speech, Madame Mao had stated that these workers "have suffered the most" and blamed Liu Shao-chi for the inequities of the contract labor system. The following month, however, the demands of these workers were rejected as reflecting only their own "personal and short-term interests."

**The peasants' complaints ran the gamut from attacking Tsao and Chen for using the rural areas as "the general garbage can" in which to dump urban undesirables to decrying the lack of bean-curd on holidays ("even though we grow the beans"). Other grievances included: lack of proper teachers in rural areas, lack of opportunities for rural children to attain a better life than their parents, (footnote continued on page 70)
By the end of December, the situation in Shanghai had reached a state of near anarchy. Shortly before Christmas, dock workers went on strike, tying up more than one hundred ships in the harbor. Soon thereafter, the strike spread to the railway system and shut down all service to the port city, cutting off the supply of coal and other raw materials. Workers in the power plants and water-works also struck, and by the first week in January, a serious food shortage had developed.

The moribund Municipal Party Committee was powerless either to restore order or to resist the workers' demands (higher wages, funds to support their revolutionary liaison and other cultural revolution-related activities, etc.). According to a later New China News Agency (NCNA) account, Shanghai officials approved retroactive pay increases and subsidized revolutionary liaison in an attempt to get the Revolutionary Rebels out of Shanghai. "They ordered the banks," NCNA reported, "to 'pay the checks so long as you have the money.'" This caused a general run on the banks and much panic-buying. According to one source, the Shanghai branch of the People's Bank of China had paid out "about ten million yuan" by the close of business on 7 January; another large amount ("more than two million yuan") was paid out by the municipal commercial department; and many factory managers attempted to assuage their employees by allotting them funds out of production capital.* In addition, Red Guards in Shanghai

(footnote continued from page 69)
inadequate medical services, the ignorance of officialdom concerning the peasants' problems, preferential treatment accorded urban workers, and the great disparity in the urban-rural wage scale. Still others denounced a 1966 tax increase, poor housing compared with that available to industrial workers ("Just what is the attitude of these dogs of officials in the towns toward the peasants?") lack of meat, and the fact that whereas grain was bought by the state for $4.00 a picul (133-1/3 lbs.), the peasants had to pay $6.60 and up for a picul of manure.

*Such practices were by no means confined to Shanghai. In Fukien, the Provincial Party Committee is said to have provided more than two million yuan in wage increases and "supplementary allowances" during the first ten days of January. Swatow (Kwangtung) workers reportedly received bonuses ranging from 200 to 500 yuan, as well as 200 yuan per man if they wished to liaise. Many other examples could be noted. -70-
(and elsewhere) received a daily subsidy of .4 to .8 yuan to support their "revolutionary activities in the factories."

By early January, the mess in Shanghai had become so serious as to require a "power-seizure" for which, it soon became clear, the Maoists were poorly prepared. On 4 January, the Revolutionary Rebels (led by the Workers' GHQ) seized control of the Wen Hui Pao and, the next day, published a "Message to the People of Shanghai," appealing to them to return to work and refuse any further pay-outs from "bourgeois reactionary" officials. This was followed four days later by an "Urgent Notice," signed by thirty-two groups including the Shanghai liaison stations of the Peking Third Headquarters, Aviation Red Flag, and Tsinghua Chingkangshan, inter alia calling for the restoration of order, a cessation of revolutionary liaison, and the freezing of funds. On 11 January, a joint "Message of Greetings" to the Shanghai rebels from the Central Committee, State Council. Military Affairs Commission (MAC), and the Central CRG hailed the rebels' actions as "a brilliant example for the working class and all laboring people and revolutionary masses throughout the country." That same day, a Central Committee directive entitled "Oppose Economism" denounced the use of "various means of economic bribery" by the "capitalist-roaders" in their attempt to lead people to "exclusively pursue personal and short-term interests and disregard the interests of the state and the collective," and ordered banks to "refuse all payments...if such payments are not in conformity with state regulations."

Although the 11 January directive claimed that "economism" was a tactic employed by opposition elements in order to wreck the cultural revolution, it is quite clear that in some cases the demands for higher wages and improved welfare benefits originated with the workers themselves.* Thus, the "power-seizure" in Shanghai was,

*For example, on 31 December, "all revolutionary comrades" of the Haiyen (Chekiang) Post and Telecommunications Bureau sent a message to the Ministry in Peking demanding a 7% pay increase and giving the Ministry one week to approve the raise. Further confirmation of pressure from the workers was provided by the Politburo decision in late December to abrogate the authority of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, freeze the Federation's (footnote continued on page 72)
in effect, a rescue operation. The Tsao-Chen administra-
tion was formally removed on 5 February and replaced by
the Shanghai People's Commune (soon renamed the Shanghai
Municipal Revolutionary Committee), headed by Central
CRG members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan. In the
months ahead, the new team would face the formidable
task of pacifying Shanghai and re-establishing central
authority over a populace whose cultural revolution
desiderata were often in conflict with Mao's objectives
in the purge.

C. "Power-Seizure," Failure, and PLA Intervention

The aforementioned 11 January instruction that
revolutionaries throughout the country should emulate
their counterparts in Shanghai led to a series of "power-
seizures," accompanied by much bloodshed and violence,
in almost every province and major city. Although the
Maoists had stated repeatedly that there were only a
"handful" of "capitalist-roaders" to be dealt with, the
Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels heard only the call
to "seize power," and thus subjected to severe attacks
a number of officials who were later declared to be "good
comrades" and retained by Mao in positions of consider-
able responsibility. This led to a deep-seated and con-
tinuing hostility on the part of many Red Guard and Rev-
olutionary Rebel organizations toward those appointed to
the Revolutionary Committees -- the new organs of power
-- established (often with great difficulty) since the
"January Revolution," for those who have survived the
purge have, by and large, been assigned to posts in the
same province where they had been under attack. In
Kwangtung, for example, the powerful and militant Red
Flag faction was strongly opposed to Huang Yung-sheng,
Commander of the Canton Military Region, yet Mao later
appointed Huang to head the Kwangtung Provincial Revolu-
tionary Committee. At the same time, the Maoists continued

(footnote continued from page 71)
capital, and render as "completely invalid all documents
and notices signed by the Federation during the previous
stage of the cultural revolution." For an excellent,
detailed account of workers' demands in Shanghai, see
to regard the Red Flag as a true "revolutionary" organization and, in effect, told Huang and the young militants to let bygones be bygones. In Canton (and elsewhere), however, many Red Guards were unwilling to do so.

A major reason for the failure of many "power-seizures" was the fact that a given Red Guard/Revolutionary Rebel faction or alliance usually attempted to seize power only for itself. This often led to a second round in which the excluded faction(s) would attempt to wrest control away from those who had carried out the initial seizure, the net result being a bewildering game of "Who's Got the Chop?"

A second problem centered around just what Mao meant by "power-seizure." It may be that he really believed that the young toughs, armed with his "thought," could seize and exercise power in an effective manner. If so, Mao couldn't have been more wrong. On the other hand, he may have meant only for the militants to supervise the work of Party and government cadres and keep them at their posts until a determination was made (by the Chairman, not by the Red Guards) with regard to their loyalty. If this was what Mao had in mind, and it seems the more likely alternative, he must have been rudely shaken by the self-seeking aberrations served up by many of his "revolutionary young generals."

Official statements made during mid-January did little to resolve the "power-seizure" question. On the 15th, Chou En-lai and Chen Po-ta told a workers rally that the "supervision formula" was "much better and more practical" than the formula of "seizure and control." Two days later, however, at a reception for Revolutionary Rebels from institutes of higher education, Chou told his audience, "Where conditions are ripe (whatever that meant), seize power. Where conditions are not ripe, exercise supervision." Few Red Guard or Revolutionary Rebel organizations would feel that conditions were not "ripe" for them to effect a takeover, the results of which were quite candidly assessed by one Red Guard publication the following March:

In some units, although the power-seizure was carried out by revolutionary mass organizations, there was only "seizure" but no "alliance," thus neglecting one work procedure. In other units, there is actually alliance in name only, and a single group is in control. Some alliances are
too narrow in scope, and regard themselves as "pure and elevated." They find fault left and right with other revolutionary mass organizations, and always regard it as beneath their dignity to form an alliance with them...

Apart from this, in some units the guests are known to have ousted the hosts, leading to a power-seizure by an outside group. In the eyes of these outside groups, there is not a single good person in that unit. The comrades of the Left who have all along persisted in struggle in that unit are also pushed aside by the outsiders, who regard themselves as saviours.

Other groups have violated the principle of "extending from one's own unit to the whole system." Their eyes are bigger than their stomachs, and they want to seize the entire system in one fell swoop. As a result, they have seized only some wooden chops, are unable to function and exercise power, and exist only on paper.

All this ends in only seizure of the chop but not the seizure of power; it is phony and a power-seizure in name only. It is not a genuine power-seizure by the proletarian revolutionary Left.

The author of this assessment was not exaggerating. For example, information is available from Red Guard sources concerning attempted or actual "power-seizures" during the period 14-22 January 1967 in twenty-four central government ministries in Peking. Of the twenty-four, only three were carried out in a relatively smooth manner (Ministry of Textile Industry, Ministry of Finance, and the 1st Ministry of Machine-Building), although another four "seizures" were apparently successful, but only after quite some difficulty. The remaining seventeen were rough, unsuccessful affairs, involving takeovers and counter-takeovers (in the Ministry of Forestry, there were four rival "power-seizure" within six days) that left the ministries in great confusion and the forces of the "revolutionary Left" badly split.
In most of the provinces, the situation was equally serious, the "power-seizure" carried out in Kwangtung being a good example. On the afternoon of 21 January, members of the militant Chungshan University Red Flag met with Kwangtung 1st Secretary Chao Tzu-yang to criticize the past "errors" of Chao's administration. After the meeting, Chao and three other members of the Provincial Party Committee were herded aboard a propaganda truck and taken to Chungshan for further interrogation. During the course of the evening session, Chao was asked for his views concerning "power-seizures," to which he replied, "The question has to be decided by the revolutionary rebels, who might send representatives either to supervise us or to seize power from us." At this point, the session adjourned, but the four Party leaders were required to spend the night at the university.

Early the next morning, two Red Flagists handed Chao a "seize-power" order, demanded that he turn over the official chops of the Provincial Party Committee, the General Office, and the Provincial CRG, and informed him, "From now on, you'll take orders from us, and we'll take orders from Chairman Mao." To this, Chao replied that he supported the Red Flagists' "revolutionary action," inasmuch as "power-seizures have been called for by Chairman Mao himself," and sent a note to Lin Li-ming (another Provincial Party Secretary) instructing him to give the three chops to the bearers of the letter. However, Lin refused and went to Chungshan to explain to the Red Guards that the chops could not be handed over without Central Committee approval. This was unacceptable to the Red Flagists, since a reply from Peking might not be immediately forthcoming, and it was finally agreed that the militants could take possession of the chops pending instructions from the Central Committee. Accordingly, the takeover was reported to Huang Jung-hai, Commander of the Kwangtung Military District, who forwarded the news to Peking. Chou En-lai replied by telephone (probably that same day) that the "power-seizure" should be supported, but that the PLA should be called out to maintain order if necessary.
On the afternoon of the 22nd, the militants demanded that the Provincial Party Committee issue a public statement announcing the takeover of the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Public Security Department, and the Canton Municipal Public Security Bureau. The statement was composed at a meeting of the Committee's Secretariat that same afternoon, the procedure being monitored by several Chungshan students representing the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Rebel Joint Committee (hereafter KPRRJC, the new "revolutionary organ of power"). That evening, a larger meeting was held, attended by members of various Provincial Committee departments, to appraise leading cadres of the statement prior to publication and to make clear the Provincial Committee's favorable disposition toward the takeover. All cadres were told to support the "power-seizure" and continue to stay on their jobs. The KPRRJC representatives in turn expressed their approval of the "positive attitude" displayed by the Provincial Committee, but again warned that the cadres must obey the orders of the supervisory groups that would be assigned to the various bureaus and departments.

The following day, the statement was published. Entitled "A Message from the Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee To All Party Members, Cadres, and People of the Province," the Party Committee announced the 22 January takeover by "local and non-local revolutionary rebels,"* declared its "resolute support" for the "power-seizure" and "solemn acceptance of supervision," confessed to having carried out the "bourgeois reactionary Liu-Teng line," and promised to learn from the Red Guards' "wisdom and spirit of revolutionary rebellion."

*The "non-locals" included Red Guards from the Peking Third Headquarters, Aviation Red Flag, Tsinghua Chingkangshan, and the Harbin Military Engineering Institute.
On the face of it, the "power-seizure" in Kwangtung Province was over; in reality, it had hardly begun. Too many local Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups had been excluded by the Chungshan coup, and a torrent of criticism concerning the peremptory actions of the KPRRJC was not long in coming.

The main complaints of those who were aced out by the takeover were quite like those levelled by Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups who had not been included in the "power-seizures" in other provinces. In the Kwangtung case, the Chungshan Red Flagists apparently envisioned a rebel alliance composed of seventeen units, nine of which were non-local organizations, to join in the 22 January takeover. However, three Canton units refused to participate (because the non-locals were in the majority), and another two local organizations listed as members of the original alliance claimed that they had not participated in any KPRRJC activities, let alone policy decisions, and that their names were being used without their authorization. Therefore, these groups -- together with others that had not been included -- branded the Red Flag takeover a phony "power-seizure" perpetrated to further the selfish interests of a select few at the expense of the true interests of the "revolutionary Left."

Other groups condemned the takeover as a total fraud, a "royalist" plot by Chao Tzu-yang and his colleagues to save themselves by making a deal with the Chungshan rebels. The latter, so this argument runs, would allow Chao and company to continue doing business at the same old stand (under the guise of being supervised) in return for a piece of the action. Finally, a major complaint was that the "power-seizure" was carried out solely by local and non-local students (no worker or peasant organizations took part in the initial takeover). Thus, the takeover was illegal on the basis of this criterion alone -- the working class, the "vanguard of the revolution," had been excluded.

Stung by the volume and manner of opposition (one or more counter-takeovers were attempted), the "power-seizure" group attempted to establish its revolutionary bona fides by announcing that, far from being a small
monopoly; the KPRRJC was composed of "eighty-four: large and small member organizations" and publishing a roster. The list, however, was greeted with hoots of derision. The names of some of the organizations were wrongly given (implying that the Chungshan crowd didn't even know enough about these groups to get their handles straight); one outfit listed as a member organization was a "Combat Corps" made up of a grand total of seven people; and the leaders of many of the eighty-four units had no knowledge that they were KPRRJC members—in short, the roster was padded. Actually, the Red Flagists and their allies gave the show away themselves by announcing that the eighty-four units "either have directly applied for membership or were recommended by member units after the 22 January power-seizure," and that those "recommended" units "will be deemed to have agreed to join the KPRRJC" unless a demurral was made within twenty-four hours. This gambit backfired, as several of the major invitees (including the Canton Workers' Scarlet Guards) did not receive the notice until long after the deadline had expired and, thus, condemned the whole business as a put-up job (which it was). The Red Flagists' second stab at attaining general legitimacy—this time with a roster of forty-seven units—was also a fiasco.

If any of Mao's bromides are applicable to the "power-seizure" phenomenon, it is his observation that no group voluntarily relinquishes its authority. As if to prove the Chairman's prescience, the competing Red Guard/Revolutionary Rebel forces were soon at each other's throats, with each group or alliance attempting to demonstrate by force that it alone was truly militant. The "revolutionary masses" has reached a state of criticality.

An early indication that Mao realized the "power-seizure" movement was a bust was provided by a 19 January Central Committee announcement that "bad people are inciting the pillage of warehouses" and, therefore, the PLA "must be dispatched immediately to exercise military control over all important granaries, warehouses, prisons, and other units which must be protected and watched . . . ." The
order warned that any violations would be "severely punished."* On the 21st, according to Peking wall-posters, Mao informed Lin Piao that the PLA must be ordered in, as the previous policy of non-intervention had been a failure. Chou En-lai affirmed that PLA intervention was required, and admitted that "sufficient preparations had not been made when it was decided to launch the great cultural revolution in the factories" -- in other words, the Revolutionary Rebels had failed, as had the Red Guards before them.**

Accordingly, on 23 January, Peking announced that the PLA -- "the most vital instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat" -- must henceforth "satisfy the demands of all true revolutionaries for support and assistance." Inter alia, the order stated:

1. All past directives concerning PLA non-intervention in the cultural revolution...are null and void;

2. Active support must be rendered to the broad masses of revolutionary Leftists in their struggle to seize power. Where true proletarian Leftists ask for help, the PLA should send troops to provide them with positive support;

3. Counterrevolutionaries and counterrevolutionary organizations who oppose the proletarian revolutionary Leftists must be resolutely suppressed. Should they resort to force, the PLA should strike back with force;

*One week earlier, NCNA had announced the establishment of a new group to direct the cultural revolution in the PLA. This group was to be responsible both to the MAC and to the Central CRG; the ubiquitous Madame Mao was appointed its "advisor."

**As Wang Li complained on 2 February, "After the "power-seizure," all that remained were some empty offices and chops."
4. The entire country should receive a penetrating education concerning the struggle between
the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois reactionary
line represented by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.*

5. This directive must be transmitted in full
to every fighter of the PLA.

Although ostensibly directed against opponents
of the cultural revolution, the real reason behind the
23 January directive was the need to restore order and
end the increasingly severe conflicts between rival Red
Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations, and many of
these organizations bore the brunt of the PLA crackdown.
In Kwangtung, for example, Huang Yung-sheng was quick to
dissolve the KPRRJC, issue a cease-and-desist order to
the Chüngshan Red Flagists and their cohorts, and impose
military control over Party, governmental, and industrial
departments at all levels. On the 26th, People's Daily
commented favorably on the suppression of a "counter-
revolutionary" veterans organization in Harbin, and on
or about that date, Chou En-lai denounced six other
Rebel groups in identical terms. (Chen Po-ta stated
that Chou's denunciation "represented the views of Chair-
man Mao.") Similar reports of PLA intervention were noted
throughout China, with particular attention given in some
areas to military takeovers of the public security ap-
paratus.

It is not known what (if any) criteria were sup-
posed to be employed in determining which mass organi-
zations were to be supported and which were to be sup-
pressed. Chou had identified a few groups (and also
issued a blanket condemnation of all "national counter-
revolutionary organizations"), but it appears that local
PLA commanders were given considerable latitude in this
regard, and that their decisions were almost certainly
influenced by the attitudes which the Red Guards and

*This is believed to be the first public denunciation
of Liu and Teng in an official source.
Revolutionary Rebels had displayed already toward the military authorities (Sinkiang and Tibet are cases in point).

Indeed, it is difficult to see what criterion could be used by the PLA aside from determining which organizations were the most responsible for the violence and least responsive to injunctions to knock it off. Unfortunately for some military commanders, although it was to be expected, much of the violence was perpetrated or, at least, initiated by the more militant Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups. When a number of these groups, suppressed by the PLA as a result of the 23 January directive, were later restored to favor by Mao and the Central CRG, the responsible military commanders had to pay for their earlier "errors." In point of fact, however, a determination of "revolutionary" or "counterrevolutionary" (given the command to restore order) was impossible except on pragmatic grounds, inasmuch as every Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organization identified itself with the Maoist cause. There is good evidence that even the Chairman and his inner circle did not know which group or groups to support in some areas, for the Central CRG reversed its earlier decisions in a number of cases.
Indeed, as a result of shifting and often contradictory policy guidelines, many Party and PLA figures would be removed to explain away each reversal; Mao and the Madame remained infallible.
VII. MODERATION, LEFTIST RESURGENCE, AND FURTHER CALLS FOR ORDER (SPRING 1967)

"Though Chairman Mao's line is in absolute control here, the general situation is still changing constantly."

--A Shanghai resident, 7 April 1967

A. Leashing the Leftists

"My life has been very dull since I returned from revolutionary liaison."

--A Fukienese Red Guard, 11 April 1967

By the end of January 1967, the Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels were quietly dropped by Mao in favor of a new exemplar—namely, the "Red Rebels" of Heilungkiang who had effected a "power-seizure" on the 31st and established the initial Provincial Revolutionary Committee (PRC). The day before, Peking Radio broadcast a major Red Flag editorial demanding the formation of "three-way alliances" of Revolutionary Rebels, military, and "revolutionary leading cadres" in provisional organs of power at all levels. The editorial reaffirmed earlier promises that

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*On the 31st, at a Harbin mass rally, the Heilungkiang PRC promulgated its "Notice No. 1." The Notice proclaimed that "all power" now resided with the PRC, that the PRC would support all "genuine Red Rebels," that cadres should "stick to their posts . . . so as to win victory in both production and revolution," and that those who violate the law "will be punished immediately." The Notice also outlawed five mass organizations in Heilungkiang (three "counterrevolutionary," two "royalist") and called for the "severe punishment" of the ringleaders but leniency toward the "hoodwinked" rank-and-file.
cadres would be forgiven their past errors if they were truly repentant, urged the Revolutionary Rebels to suppress the "desire to overthrow everything," and ordered them to join with and give the leading roles to revolutionary cadres, inasmuch as these cadres "have acquired comparatively richer experiences in struggle, are more mature politically, and possess greater organizational strength." The Rebels, touted as the revolutionary vanguard only a few weeks earlier, were now ordered to the back of the bus.

On 9 February, the Heilungkiang PRC announced its organizational set-up. In general, the PRC was a somewhat streamlined amalgamation of the old Party and governmental apparatus, with the "revolutionary" Party cadres (such as Pan Fu-sheng) and PLA officers (such as Wang Chia-tao, Commander of the Heilungkiang Military District) holding down the top slots. Lower-ranking revolutionary cadres were to be kept on, as were those who had committed minor errors but had already made amends or displayed a desire to make amends. Cadres who had committed serious mistakes but were willing to change their ways were to be allowed to work under supervision; incorrigibles would be suppressed.

On the same day, Peking came out with a statement on the Heilungkiang "power-seizure." The actions of Heilungkiang's Revolutionary Rebels were highly praised, as was the role of the Heilungkiang Military District in "supporting" the Rebels in accordance with the 23 January directive. Especial kudos, however, were reserved for Pan Fu-sheng, who (together with Wang Chia-tao) was said to have contacted the Revolutionary Rebels on his own in order to "learn" from them. This initiative so impressed the Rebels that they in turn "invited" both Pan and Wang to join the PRC (as Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively). Thus, each element of the model "three-way alliance" had acted in exemplary fashion, and their counterparts throughout the country were urged to act in the same manner.*

*This was reiterated in a 19 February Central Committee directive which stated that "power-seizure" committees must be based on "three-way alliances," and that the Central Committee must approve every "power-seizure" before it is announced in the local press. The following month (16 March), Wang Li announced, "Power-seizures must pass the inspection of the Central CRG and be approved by Chairman Mao. Only then are they in order."
If the new model was to be followed successfully in other provinces, a basic requirement was to end the local/non-local hostilities that had erupted in many areas due to the fractious activities of liaising Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels. Accordingly, a 3 February Central Committee directive ordered all Red Guards engaged in "revolutionary long marches" to return to their schools, notified those non-Pekingese contingents still in the capital that no free meals would be provided after 7 February, and authorized free travel by train or boat until the 18th to facilitate the return of "long marchers" more than three hundred miles away from their schools. On 21 February, another directive expanded the recall order to include everyone engaged in revolutionary liaison except, and it was an important exception, "those granted special permission by the Central Committee"--i.e., the Central CRG. Finally, Mao announced (7 March) that, after returning home, the Red Guards would have to "rectify their thinking, work-style, and organization," and that the PLA would direct the "rectification" and assist in reopening classes in "universities, middle schools, and the higher grades of primary schools."

References to revolutionary liaison and long marches fell off markedly during February, suggesting both considerable obedience by the Red Guards to Peking's directives and enforcement of these directives by the PLA. Liaising groups were noted at various places around the country, but most of them were discussing arrangements for returning home or to school. On the 12th, for example, Tsinghua's Chingkangshan ordered all Chingkangshan members--"including those of the liaison stations, those who have gone to factories, and those who have gone to the countryside"--to return to school within fifteen days, adding that any use of the title "Chingkangshan Liaison Station" by "any unit" would be invalid as of the 27th. On the 28th, the "Red Rebel Corps" of the Harbin Military Engineering Institute announced that it was disbanding its liaison station in Shanghai, that all "property" of the liaison station would be turned over to the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and that any member who had not returned to Harbin by 5 March would "automatically be considered to have withdrawn from the Corps."
In early March, Red Guards from Peking were noted pulling out of Lhasa and closing their liaison stations, and an additional twelve liaison stations were dissolved in Shanghai.

One major explanation for the considerable adherence to the 3 and 21 February directives was probably the termination of Red Guard emoluments (free room and board, free travel, and pocket money) for all groups except the select few that continued to liaise under authorization of the Central CRG.*

*Of course, another prime motivation for a Red Guard to hustle back to school could have been the fear that he would be expelled if he did not obey and, as a result, face the dismal prospect of being assigned to factory or farm work.
With the largesse now at an end, there was little alternative for the Red Guards other than to terminate their liaison. In addition, it appeared that, once the youths were back in school and undergoing "rectification," the intention was to prevent a recurrence of such widespread and disruptive activities as had taken place in recent months. On 19 March, a Central Committee directive stated that the previously announced plan to permit the general resumption of revolutionary liaison "during and after the coming spring" was cancelled, a further indication that only a select number of organized, responsive Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations would be permitted to engage in such activity. Thus, with the general ban on revolutionary liaison, with the PLA knocking heads together in the schools, and with the lid clamped down on the cash box, the young militants now found themselves on the receiving end.

As noted in the previous chapter, the 23 January directive authorized the PLA to use force if opposed by "counterrevolutionary organizations," yet contained no explicit criteria for the military to use in determining which groups fell into that category. Accordingly, the PLA tended to crack down on the most militant groups—namely, those embroiled in "power-seizures," counter-takeovers, and, in general, those continuing to disrupt society and ignoring orders to cease fighting and return to school. Thus, among the many Red Guard organizations
that were outlawed by provincial and regional military commanders during this period were a number of groups (including the Third Headquarters in Inner Mongolia, Tsinghai's "18 August," and the Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters in Tibet) that had powerful Red Guard allies in Peking.

For example, the Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters (LRH), established in December 1966, was a particular target of the PLA crackdown in Tibet. On 22 January, Revolutionary Rebels had seized the Administrative Staff Office and the Secretary's Office of the Regional People's Committee. Other takeovers were reported in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet in succeeding days, with at least three of them resulting in a number of deaths or injuries. The Regional Party's Control Commission was seized on the 25th, followed by a statement proposing the election of a "revolutionary congress," Paris Commune-style, to take over administrative power. By the first week in February, LRH announced that, together with the Peking Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters in Tibet (including Red Flagists from the Aviation Institute), it was in control of the Tibet Daily, three radio stations, and the NCNA branch office in Lhasa.

Initially, Chang Kuo-hua, Commander of the Tibet Military Region, appears to have maintained an equivocal attitude toward the various Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations. Reportedly, Chang originally gave the nod to the "Lhasa Combat General Headquarters to Defend the Thought of Mao Tse-tung," now on as the Great Alliance General Headquarters (GAH). After the promulgation of the 23 January directive, however, Chang opted for the LRH, only to withdraw his support on 28 January, apparently because the LRH refused to act in concert with GAH and, moreover, kept trying to establish ties with Revolutionary Rebel groups in organizations of the Military Region itself.

In early February, the situation in Lhasa worsened considerably. On the 4th, the "Tibet Autonomous Region Cultural Revolution Directorate Preparatory Committee"
announced that it had "seized power" from the Regional Party Committee and the "counterrevolutionary revisionist Chang Kuo-hua." The "power-seizure" was unsuccessful,

Such cooperation was not forthcoming, however, from the recently outlawed LRH, which, together with its allies, continued to oppose Chang. This culminated in a military crackdown on 25-26 February, at which time the PLA retook the Regional Public Security Bureau, the Lhasa Municipal Public Security Bureau, the aforementioned radio stations, and the NCNA office. Many LRH supporters were arrested, and some member units were noted switching their allegiance to the GAH. The LRH had been roundly defeated.

B. The "Adverse Current of Counterrevolutionary Restoration"

However, it soon became apparent that, in Tibet and elsewhere, the PLA, from Mao's point of view, had carried out the 23 January directive too well. In other words,
too much order had been restored; too many Red Guards had been muscled around by the military; too many Party and government officials had been confirmed in their posts (conversely, too few "revolutionaries" had seized and retained power). To correct this situation, the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels were again given the go-ahead in mid-March. This time around, the initial target was the so-called "adverse current of counterrevolutionary restoration"--also known as the "February black wind"--i.e., the practice whereby high-ranking Party officials had effected "false power-seizures" in an attempt to save the existing system and pass off incumbent cadres as "rehabilitated," even though many, if not most, of them had not gone through the prerequisites of "rehabilitation" (being "struggled," composing abject self-criticisms, and willingly accepting "supervision" by the "revolutionary masses").

An early clue that things were going to heat up again was a speech by the fanatical Kuai Ta-fu, reproduced in wall posters seen in Peking on 14 March. In his speech, Kuai warned that "Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Tao Chu are on the go"--i.e., making their move--and that "we are in a lull before the decisive battle." Admitting that the going would be rough ("be prepared to face a fresh trial") and that there were "those who say that we should stop the revolution," Kuai stated, "We must not stop now, but rather clench our fists for the heaviest blow."

A more authoritative indication was forthcoming on 27 March, with the promulgation of the nine-point Central Committee decision on the problem of Anhwei Province (made applicable to other provinces on 1 April). In this decision, the Anhwei Military District Command was taken to task because the 26 January "power-seizure" in the province had brought about neither a "proletarian revolutionary alliance" nor a "three-way alliance." Rather,

*Politburo member and Vice Premier Tan Chen-lin was accused of being the "commander-in-chief of the bourgeois adverse current of counterrevolutionary restoration" for having carried out a number of "false power-seizures" in various agricultural departments."
the result had been a Military District-sponsored monopoly by one group (the Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters), whose leaders "suppressed the Leftist masses and revolutionary cadres who held different views." Thus, the decision ordered the creation of a Military Control Commission to "take over the leadership powers in the province," directed the Commission to "resolutely support all Leftist mass organizations" and "not arbitrarily support one side against the other," announced that "any declaration that a mass organization is counterrevolutionary must first be approved by the Central [CRG]," and ordered the "release and rehabilitation without exception" of all revolutionary cadres and Revolutionary Rebels who had been arrested for opposing the 26 January takeover, as well as the reinstatement of several Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations that had been suppressed some two months earlier. At the same time, all of these organizations were told that, "where there are differences in principle," they must be resolved by peaceful means: "beating people, smashing things, robbing, ransacking, arresting people, and violent struggle are forbidden."

In sum, the PLA (through provincial and municipal Military Control Commissions) was ordered to hold the line until genuine "three-way alliances" could be realized and Revolutionary Committees established, assist the various Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups to settle their disputes, but at the same time enjoined from using force should the competing mass organizations refuse to unite. As Lin Piao spelled it out to a PLA audience on 30 March:

Do not be afraid of disorders. Such things are not important. Only by having disorder is it possible to distinguish the black elements; thus, disorder is actually a great victory . . . Many have been murdered and many have committed suicide, but these still number less than those who lose their lives in natural catastrophes, etc. Our victory is therefore greater than our losses are. Only by taking all these losses can we get the best successors. Only the good revolutionaries survive . . .
the PLA should shoot as little as possible, beat up people as little as possible, and arrest as few people as possible. Never take any action on your own initiative is a rule that PLA units must follow. Only act on orders from above. It is very important to give a detailed account of the situation to higher authorities as soon as something happens. However, remember that all provincial Party committees are rotten and that you should not listen to them. (emphasis added)

Finally, on 6 April, the MAC issued a major ten-point directive, personally approved by Mao, which in effect rendered the PLA incapable of intervening in conflicts between rival mass organizations and maintaining order. Per the directive, the PLA was forbidden to open fire on mass organizations, "be they revolutionary or controlled by reactionary elements," and was allowed only to conduct "political work"—i.e., attempt to persuade. In addition, the Army was instructed: not to arrest anyone unless approval had been obtained beforehand; not to repress any "reactionary organization" without the authorization of the Central CRG; not to take any action against "the masses who intruded into or assaulted military organs in the past, regardless of whether they are Leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, or Rightists;" to report to and seek the advice of the Central CRG and the PLA/CRG "before taking any important action;" to "skillfully persuade and educate [the Red Guards] rather than simply and cruelly issue orders;" and to correct immediately any actions or standing orders that violated the new directive.

*On 7 April, Mao instructed that recordings of Lin's speech "should be broadcast to all personnel of the Chinese PLA and to the Red Guards throughout the country. . . ."
Three days earlier, Madame Mao had promised that some of the Red Guard organizations "mistakenly" outlawed during January and February would be restored to good standing, and the 6 April MAC directive explicitly condemned Chao Yung-fu, former Deputy Commander of the Tsinghai Provincial Military District, as a counter-revolutionary for his "savage, armed suppression of revolutionary mass organizations." Accordingly, a number of groups were reinstated, including the LRH, the "18 August" in Tsinghai, and the Inner Mongolian Third Headquarters. At the same time, official media emphasized the necessity of PLA humility and prudence in dealing with mass organizations, cautioned the Army to beware of tricks by the "handful" who attempt to exaggerate the defects of the militants, and intensified the attack on Liu Shao-chi, this latter in an attempt to provide a specific enemy against which the entire revolutionary Left could unite in opposition. However, the hatreds that had been generated during the "seize-power" period were too deep-seated to be erased or assuaged in most cases, and the PLA had been rendered incapable of firmly channeling the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in the correct direction and against the correct targets. Thus, the rival revolutionary groups fell almost immediately to fighting among themselves, and several of the recently rehabilitated organizations turned their energies to settling accounts with those military commanders who had outlawed their units and arrested some of their members earlier on.* Other Red Guards took advantage of the PLA's impotence to embark on another round of revolutionary liaison, despite repeated injunctions from Peking that such activity was forbidden unless specifically authorized by the Central CRG.

As noted above, the fighting that erupted after the promulgation of the 6 April directive was largely within the ranks of the revolutionary Left itself, rather than between the militants and the remaining "bourgeois" power-

*Mindful of Chao Yung-fu's fate, the military was reluctant to firmly resist these assaults.
holders.* In Peking, for example, fighting soon broke out between several rival groups, apparently over which ones were to represent the Red Guard movement on the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee (MRC). According to wall posters, a large force from the Geological Institute "East-is-Red" raided Peita on 11 and 12 April, protesting the appointment of the venomous Madame Nieh Yuan-tzu to the MRC. The clash was apparently severe enough to require Hsieh Fu-chih (Minister of Public Security and soon appointed to head the Peking MRC) to order troops from the Peking garrison to evict the "East-is-Red" demonstrators from the Peita campus. Whether a cause or an effect of this incident, no "East-is-Red" leader was named to the MRC, although the rest of the "big five"—Aviation Institute, Peita, Tsinghua, and the Normal College—were all represented on the MRC's Standing Committee (with Madame Nieh as a Vice-Chairman).

The developing situation was accurately described in an 18 April editorial entitled "Vigorously Oppose Anarchism," published in Capital Red Guard, organ of the Peking Universities and Colleges Red Guard Congress. "At this time," the editorial began, "a reactionary anarchist trend is spreading unchecked" with "no unified will or iron discipline" among the Red Guards: "This school unites with other schools to attack still other schools, or a school has several factions which fight among themselves, or this unit attacks that unit." Four types of Red Guards were said to be responsible for the "anarchist trend." First were the militants who were only "keen on fighting civil

*The principal victim of the shift in line at this time was Hsu Hsiang-chien, a Vice-Chairman of the MAC and head of the PLA/CRG. With the 23 January directive rescinded, Hsu became the scapegoat and was replaced as head of the PLA/CRG, with his duties assumed by his two deputies, Yang Cheng-wu and Hsiao Hua. Of course, Madame Mao continued to "advise" the group.

**The remainder of this paragraph draws heavily on OCI-D/CH's China Political Monthly, April-May 1967, dated 5 June 1967.
wars and bringing about each other's downfall, thus forgetting the general orientation of the struggle." Next came those who were "indifferent to revolutionary organization and discipline" and agitated for "independence" from and created "splits" in the Peking Red Guard Congress, knowing full well that the Congress was "already in power" and the Peking MRC "about to be set up." Third, there were those who "raided units under PLA control and units under Leftist control." Fourth, there were Red Guards interested solely in rebellion for its own sake.

Finally, the editorial encouraged the Red Guards to emphasize self-criticism, stop attacking their fellows, heed the Central CRG's call that they carry out a rectification campaign of "three to five days duration," and remember that "the serious task before us is, first of all, to direct the spearhead of struggle at . . . China's Khrushchev"--i.e., Liu Shao-chi. Interestingly, however, the editorial ended not on the customary upbeat of "Long Live Chairman Mao," but with the resigned observation that "some comrades fail to take a deep interest in this, thinking as they do that such things [condemning Liu, Teng, et al.] are like 'killing a dead tiger.'"

Also at this time, Central CRG and other leaders were busy meeting with PLA commanders and representatives of the competing Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations from the provinces and major cities. However, the delegations proved difficult to handle. They knew that the PLA had been ordered to lay off, and they refused to accept and obey instructions and unite with rival, but also revolutionary, groups. Kang Sheng was so disgusted with the caterwauls of one outfit that he retorted, "If you don't believe what I'm saying, beat it!" That such a powerful figure as Kang could be openly defied by the Red Guards--and provincial Red Guards summoned to Peking, at that--indicated clearly that obedience was no longer to be gained by simple fiat.

It was amid such conflict that the Peking MRC--ostensibly based on a true "three-way alliance"--was formally established on 20 April.
C. Mao Tries to Have it Both Ways

As a result of the deteriorating situation—increasing conflicts among "revolutionary" organizations, splits within organizations, work stoppages, and the relative lack of success in establishing PRCs and MRCs (Peking was only the sixth, with twenty-three yet to be set up)—a renewed yet modest attempt to restrain the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels began in early May. The Central CRG had already ordered the Red Guards to undertake a brief period of rectification training, with an assist from the PLA. On 7 May, Mao ordered Lin Piao to see that two weeks of similar instruction was given to Army units, thereby further diminishing the status of the PLA in the eyes of the Red Guards, for the military could not whip the young militants into shape while simultaneously undergoing rectification itself.

Additional directives were issued ordering Red Guards who were liaising without Central CRG authorization to return immediately to their schools, but by and large they were ignored. Contingents from Tsinghua and Peking Aviation Institute were aiding the LRH in Tibet; non-local Red Guards flocked into Canton; rail outages and violent clashes occurred in the "model province" of Heilungkiang; elite units from Peking and elsewhere—probably under orders from the Central CRG—returned to Szechwan to support the "26 August East-is-Red" and to Honan in support of the 7 February Commune (the violence and destruction in Chengchow appears to have been particularly severe).

On 27 May, a People’s Daily editorial announced that Mao had personally approved a recent Peking MRC notice giving the PLA "authority to deal with the question of struggle by coercion or force," and stated unequivocally that "all departments concerned must comply, and disobedience will not be allowed." On 6 June, a joint order from the Central Committee, State Council, Central CRG, and the MAC expanded upon the Peking MRC directive and prohibited the following activities: illegal arrests and
trials; seizure, removal or destruction of official documents; interference with state property; armed struggles and beatings; intra- and inter-organizational conflicts; and illegal investigations of groups or individuals and confiscation of their property. Local PLA garrisons were made responsible for enforcement.

Although the 6 June directive stated that all violators would be dealt with severely, it did not authorize the PLA to open fire on groups that disregarded the order, nor did it command the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels to surrender their weapons. Without such authorization, the PLA did not have the final "convincer," and the "revolutionary Left" continued its fratricidal war.
VIII. THE LONG HOT SUMMER

Shanghai is considered the place where the cultural revolution has achieved the best results. If Shanghai is like this, you can imagine what the situation is like in other places... God only knows how many people have been killed. This is really a world full of terror!

--A Shanghai resident, 17 June 1967

A. The Violence Continues

Although professing to support the 6 June directive, in reality the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels largely disregarded the order. The bitter factional disputes and violent conflicts in many parts of the country showed clearly that few groups were willing to stop fighting before they had asserted their "revolutionary" primacy by defeating their rivals. In point of fact, however, "revolutionary character" and ideological purity by now had little to do with many of the bloody conflicts fought during the summer of 1967. To be sure, Red Guards would describe themselves as "genuine Leftists" and their opponents as "conservatives" or "counterrevolutionaries," but, as a result of Mao's previous policy reversals, of the rehabilitation of certain groups and the fall from favor of others, and of the general confusion and breakdown of public order, such terms had lost much of their meaning and become little more than catch phrases.

Not a few members of the "revolutionary Left" made it quite clear that their overriding concern was to secure for themselves a place in the new order. For example, one Peking Red Guard opposed any move to unite the various factions because, as he put it, "I want to be a leader and fear that, if the great alliance swallows up my combat..."
corps, I will lose my position." In another case, a Revolutionary Rebel in Chengtu (Szechwan) was resentful of the fact that, although his group had been assigned a few more slots on the projected PRC than its opponent, the latter had been awarded the more responsible positions:

Now we're in the preparatory stage and we're arranged like this. What will we do when it's time to actually establish the Revolutionary Committee? We'll have no power, so we must crush them now before it's too late.

In Kwangtung, many of the "radicals" were at the bottom of the economic ladder. For example, contract/temporary workers opposed the East Wind faction because the latter's membership included many state factory workers who received higher pay and fringe benefits. Thus, the contract/temporary workers sought to "seize power" in order to "gain better jobs and more material benefits." That this was "economism" was inconsequential.

With the PLA unable to act decisively because of the constraints of the 6 June directive, the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels continued their murderous activities.*

*A good example of the extent of these constraints is provided by an incident that took place on 1 July in Kanhsien, Kiangsi Province. On that date, some 10,000 people invaded the local airport, forcing it to suspend operations. However, rather than crack down on the mob, Kanhsien officials were instructed to do nothing, even if they were "reviled and beaten."
The basic problem appears to have been Mao's reluctance to accept the fact that much of the fighting was the result of "antagonistic contradictions" within the ranks of the "revolutionary Left" itself. Thus, instead of ordering the PLA to move effectively against the troublemakers, Mao's policy throughout June and most of July was (a) to summon representatives of hostile factions to Peking where--it was hoped--they would work out their differences, and (b) to dispatch delegations of Central leaders to the provinces to settle disputes and promote the formation of "revolutionary great alliances" among competing Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations, a prerequisite for the establishment of "three-way alliances" of Revolutionary Rebels, PLA, and "revolutionary leading cadres," thus making possible the formation of a new "revolutionary" organ of power.

In addition, attempts were made to reopen the universities and colleges, with the Peking Aviation Institute selected to inaugurate the back to school movement on 3 July. However, in reporting the event, the People's Daily of 5 July stated that the "reopening of the school does not mean that the school will concentrate on [academic] studies; it means that it will conduct struggle-criticism-transformation." "Struggle-criticism" was to be emphasized until mid-July, then "transformation" stressed until 1 September, at which time those students still on revolutionary liaison would return to school and resume their regular studies. Apparently the students were none too happy about returning to school, for the People's Daily account said they "consider the schedule to be too tight and too rigid," and admitted that "many problems still remain to be settled because there was not enough time and preparations were inadequate..."

At the Peking Geological Institute, which reopened on 4 July, a similar schedule was announced, with the exception that students there would devote the last ten days of August to drawing up a new curriculum which would then be introduced on a trial basis on 1 September. As of 13 July, at least nineteen institutions of higher education had reopened in Peking, five in Shanghai, seven in Shantung, and four in Heilungkiang.
If developments at Peita and Tsinghua provide any criteria, however, the situation continued to deteriorate at many of the reopened schools.

Severe fighting erupted at Peita on 7 July between Nieh Yuan-tzu's group and a rival organization led by Peita Vice President Chou Pei-yuan. Four people were said to have been killed and an additional three hundred seriously wounded. By the early hours of 9 July, the fighting had become so serious that Madame Nieh had to call for help from Chen Po-ta, Peita's President as well as head of the Central CRG. Chen remained on the campus until 4 a.m., and was apparently able to restore some degree of calm.

Two days later, however, clashes broke out again after Chou Pei-yuan's organization held a mass rally in memory of an anti-Nieh coed who had committed suicide. At the same time, Madame Nieh's crowd was meeting at another stadium on the campus, and Chou sent some of his people to tape the proceedings. They were spotted and another fight started, this time with workers joining the fray. Again, Chen Po-ta was called in to help.

In brief, the back to school movement seems to have done little more than restrict the boundaries of Red Guard violence; it certainly did not eliminate the violence itself.

B. The Wuhan Incident and its Aftermath

As noted earlier, June and July saw groups of Central leaders attempting to resolve conflicts between hostile Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups in various provinces. One such contingent—headed by Haieh Fu-chih and Wang Li and including several Red Flagists from the Peking Aviation Institute—visited Yunnan and Szzechwan in late June and early July. On 26 June, the Central Committee had issued a six-point directive, drafted by Kang Sheng and approved by Mao and Lin Piao, which ordered
rival mass organizations in Yunnan to settle their differences peacefully, cease stealing weapons, and stop attacking the PLA. On 3 July, Hsieh and Wang addressed a joint Kunming rally of the major contending factions in Yunnan Province—the "23 August Corps" and the "Yunnan Thought of Mao Tse-tung Bombardiers"—and informed them that the delegation's mission was to assure that the Yunnanese groups obeyed the 26 June order (to which both factions had assented a few days earlier).

In mid-July, Hsieh's delegation moved on to Wuhan, and it was in the Hupei capital that events transpired which moved the cultural revolution into its most leftist stage to date. Wuhan, an important industrial center and major hub on the north-south rail line, had been the scene of violent clashes and widespread work stoppages since early June and the PLA and public security forces were forbidden to intervene.

The circumstances and chain of events leading up to the Wuhan Incident are still obscure, for ex post facto Red Guard accounts contradict each other on several points. However, it is clear that Hsieh's delegation faced a different situation than had existed, for example, in Yunnan. In Yunnan, Hsieh and Wang had labored to bring about an alliance between two hostile mass organizations that were both considered by the Central CRG to be "revolutionary." In the Wuhan case, the Center opted for one side in the fracas by declaring that the so-called "Million Heroes"—an alliance with a membership reportedly in the neighborhood of 500,000 workers, students, and cadres—was a "conservative" organization, and that their opponents—the "Three Steels" (mainly workers) and the "Three News" (university students)—were "revolutionaries" who had been erroneously suppressed in March by Chen Tsai-tao, head of the Wuhan Military Region.

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Chou En-lai was already in Wuhan attempting to hammer out a settlement when Hsieh, Wang, and their entourage arrived on 14 July. Having informed the Military Region commanders of the Center's decision with regard to the conflicting organizations, Chou returned to Peking that same day, leaving Hsieh and Wang to see that the decision was carried out.

That evening, Hsieh and Wang visited Hupei University and assured the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels that they had the support of Mao, Lin, and the Central CRG. The next day, members of the rehabilitated organizations holding a demonstration in honor of the visitors were reportedly ambushed by the "Million Heroes," leaving eight people dead and a "few dozen" seriously wounded. Nevertheless, Hsieh and Wang continued on their appointed rounds, including a visit on the 16th to the "Heroes" headquarters.

Even though the "Million Heroes" had been adjudged a "conservative" faction, the Central CRG apparently did not then consider it to be beyond the pale. Wang stated the following day that he and Hsieh had asked the group to stop their armed attacks and "demagogic propaganda" and to dismantle their "defense works," but they did not order the "Heroes" to disband:

We told them that they must not use the workers and soldiers who entered the city for armed fights, that they must not incite the peasants to come to the city, that they must not stop vehicles for inspection, that they must pull down all sentry posts, surrender or destroy their weapons, and guarantee the... rights of people whose opinions differ from their own.

On the 17th, Hsieh and Wang again met with representatives of the "Three Steels," and one member of the Central delegation implied that the "Million Heroes" had threatened the visitors when he noted, "No threats of beatings can make us leave, for we are not afraid of..."
being injured. If we go, you may be placed in a passive position." At the same time, Hsieh told the "revolutionaries" to try to reach an accord with the "Million Heroes" on the basis of the 26 June six-point directive or "agree on as many points as you can." Failing that, they were urged to issue a unilateral statement forswearing the use of force.

Although both Hsieh and Wang took pains to butter up the Rebels, they made it clear that they were fairly disgusted with the good guys too:

It doesn't help your cause if you call them "Million Bandits." You won't get anywhere by cursing them. You people of Hupeí have gone too far in scolding others... [Do] not have a low-grade and vulgar revolutionary style. After all, you are university students... It's wrong to describe PLA soldiers as pock-marked [i.e., ma-p'i, one of the more effective insults in Chinese].

And the Rebels' responses--"Blood debts must be repaid..., for the struggle between the two lines leaves no room for compromise"--must have angered the two leaders even more. They adjourned the session at 2:25 a.m.

On the 19th, the team from Peking met with leaders of the Wuhan Military Region and told them:

The "Million Heroes" is a conservative organization. In assessing this organization, the military command made a mistake. The leaders of the command should confess to the Red Guards and the revolutionary masses at once and conduct self-criticisms.

That did it. One of the PLA commanders was reportedly so infuriated at this order that he walked out of the meeting, called out his troops and, together with members of the "Million Heroes," returned to the Military Region headquarters to demonstrate in protest against Hsieh and Wang.
That evening, the "Million Heroes," emboldened by the afternoon demonstration and equipped like a medieval goon squad (knives, spears, steel helmets), mounted another protest in front of the hostel where the visiting delegation was staying. By the following morning, the hostel was surrounded by the "Heroes," reportedly acting in concert with soldiers from a local PLA unit.

At this point, Chen Tsai-tao visited the scene and apparently decided to let Hsieh and Wang get a taste of what it was like to be on the receiving end, for he told them, "They [the demonstrators] are beyond our control. Deal with them yourselves."

Hsieh and Wang offered to meet with representatives of the "Million Heroes" the following day, but the demonstrators would not be put off. The visitors were taken out into the hostel garden and beaten up; reportedly, Hsieh's secretary was fatally stabbed. Hsieh was then unceremoniously deposited in his room; Wang Li was removed to the Military Region headquarters where he was bounced around in the gymnasium for several hours and then detained under guard.

As soon as the initial reports of the incident reached Peking, the East China Sea Fleet was placed on alert, several vessels were dispatched up river, and Chou En-lai returned to Wuhan to secure the release of Hsieh and Wang. Chou was successful—reportedly, elements of the Communist Chinese Air Force were instrumental in rescuing the detainees—and the battered delegation, accompanied by the Premier, arrived back in Peking on the morning of the 22nd.

The Macists' reaction to the Wuhan Incident was swift: Chen Tsai-tao was immediately ordered to Peking, accused before the Central CRG, struggled at a mass rally, and busted; the revamped Wuhan Military Region command
issued a public self-criticism dissociating itself from Chen; and the "Million Heroes" was condemned as "counter-revolutionary."

At the same time, the reaction was extreme. On 21 July, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng were said to have told a Red Guard audience that armed "conservatives" were marching from Szechwan and Hupel to link up with their allies in Honan. On the 22nd, the day of Hsieh and Wang's "triumphant" return, Madame Mao declared that the "revolutionary masses can use weapons in self-defense." Her statement was followed by a series of press attacks on the PLA, culminating in an editorial in the 1 August issue of Red Flag which stated that the movement to "overthrow and discredit...the handful of top persons in authority taking the capitalist road in the Party and the army" now "represents the general orientation of the struggle."

Finally, on 9 August, Lin Piao issued a major directive to officers of the various Military Regions and Military Districts who were in Peking to receive orders in the wake of the Wuhan Incident. Again and again, Lin warned the commanders that "the masses must not be suppressed" and ordered them, "even if you think your ideas are correct or that you're clever," to "seek instructions from and report to...Mao, the Central Committee, and the Central CRG" before acting on "any matter, large or small..." In effect, the directive rendered the PLA even more incapable not only of maintaining order, but also of defending itself against attacks by the "revolutionary masses," and Lin made it quite clear
that those commanders who disobeyed this latest instruc-
tion would be dealt with severely.

And the ramifications of this order? "Our state
machine," he said, "has many things which are capitalist
and revisionist and its fall can't do any harm. Let it
fall."

The call of overthrow the "handful" in the Party
and the army, together with the constraints placed upon
the PLA by Lin's directive, reduced China to a state of
near chaos. In Shanghai, one Revolutionary Rebel organi-
ization interpreted the "Party handful" to mean the Munici-
pal Revolutionary Committee and "kidnapped and merci-
lessly assaulted" several Committee members and "PLA
comrades." In Nanning (Kwangsi), rival Red Guard factions
are reported to have plundered rockets and other ordnance
destined for North Vietnam from a local storage depot.
In Chengtu (Szechwan), the post and telecommunications
office reported that Revolutionary Rebels were using
"machine guns, tanks, and artillery"--which was credible,
in view of the fact that many Rebels were ex-servicemen.
In Peking, ultra-militants moved against Foreign Minister
Chen Yi and other ministry heads, and were incited to at-
tack several foreign diplomatic missions.*

At the same time, in accordance with the Madame's
"attack by reason, defend by force" dictum, the Maoists
were proceeding to provide weapons to favored Red Guard
and Revolutionary Rebel factions. By mid-August, the
following organizations in Peking were given weapons:
Aviation Institute Red Flag ("more than 2,500 riflemen"),
Tsinghua Chingkangshan (500 "selected fighters"), and
the Geological Institute "East-is-Red." Other groups in
Nanchang (Kiangsi) and Foochow (Fukien) received Central
Committee authorization to bear arms.

The consequences of such a move were to be expected. As was the case the preceding autumn--when the majority of Red Guards not permitted to embark upon the initial round of revolutionary liaison took off anyway after they observed or heard of the adventures of the elite groups--those Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels who were forbidden (or, at least, not authorized) to take up arms began to seize weapons from the PLA. And, of course, the PLA was under strict orders not to resist any initiative of the "revolutionary masses" without checking with Peking. Thus, the young fanatics put aside their clubs and knives, and turned to the pursuit of their vendettas with more sophisticated weapons.

C. The Situation in Canton

Both camps claim to be on the side of Chairman Mao, but who is to tell which is true and which is false? Since there is no third way to follow, I had to choose between the two... I am really lucky if I have chosen correctly; if I am wrong, then my future will be doomed.

--A Canton refinery worker, 24 August 1967

By late July, Canton was in a state of anarchy. The two major alliances in Canton--the East Wind (comprised of some fourteen-odd factions) and the Red Flag (at least twenty-six member groups and eight outside allies)--were nothing less than two opposing armies, each in control of certain areas of the city and its environs. According to Red Guard and other reports, the organizational structure of these Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups was fairly sophisticated. Each consisted of four sections: Political Department, Propaganda Department, Combat Department, and Finance Department.

The communications system of these organizations was tightly controlled. In the 1 August Combat Corps (a Red Flag affiliate), message traffic between the
headquarters and its district branches, street branches, and sub-headquarters in neighboring towns were handled by "single line contact" between a small number of selected couriers. Each unit normally had only one such contact whose identity was concealed by the use of code numbers.

By means of such security measures to preserve the anonymity of key personnel, it was quite difficult for a given faction to gain information from prisoners or defectors as to the infrastructure and table of organization of its enemies. Interprovincial communications were also very effective, as can be seen from the fact that the first arms seizures in July were reported in Canton only a few hours after Madame Mao's speech of the 22nd.

The day after the speech, the biggest battle up to that time was fought in Canton. Although some Red Guards seem to have based their hostility toward other factions on the ideological conviction--usually erroneous--that they were opposing the class enemy, most of the violence was occasioned by the desire to come out on top. In Canton, almost every incident was triggered by some small insult or injury, developed into a brawl, and finally turned into a fierce, disorganized battle as both sides called in reinforcements.

The 23 July incident, which resulted from a stabbing at the Chungshan Memorial Auditorium, is of interest because it provides a classic example of the difficulties involved in trying to reconstruct a reasonably accurate picture of Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel activities. Based upon Red Guard posters the incident resulted in the following casualties:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Red Flag</th>
<th>East Wind</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Flag</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poster</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Wind</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveler</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>200-300</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveler</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traveler: "About forty were killed, mostly Red Flagists."

Traveler: "One passer-by was killed."

Traveler: "Twenty corpses were found in the basement of the auditorium, along with enough severed ears and noses to fill a basin."

Traveler: "Twenty-nine corpses were found in the auditorium."

Traveler: "Red Flag suffered the heaviest casualties, and four PLA soldiers died of their wounds."

As a result of the 23 July clash, travelers reported that a general air of foreboding hung over the city. People avoided going out after dark and began to establish street self-protection squads. It was feared that the Red Flag would seek reprisals, and the East Wind made it clear that its members would use firearms in future encounters.
Seizures of weapons by the contending forces increased markedly during August, a favorite source of supply being a naval arsenal in the northern part of the city where military supplies destined for North Vietnam were stored. One raid—the so-called Sanyuanli Incident—resulted in the bloodiest battle of them all in Canton. On 19 August, the Red Flag faction had grabbed firearms from the arsenal; the next day, more than a dozen truck loads of Red Flagists went back for more. The East Wind got word of this and ambushed the trucks before they got to the arsenal. Many Red Flagists were killed or taken prisoner; of the latter, it was reported that those found to be from Chungshan University were summarily executed. Estimates of Red Flag casualties ranged from one hundred to six hundred dead. The Red Flagists admitted that they had lost one hundred killed and stated that "the waters of the Huahsien Hot Springs swimming pool turned red," probably giving rise to the widespread rumor that the prisoners were driven into the pool and then shot one by one. The incident is of particular interest because it seems to have been one of the rare ones that was planned beforehand.

A noteworthy aspect of the weapons seizures in Canton was that the success of the raids apparently varied, depending upon what group seized the arms and from whom. Several reports indicate that the Red Flag faction was able to obtain quality ordnance from warehouses operated by the Kwangtung Military District (MD), but only unserviceable rifles from those run by the Canton Military Region (MR). Conversely, the East Wind secured good weapons from MR depots, but little or nothing from those of the MD.*

*Some reports indicate that a similar situation apparently obtained in Yunnan Province, where Kunming MR depots were the "23 August" faction's source of supply, while the "Bombardiers" got their weapons from Yunnan MD warehouses.
There is not enough information available to satisfactorily explain this phenomenon, although it is understandable that Canton MR commanders appeared to favor the East Wind faction, for they had been under severe Red Flag attack since early in the year. Moreover, the three sons of Huang Yung-sheng--commander of the MR--were leaders of the Soldiers of Mao's Principles, an important East Wind affiliate.

If the Kwangtung MD willingly assisted the Red Flag, why it did so is less certain. One possibility is simply that the Red Flagists had sympathizers among the staffers at MD depots. Another is that Kwangtung MD Commander Huang Jung-hai believed Huang Yung-sheng's status to be precarious, and was attempting to curry favor with the Maoists by aiding the faction that was strongly supported by such prestigious groups as Peking Aviation Institute, Tsinghua Chingkangshan, and Madame Nieh's New Peita Commune. This latter consideration may explain the fact that, even though Huang Jung-hai had engaged in activities that had the effect of undercutting his superior's position, he was not sacked after Huang Yung-sheng's confirmation as Mao's man in Kwangtung; that is, both factions were still considered to be "genuine revolutionaries." However, this explanation is a weak one. It is difficult to believe that Huang Yung-sheng, especially after he was promoted to PLA Chief of Staff, would not have removed Huang Jung-hai had the latter engaged in such activities.

A third possibility is that, inasmuch as the East Wind and the Red Flag were both "revolutionary" factions, Huang Jung-hai was carrying out Huang Yung-sheng's orders, with both men attempting to make the best of a difficult situation—that is, even though Huang Yung-sheng had no use for the Red Flag faction, he knew that its allies were close to the Central CRG. He also knew that the Red Flagists would probably not accept his support if he offered it—they were after his scalp—or, if they did, that would only serve to infuriate the East Wind. Thus, Huang ordered his MD counterpart not to resist Red Flag weapons seizures, thereby in fact managing to support both factions of the Kwangtung "revolutionary Left."
A final possibility, and the most likely of the four, is that the reports, primarily from travelers and Red Guard materials, reflected the factional bias and interests of the originators, and that the weapons seizures were actual seizures and not a cover device by means of which commanders in a faction-ridden PLA attempted to further their own interests. Thus, the seizures were not abetted by MR and MD commands—they were permitted. And they were permitted because such orders as Lin Piao's aforementioned 9 August directive denied the PLA the authority to stop them.

As a result of the seizures both factions were equipped with a wide variety of weapons, including small arms, mines, grenades, and machine guns. Several reports state that armored cars and artillery were also used, and it is known that the Red Flagists employed gunboats in one assault on the East Wind's riverine headquarters.

At the height of the violence, a rumor swept Canton that a large number of prisoners (including some lepers) had escaped from labor camps to the north and that they were responsible for the robberies and murders plaguing the city. The rumor was credible, inasmuch as prison security may have broken down with the collapse of the public security apparatus. However, some Cantonese were convinced that the Red Guards made up the story to explain away their own outrages.

In any event, the rumor won wide acceptance and resulted in the establishment of additional vigilante groups by the terrified populace. These groups would barricade their streets and attack anyone who approached at night. Many innocent persons were killed. On one occasion, for example, a young man who was apprehended sent for his sister to verify his innocence. She was unable to do this to the vigilantes' satisfaction, and the boy was stabbed to death in front of her. It was common practice to hang the corpses, bearing a sign reading "End of a Thief" or some similar epithet, from trees or telephone poles to serve as a warning to others. Reportedly, the vigilantes killed as many people during August as were killed in all the Red Flag-East Wind battles.
By the middle of the month, it was clear that the carnage had to be contained. Accordingly, the Central CRG ordered representatives of the two factions to attend a conference in Peking and effect a "revolutionary great alliance."* On 14 and 16 August, Chou En-lai and Huang Yung-sheng met with the delegations; on the 20th, the Canton MR issued a self-criticism, stating that it had erred in suppressing the Red Flag in January and apologizing for "certain mistakes made by some mass organizations under our influence..."

At the same time, elements of the Hunan-based Forty-seventh Army were transferred to Canton to help the local garrison restore order. However, the troops, equipped only with Mao's "little red book," were helpless when confronted by the armed Rebels. The conclusion of a cease-fire by the delegates in Peking also proved ineffectual, for the number of major and minor clashes continued to increase. In truth, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" seemed little more than a euphemism for lunatic, indiscriminate slaughter.

*Reportedly, the mere mention of the phrase evoked laughter in many Canton households.
IX. REPAIRING THE DAMAGE (SEPTEMBER 1967–EARLY 1968)

The line of demarcation between a thorough-going revolutionary and a deserter who stops midway can be drawn on the basis of whether or not he closely follows the great strategic plan of...Chairman Mao. If he does not, then he is disloyal to the revolution. Any interference with or even undermining of Chairman Mao's great strategic plan is a crime against the revolution.
--Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, 4 September 1967

You are not for revolutionary alliance. I think it is because you are not revolutionary but are out for yourselves.
--Madame Mao to Anhwei Rebels, 5 September 1967

A. Leashing the Revolutionary Left

Viewing the near disaster that resulted from their overreaction to the Wuhan Incident, the Maoists moved quickly to redress the balance according to the Chairman's "great strategic plan." This major pronouncement, probably delivered in late August, is extremely important to an understanding of the course of the cultural revolution since September 1967, for several of Mao's major concerns in the summer of 1968 were identical with the key points set down in his "plan" a year earlier. Accordingly, the pronouncement will be discussed in some detail.*

*The most detailed account available was received in March 1968; the following summary is based on that text. (footnote continued on page 116)
After the October (1966) Central Committee Work Conference, according to Mao, the "key point was criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line," and, "in this, the revolutionary intellectuals and young students [Red Guards] rose as the first to recognize the situation." However, in January 1967, heeding the call to seize power, "the Shanghai workers rose, workers of the whole country rose, the peasants also rose." Since then:

The progress of the movement shows that the principal force lies with the workers and peasants, as soldiers are merely workers and peasants in military uniform... Only when the broad masses of workers and peasants rise can they sweep away what the bourgeoisie possesses. The revolutionary intellectuals and young students can only then recede to the subordinate position.*

(footnote continued from page 115)
An earlier statement of the "plan" appeared in a 7 September Liberation Army Daily (LAD) editorial and was reprinted by all Peking newspapers. LAD's six-point precis of the "plan" was: "(1) do well in revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation; (2) develop and consolidate the revolutionary great alliance and the revolutionary three-way alliance; (3) consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat; (4) launch a campaign of supporting the army and cherishing the people; (5) grasp revolution and stimulate production; and (6) maintain high revolutionary vigilance and strictly guard against sabotage by the class enemy at home and abroad."

*Mao went on to note a "comparable" instance of intellectual creativity and subsequent worker-peasant primacy:
The democratic revolutionary May Fourth Movement [1919] was conceived and initiated by the revolutionary intellectuals. The revolutionary storms of the subsequent Northern Expedition [1926-28] and the Long March [1934-35] depended entirely upon workers and peasants as the principal base.
After the "power-seizures" of early 1967, Mao stated, the hope had been for a "prompt great alliance." However, this had not been possible because "petty-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas that emerged among intellectuals and young students were detrimental to the situation, and all classes continued to assert themselves." Thus, the movement to establish "revolutionary great alliances" and "three-way alliances" had to be slowed down, as "what could not be organized as a [true] alliance would disintegrate quickly if it was artificially organized." Mao was most dissatisfied with the past performance of the Red Guards and made it quite clear that they would be well advised to acknowledge worker-peasant primacy and forswear further self-seeking activities:

The intellectuals are always more sensitive and versatile than the workers and peasants, but they are usually more opportunistic. In order to carry the revolution to its successful conclusion, the revolutionary intellectuals must constantly reform themselves through labor, because they, including the young students, have been subjected to what is basically a bourgeois education for scores of years, with bourgeois ideas circulating in their blood. Unless they strive to reform their world outlook, things will run counter to their wishes.

Mao went to some length to point out that his "plan" did not mean that the cultural revolution was "rapidly coming to an end," but rather that the movement must re-direct the attacks against "correct" targets, organize "revolutionary great alliances" and "three-way alliances," point out "bad persons and devils," and "rehabilitate Party organizations" and "convene Party congresses at all levels." Two groups, Mao said, posed the major obstacles in this regard:

One is the Party persons in power taking the capitalist road [i.e., Liu, Teng, and the other tried and true targets]; the other consists of the mountain-topism and
factionalism among those Rebels who disregard efforts to promote the great alliance.

Moreover, Mao made it clear that his call for attacks against the "capitalist-roaders" did not authorize the Red Guards to attack the new revolutionary committees that were being established with such difficulty. "We must have faith in over ninety-five percent of the masses and cadres," Mao said, as well as "those who have been temporarily deceived." As for the Red Guards, Mao called for meticulous political and ideological training to eliminate "petty-bourgeois" influences—i.e., factionalism—from the ranks of the "revolutionary Left."

Numerous directives were soon promulgated in an attempt to lower the level of violence and hasten the realization of Mao's "plan." On 1 September, the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee (MRC) called on all workers to "hold fast to production," promising that, "no matter which revolutionary faction they belong to, or whether they belong to no revolutionary faction," they will be "commended and properly rewarded." In those units where production had stopped because of "struggle by force," the MRC ordered wages to be suspended; however, it stated that workers who were found not to have participated in the fighting would be paid later, implying that those who had not engaged in "revolutionary" activities might end up better off than those who had. Finally, the directive called for all weapons to be turned in or stored, and stated that any mass organization that continued to engage in violent struggle would be declared illegal and completely disbanded.*

*As an example, the MRC directive ordered that the "counterrevolutionary May 16 Corps...must be firmly banned." This group, reportedly an alliance of at least seventeen organizations (including units from the Foreign Languages Institute, Peita, Tsinghua, and possibly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), was quite active in August, with Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (footnote continued on page 119)
This was the second order to the Rebels to turn in their weapons, the first having been a directive issued a week earlier, which stated that mass organizations had to hand over their weapons to the PLA or have them "sealed" unless they were armed as a result of express authorization by the central authorities. Neither order, however, indicated who was to see that the provisions were implemented or what actions would be taken against those organizations that refused to comply.

Thus, on 5 September, a more specific directive was issued by the MAC and the Central CRG. The order prohibited any further weapons seizures, demanded that the Rebels return all ordnance seized previously, and forbade disruptions of transportation carrying military supplies (as had occurred with Vietnam-bound consignments). In order to implement the directive, the PLA was instructed to attempt to reason with those who refused to turn in their weapons and if unsuccessful, to fire warning shots into the air. Should the rebels still refuse, the military was empowered to arrest them as "counterrevolutionaries" and to defend itself if they resisted arrest or attempted to seize more arms. Subsequently, several Red Guard organizations queried the authenticity of the directive, and were informed by the Central CRG that it was indeed genuine.

(footnote continued from page 118) the primary targets. It appears that the Corps was involved in the outrages perpetrated against several foreign diplomatic missions. After the group was outlawed, Chou issued a five-point order restricting Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel demonstrations against embassies: "(1) don't beat diplomats; (2) don't stone embassies; (3) don't burn embassies; (4) don't enter diplomats' residences; and (5) don't violate the boundaries of the diplomatic missions."
That same day, Madame Mao, Kang Sheng, and Yao Wen-yuan met with representatives of the two major contending factions in Anhwei Province (both of which the Central CRG had declared to be "revolutionary mass organizations" in July). In her speech, the Madame explicitly repudiated the 1 August Red Flag editorial (which had called for the overthrow of the "handful" in the army as well as the Party) and implicitly repudiated her own 22 July exhortation to the Red Guards to arm themselves in self-defense. Now effusive in her praise for the PLA, she emphasized the "big difference between this year and last year." In 1966, the "main task was to light the fires of revolution all over the country," and she complimented the Red Guards for their "great successes" in this regard. In 1967, however, "to go out again on revolutionary liaison is the reverse of helping," yet "people are still going everywhere in a disorganized fashion creating disturbances." This, she admitted, had seriously interfered with the establishment of additional provincial and municipal revolutionary committees.*

Accordingly, Madame Mao commanded the rival Anhwei factions to effect a cease-fire, purify their ranks, and turn in their weapons to the PLA. The order was followed on 9 September by another directive giving the army the responsibility for policing the cease-fire. In addition, the latter directive authorized the "deployment of military units to preclude chance occurrences of armed conflict," and stated that "no further intervention [would be taken] by military units in those cases where bad heads are turned over by the mass organizations themselves." Impressed by the PLA's increased authority, the rival factions surrendered several of their leaders to the provincial Military Control Commission, demoted others, began to turn in their weapons, and reportedly joined together in a "revolutionary great alliance." On the 23rd, a

*Only one PRC, Tsinghai, had been set up since mid-April, bringing the total to seven—i.e., leaving 22 yet to be established.
further directive--endorsed by Mao--instructed mass organizations throughout the country to emulate the Anhwei groups in "ending their factional discord."

Additional steps were taken to curb the Red Guards during this period. In some provinces, public trials were held and criminal elements—including "juvenile delinquents" and "hoodlums using the names of revolutionary mass organizations"—were imprisoned or executed. Several second-level members of the Central CRG, including Wang Li, were purged for their reputed connections with the May 16 Corps. Such Red Guard luminaries as Peita's Madame Nieh, Tsinghua's Kuai Ta-fu, and Han Ai-ching of the Peking Aviation Institute submitted self-criticisms, vowed to study and implement Chiang Ching's 5 September instructions, and acknowledged that the working class provided the model for establishing "revolutionary great alliances." On 14 September, the Peking Red Guard Congress once more banned any revolutionary liaison undertaken without Central CRG authorization and resolved that: "Hereafter, Peking students and student groups will not be allowed to intervene in cultural revolution activities in other areas or at other schools, enterprises, or organs." On the 16th, Madame Mao informed representatives of the Congress that "troops will be assigned to your schools to conduct military training"—that is, to shape up the young militants. Once again, the "revolutionary Left" found itself on the receiving end.

While the Madame was holding down the home front, Mao was touring north, east, and central-south China, surveying the damage and issuing instructions with regard to the implementation of his "great strategic plan." Most of his instructions were typically vague and ambivalent, but the Chairman's two basic concerns came through clearly.

Mao's primary objective was to speed up the establishment of additional PRCs with a view toward "reaching a resolution" in 25 provinces by the end of the year. His second objective—namely, the realization of "revolutionary great alliances" and an end to the Rebels' internecine warfare—was actually a prerequisite for the attainment of the
first. Thus, the Chairman "instructed" that "there is no fundamental clash of interests among the working class and no reason for it to "split into two great irreconcilable organizations." In fact, however, this was indeed the case. In every province, autonomous region, and major city, the "revolutionary Left" had polarized into autonomous, armed, and murderous factions.

In an attempt to correct this, representatives of the contending groups, PLA commanders, and "revolutionary leading cadres" from various provinces were ordered to attend "Mao-study classes" in Peking. At these classes, Chou and the Central CRG saw to it that the participants engaged in criticism and self-criticism, tried to secure their voluntary compliance with Mao's "plan," and attempted to hammer out compromises and "revolutionary great alliances" among the rival mass organizations--a necessary precondition for both the creation of "three-way alliances" of Rebels, PLA, and cadres and the establishment of the remaining revolutionary committees, described by the Liberation Army Daily on 18 October as the "highest central political task at the present time."

The study classes, together with the deployment of additional army units, were instrumental in restoring relative calm to a number of areas where large-scale violence had been the rule during July and August. Although only two additional committees were established during the rest of 1967 (Inner Mongolia and Tientsin), 15 more were set up during the first five months of 1968, bringing the total to 24. Mao's own timetable (25 by the end of 1967) had been too optimistic, indicating that the Chairman realized neither the intensity of the hatreds and ambitions that rived the Left nor the difficulties involved in resolving or repressing them. Yet Mao was still convinced that, by means of the study classes, by having all concerned "combat self-interest and repudiate revisionism,"* and by giving the PLA additional, though

*That is: (a) renounce personal ambitions, and (b) rechannel the attacks back to standard anathemas such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.
less than adequate, authority to maintain order,* he could secure the Rebels' voluntary compliance and retrieve the situation without repudiating his latest innovation.

B. Reopening the Schools

My son, the pest, never takes care of his room and never reads his books... My daughter, Ying, has been wandering [around]...just doing meaningless things. She gets letters from her boy friends everywhere. She spends money like it was paper and gets in debt every month. "I cannot clear her endless debts."

--An Amoy mother, 14 December 1967

An essential element in the regime's drive to re-store order was to persuade or compel the Red Guards to return to their schools. On 8 September, for example, Kiangsi Provincial Radio broadcast an "urgent circular" issued by the Kiangsi Red Guard Congress calling on all students to "voluntarily and unconditionally return to their schools before 15 September to properly carry out the task of mass criticism and repudiation and the struggle-criticism-transformation in their own units." And the circular established that this was not a pro forma request when it stated, "It is our hope that PLA units in various places...will help us in successfully carrying out the work of bringing back to schools the students on revolutionary liaison in other places, [as well as] disbanding all liaison stations, investigation groups, and teams." Other examples could be cited.

*In the vast majority of cases, the PLA's tasks were rendered quite difficult by Mao's September instruction that the army must "support the Left, and not any [particular] faction," an attempt to disentangle the PLA from the summer's violence.
It soon became clear that the Maoists were not engaged in simply another short-lived effort to bring the Red Guards to heel. One indicator was Madame Mao's aforementioned statement of 16 September to representatives of the Peking Red Guard Congress that army units would be assigned to schools in the capital to maintain order and instill discipline. In other cities and provinces, the PLA was given the same assignment. As a result of the crackdown on unauthorized revolutionary liaison, culminating in a 14 October directive ordering all schools to open immediately, a substantial number of Red Guards had returned to school by November and most, at the least, had returned to their own localities.

There were several reasons why many Red Guards did not return to school immediately, even though they did cease liaising. First, most student bodies were split into hostile factions, and some Red Guards, fearing reprisals should they return to the campus, simply stayed home. Second, in not a few areas, there was no school left. Moreover, even in those schools where the physical plant remained intact, there were no books; new texts had not been compiled to replace those that had been either denounced or burned. Third, many Red Guards, still intoxicated by their experiences over the past year, must have realized that the resumption of classes would be more formal than real and that, with the PLA present to provide "military training," the schools would be more akin to reformatories than to educational institutions. Fourth, and closely related to the previous point, the youthful militants could take little solace from directives ordering the dissolution of mass organizations that cut across occupational or functional lines (factories, communes, individual schools, etc.), the result being that some Red Guard organizations had "streamlined" their organizational structure by personnel cutbacks of up to 90 percent. Nor could they derive comfort from such news as, for example, was broadcast over Inner Mongolia Regional Radio on 21 November: "Another group of revolutionary intellectual youths from Peking has volunteered
to come to settle permanently in Hsilinkuolo meng [a sub-provincial administrative division] and live a simple herdsman's life." Finally, many Red Guards probably believed that this order, as was the case with earlier commands, would not be enforced.

In addition, many teachers themselves were reluctant to return to classrooms full of young toughs who had only recently been encouraged to terrorize them. Moreover, the teachers were not reinvested with their former authority. A good example of this is provided by the so-called "Eight Rules of Respect for Teachers and Eight Rules of Love for Students," published "merely for reference" in the 11 November People's Daily. Drawn up by the students at Peking's Tsaochangti Middle School, the "rules" contained the usual exhortations--"Be Chairman Mao's good students"--but demonstrated clearly that the pupils, if they had anything to say about it, did not intend to relinquish their power over the faculty. The key rules read as follows:

Rule Five (for students) -- Regarding political matters, pay attention to the teachers' progress and energetically help them to achieve success, rectify their defects and errors, and improve their work.

Rule Five (for teachers) -- Respect the masses, trust the masses, humbly learn from the students and be their willing pupils.
In sum, although the back-to-school movement of late 1967 was more successful (and more sustained) than similar drives during March and July, there were still major, unresolved problems concerning the Red Guards. A few continued to liaise with authorization, either from the Central CRG, the PRCs and MRCs, or the provincial Military Control Commissions; more importantly, some groups refused to cease liaising. Moreover, as was the case during the previous July, getting the Red Guards to return to school meant, in many instances, merely that the battleground for hostile factions would be confined to the campuses; in some cases, the campus warfare was even more savage because of the limited area.

Finally, a major problem continued to be that policy pronouncements, at both the provincial-municipal and national levels, remained open to contrary interpretations through the use of selective quotation. For example, on 25 December, the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau issued a notice entitled, "On Smashing the Criminal Activities of Young Hooligans." Stating that "Shanghai's young hooligans have recently run wild in their activities," the notice indicated clearly that
the offenders were Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels:

By every conceivable means, they sabotage the resumption of classes and the making of revolution [in the schools], undermine socialist construction, disrupt social security, entice and corrupt youngsters and teenagers, insult women, and oppress the masses in a vain attempt to disturb the great strategic plan...of Chairman Mao...

However, in announcing that such "criminal activities must be resolutely suppressed," the Bureau proclaimed:

Public Security organs at various levels, revolutionary mass organizations in Shanghai, the broad masses of proletarian revolutionary fighters, Red Guard revolutionary young warriors, and the revolutionary masses should go into immediate action, coordinate and cooperate with one another and, under the single leadership of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, fight a people's war of encircling and suppressing the young hooligans.

Thus, the Red Guards could (and some probably did) twist the directive around—for example, by editing out the reference to MRC leadership—so that it appeared to sanction another round of factional clashes.

A final classic example of the dangers involved in spelling out an essentially moderate line in militant terms is provided by Chiang Ching's 12 November speech at a Peking forum on "literature and art." On this occasion, she informed workers in literature and art circles what they should do in their own units to further reform (i.e., prostitute) Chinese culture for the sake of the "cultural" revolution. Stating that it would do a "lot of good" to "shake up" a certain motion picture studio and some ballet and theatrical troupes—"they are pools of stagnant water"—the Madame explicitly forbade "shaking
up" those "units which are already in good order" as well as units "already thrown into confusion."

Stripping away the militant verbiage, it is clear that one of her major concerns was to speed up the formation of "revolutionary great alliances" and "three-way alliances." However, the Madame advocated accomplishing this by "dragging-out" more "bad elements," and her inimitable invective--"Throw the enemy into confusion! Throw the enemy into confusion!"--tended to obscure the fact that she was calling for the implementation of Mao's "great strategic plan." And after her speech was disseminated as an official directive on 13 November, Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels cited it as a justification for their further depredations, when Mao's desire was to reduce the level of violence by getting the young fanatics back to school.

C. Entering 1968

At the beginning of the cultural revolution, we students were encouraged to join in enthusiastically, to become its leaders, and to behave in whatever way we liked according to our own interpretation of Chairman Mao's little red book. But now the workers have become the leading force in the revolution and we students are ordered to return to school and not to interfere with the workers.

--A student at Nanking University, 2 January 1968

As noted earlier, only nine revolutionary committees had been established by 1 January 1968, leaving 16 provinces and four autonomous regions under the authority of revolutionary committee "preparatory groups" or military control commissions. Thus, in some two-thirds of the country, "three-way alliances" had not been effected,
and many Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in these areas continued to vie for slots in the new order.

Clearly, the task of establishing the remaining 20 revolutionary committees was a tremendously difficult one. Mao still refused to give the PLA the necessary authority to maintain order in the provinces while the long, drawn-out negotiations were in progress in Peking. I.e., the army was still bound by the 5 September directive: units could defend themselves if Rebels attempted to seize their weapons, but they could not intervene with force to stop armed clashes between rival factions. In Yunnan, for example, a PLA unit reported a "rifle battle" in progress in Kunming, but stated that "no matter how serious the situation, we are not allowed to open fire." In Amoy, residents deplored the army's hands-off posture, and one writer noted that "there were cases of old women tugging on the arms of PLA personnel, beseeching them to put a stop to the struggles by force." Another wrote that the reason why "the two [Amoy] factions continue to fight furiously is that, so far, the Central [CRG] has not openly stated which of the two is the genuine Leftist faction."

In other areas, the Macists stated that the two major opposing organizations were both revolutionary. Such decisions had been handed down, *inter alia*, with regard to the contending factions in Kwangtung and Tibet. However, the factions themselves were not going to passively acquiesce and call it a day, letting bygones be bygones and forming a "revolutionary great alliance" with their enemies. There had been too much bloodshed, there were too many scores yet to be settled, Party authority had been too thoroughly debased, and the PLA was not empowered to see to it that the young toughs settled down whether they liked it or not. The provincial "Mao-study classes" being held in Peking were essential elements in the movement to establish a new revolutionary order, but they were not the Draconic solution that was required to finally convince the Red Guards that Mao had dumped
them in favor of a new vanguard—the workers and peasants—and, moreover, that this time he meant what he said.*

An excellent example of the difficulties involved in getting the rival factions to sit down and iron out their differences in a peaceful manner—even with Central leaders in attendance—is provided by the performance of the Peking "Mao-study class" for representatives of the two major Tibetan groups—the Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters (LRH) and the Great Alliance General Headquarters (GAH). The class convened (at the Peking Aviation Institute) in early March, but only after a hassle in Lhasa concerning who was to attend.

Nevertheless, the convening of the study class had a calming effect in some areas of Tibet. LRH stated that its members had returned to work in a number of factories, even crediting some GAH personnel with doing the same, and reported the situation in Lhasa to be "extremely good." The GAH reported that, as of 7 March, 19 of its combat teams had turned in their weapons to the Garrison Headquarters. In Shigatse (100 miles west of Lhasa), the "Military Sub-District Support-the-Left Office" congratulated both factions on 9 March for "reaching an accord on implementing [a

*Other indicators (early 1968) that the Red Guards were no longer Mao's favorites included: (a) the resumption of military conscription after a hiatus of nearly two years; (b) the further assignment, reportedly permanent, of thousands of students to remote border areas as workers; (c) a 10 January order of the Peking MRC directing all "liaison representatives" in the capital to leave by 20 January, and banning the sale of Red Guard newspapers; and (d) increasing emphasis on the need for hard work and frugality (for example, the Red Guard Congress in Shihchiachuang, Hopei Province, was praised in the People's Daily for having "cut its staff from 63 to 17", and "moved its offices from a well-furnished four-story building in the downtown area to a simple building in a school").
revolutionary] great alliance." Things seemed to be looking up.

In Peking, meanwhile, the study class made rapid progress and signed a draft agreement regarding an LRH-GAH "revolutionary great alliance" on 13 March. The agreement promised that the two factions will "immediately unite to thoroughly strike down and criticize the common enemy"—e.g., Wang Chi-mei, Deputy Commander of the Tibet MR, and a common target of both organizations. With regard to the case of Chou Jen-shan:

Prior to the central authorities' formally expressing their attitude, both factions must reserve their own respective viewpoints, not force them on the other, and absolutely not hinder the revolutionary great alliance. After the central authorities formally express their attitude, the two factions must handle their affairs in firm accordance with instructions from central authorities.

In addition, the agreement pledged that the two organizations would: (a) "stop armed struggle at once;" (b) "immediately turn in the entire lot of weapons and ammunition and completely dismantle all fortifications for armed struggle;" (c) "strictly prohibit the transfer of farmers and herdsmen to the cities to engage in armed struggle;" (d) return everyone to their original units "before 18 March" and see to it that the returnees "treat one another cordially;" (e) "immediately restore overall communications and transportation, industrial construction, and make a great effort to successfully grasp spring farm work production and insure the supply of commodities;" (f) "prohibit the non-productive use of vehicles, frugally

*Chou, strongly backed by the LRH and bitterly opposed by the GAH, was Acting First Secretary of the Tibet Party Committee. He held no real authority after the "power-seizure" of January 1967.
conduct the revolution and strike down anarchism, strengthen labor discipline, and abide by financial administrative regulations;" (g) become exemplars in "support the army" work; and (h) appoint 14 representatives (seven LRH, seven GAH) to organize a "Great Alliance Committee of the Two Great Tibetan Revolutionary Mass Organizations."

Finally, the signatories (three LRH, three GAH) stated that the agreement had been approved by the study class and was now in effect.

The initial reaction in Tibet concerning the 13 March accord was a mixed one. From Pomi (300 miles east of Lhasa), an agreement had been reached and "normal services were restored" in the town. From Lhasa, however, LRH evinced clear displeasure that the agreement had been "concluded in Peking without submitting the proposals to the masses for discussion," and listed several "deficiencies" in the agreement together with "suggestions for revision." Moreover, the GAH was reportedly less than satisfied that the Chou Jen-shan question had been shelved for the time being, since the GAH "considers compromise to be a violation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line." Nevertheless, Tibet remained relatively calm throughout the rest of March and most of April, and the study class in Peking remained in session.

By late April, however, tensions in Tibet began to increase rapidly. On 23 April, an LRH unit charged that LRH members of the Peking study class were guilty of "right splittism" and "right capitulationism" for backing down on the demands that Chou Jen-shan be declared a "revolutionary cadre" and that Jen Jung and the Tibet MR command be condemned for repressing the LRH in February of 1967. It also demanded that Jen be dismissed as head of the study class and stated that all decisions of the class "must be submitted for our concurrence." The LRH branch in Shigatse levelled identical charges on 5 May, adding that, "unless you [representatives] immediately reform, we will quickly order you back to Tibet."
The split in the LRH became wider after Chou En-lai's 4 May statement that, although the Central CRG had not yet decided Chou Jen-shan's fate, he would not be included in the membership of the revolutionary committee when it was established, as well as a Central Committee directive that Jen Jung and the Tibet MR were not to be attacked. On 5 and 7 May, Chang Kuo-hua spoke to the study class, and repeated the order that Chou Jen-shan would be excluded from the revolutionary committee.

Chang's speeches and the Central orders caused disarray in LRH ranks. On 7 May, an unidentified LRH headquarters in Lhasa ordered the LRH 20th headquarters in Tienchuan (Szechwan) to obey Chou's 4 May instructions and stated that "branches and headquarters should hold rallies to signify that they will comply with and carry out" the order. However, an LRH minority--reportedly the Lhasa-based 1st, 2nd, and 4th headquarters--issued a four-point "decision" on 11 May recalling all LRH members of the Peking study class, vowing continued support for Chou Jen-shan, criticizing Chang Kuo-hua, and calling for heavy attacks against Jen Jung. On 19 May, another LRH faction "cancelled" the credentials of its four representatives in Peking. On the 22nd, the LRH 9th headquarters declared that "the plan for the [Lhasa] Municipal Revolutionary Committee decided in Peking is null and void."

Finally, on 24 May, the study class decided to "topple" Chou Jen-shan. Severe fighting broke out again in Lhasa as a result of the decision, and was possibly encouraged by an 8 May directive which stated that the Tibet question would be put on the back burner until the more urgent problems of Szechwan and Fukien had been solved (thus giving the LRH and GAH more time to try to knock each other off).

On 7 June, martial law was declared in Lhasa; on about
9 June, civil communications shut down.* In addition, the Lhasa-Peking airline was grounded, and the two major land routes into Tibet were disrupted (bridges destroyed, fighting, and flooding).

As of 1 March 1968, 14 revolutionary committees remained to be established at the province/autonomous region level. Violence similar to that in Tibet--violence that precluded the establishment of the 14 committees--was noted in varying degrees not only in these areas, but also in some areas where revolutionary committees had been set up for some time. This, together with the imminent purge of Acting PLA Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, provided another, albeit temporary, setback to Mao's "great strategic plan."

*Normal radio communications services remained out until 4 September, the eve of the establishment of the Tibet Revolutionary Committee.
X. RECTIFYING THE RED GUARDS

"I have been dedicated to the cultural revolution for nearly two years. Rising from the ranks of Rebel fighters, I later became the commander of some 400 comrades-in-arms. They all gave me unreserved support, because I had fought courageously in battle and always been loyal to our great leader, Chairman Mao. However, calamity fell upon me earlier this month when I was dismissed from my leadership post by the organization at the higher level on the grounds that I had committed 'mistakes' on certain questions. I feel very frustrated and dejected because of this dishonor . . . There are many Rebel leaders who have committed mistakes and thus been dismissed."

-- A Rebel in Tsingtao, 23 March 1968

"Seize power if the battle is won. If lost, enter into an alliance."

-- A Red Guard headquarters in Golmo (Tsinghai), 10 April 1968

A. The "Twin Evils" of Anarchism and Factionalism

By means of the negotiations in Peking, 12 more revolutionary committees were set up at the provincial level during the first four months of 1968, thereby bringing the total to 21 and leaving eight yet to be established. At the same time, the campaign against the "twin evils" of anarchism and factionalism was greatly intensified, the purpose being to persuade hostile Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations to get on with the business of
forming "revolutionary great alliances," reaching accords on which cadres were "revolutionary" and thus eligible for inclusion in "three-way alliances," and defending and consolidating the revolutionary committees at various levels.

An authoritative statement on the dangers posed by anarchism to the successful completion of the cultural revolution appeared in the 25 February People's Daily. Entitled "Anarchism Is the Political Bridge Leading to Counterrevolution," the article complained that:

... in the face of the onslaught of anarchism, some comrades in our ranks cannot resist the temptation for some immediate gains ... Some people not only fail to oppose anarchism, but, seeing that some other people have "something to gain" from anarchism, are even afraid of being left out of the game, and are apprehensive that "once the opportunity is gone, it will be hard for them to get what they want."

Turning next to the tactics employed by such people, the author stated:

People engaged in anarchism often adopt revolutionary slogans to cover up the bourgeois essence of their reactionary trend of thought: "What I am doing is rebellion," "I am emancipating myself," and "Oppose new enslavement!" They become furious as soon as they are criticized by others, clamoring, "You are shifting the general orientation of the struggle, directing the spearhead at the masses," and so forth.

Nevertheless, it was argued that only "a very small number of people are going over to the side of counterrevolution via the dangerous bridge of anarchism." While such people must be subjected to "proletarian dictatorship" and "ruthlessly suppressed," the author maintained that, "in most cases," those influenced by anarchism could be saved "as long as we patiently carry out ideological and political work with them." In other words, the Maoists still felt that it was possible to quell factional violence and reorder the ranks of the Left by essentially pacific means.

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As noted in the last chapter, the method employed in establishing the revolutionary committees—i.e., negotiations involving Central leaders and provincial Bebels, "revolutionary" cadres, and PLA representatives, rather than an enforced, unilateral fiat from above—were extremely complicated and time consuming. Moreover, the committees were inherently unstable, some more than others, because their composition was never totally satisfactory to the competing factional groups that desired to secure for themselves a dominant position in the new order at the expense of their enemies.

Accordingly, the defense and consolidation of the revolutionary committees was a major concern during early 1968. On 18 February, in an attempt to further remove the PLA from factional clashes and increase its effectiveness in supporting the committees, a Central Committee directive ordered all dependents of military cadres to withdraw from mass organizations. (The order was reiterated by the MAC on 30 March.) On 4 March, at the inauguration of the MRC in Wuhsi (some 70 miles west-northwest of Shanghai), Chang Chun-chiao, member of the Central CRG and head of the Shanghai MRC, stated that the "establishment of the revolutionary committee by no means indicates the end of the class struggle," inasmuch as the committee is "an extremely important target of this struggle." Hence, he said, "We must . . . use all available means to consolidate the revolutionary committee . . ."*

At the same time, Chang cautioned his audience to remember that "the revolutionary committee is a newborn entity and we cannot expect it to be born perfect, For"

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*Chang was followed to the rostrum by a "responsible person" of local PLA units, who avowed: "We resolutely support the Wuhsi MRC and resolutely protect its revolutionary authority. We will give no quarter to whoever dares to oppose the revolutionary committee."
perfection can only be achieved gradually in the course of struggle." Even more important was Chang's demand that "there must be a correct understanding of the nature of a revolutionary committee": "It is an organization of the revolution for holding power, and it certainly is not a council of revolutionary mass organizations."

At this point, it should be noted that a fair number of PRCs had been purged during recent months, that such purges have continued up to the present time, and that they no doubt will continue as the revolutionary committees are further streamlined and consolidated. With one or two exceptions, however, as of this writing (November 1968) the purges have been relatively low-level types who were probably engaged in attempts to further their own fortunes or those of their factions, thereby undermining the authority and endangering the already tenuous stability of the revolutionary committees.

Such self-seeking activities, on the part of some revolutionary committee members as well as those who were not named to the committees (and thus sought to oust the incumbents), were of understandable concern to the Central leadership, and this concern was clearly reflected in the national and provincial press. On 10 March, for example, the Tsinan Tachung (Masses) Daily was extremely outspoken in its criticism of Shantung Rebels. "Even today," the editorial decried, there are people "fighting for the core of power and position, dizzy with their craving for 'fame, power, and profit.'" More specifically:

Leaders of the various mass organizations usually can nobly shout very loud slogans of "fight self Interest and repudiate revisionism." However, when the time comes to establish the leadership group for the three-way alliance, they are no longer what they seem to be. Leaders of various organizations of workers, peasants, and Red Guards, as well as cadres, will all speak out in favor of their own organizations and fight for membership in the Leadership group.
In conclusion, the editorial succinctly contrasted Mao's "latest instructions" with the Rebels' activities:

While Chairman Mao calls on us to realize the revolutionary great alliance, they tenaciously defend their own small strongholds. While Chairman Mao teaches us to talk less about the shortcomings of others and more about our own, they implicitly attack the other side and refuse to make conscientious self-criticism. While Chairman Mao asks us to grasp revolution and do a still better job in all fields, they constantly promote work stoppages and suppress revolution. Instead of following Chairman Mao's instructions, they carry out revolution according to their own wishes.*

A similar line was propagandized in other areas during much of March. In Kiangsi, the provincial daily published several spirited defenses of the PRC. In Peking, there were demonstrations against disgraced Politburo member Tan Chen-lin and calls to defend Hsieh Fu-chih and the Peking MRC. On 20 March, the Chekiang Daily announced that the PRC "will soon be born," welcomed the return of the provincial "Mao-study class" from Peking, stated that "we should continue to consolidate and develop revolutionary great alliances and revolutionary three-way alliances and usher in with actual deeds the founding of the provincial revolutionary committee," and warned that "Kuomintang agents" opposed the establishment of the RRC.

At the same time, it is important to note that when the Maoists called for the establishment and consolidation of revolutionary committees, they did not (nor do they now) mean that the cultural revolution was nearing an end. Although anarchism and factionalism were roundly condemned, so were other "evils," including the fact that "bad elements" were still hidden within the ranks of the Party (thus indicating more purges). In sum, the Maoists wanted:

*The Kansu Daily of 7 March was even more to the point: "Other students do not listen to anyone. They do not listen to teachers, schoolmates, school revolutionary committees, or even PLA training personnel. They often say to the authorities, 'Who the hell are you?'"
(1) to terminate indiscriminate mass attacks on the revolutionary committees; (2) as required, to purge and streamline the committees, either directly from Peking or through continual personnel screenings by the committees themselves; (3) to put an end to factional clashes; (4) to stimulate revolutionary clan by further attacks on those already in disgrace; and (5) by means of "Mao-study" classes, conducted in some areas by worker-soldier-cadre propaganda teams, to carry out "struggle-criticism-transformation" (criticism, self-criticism, reform) in a "penetrating way" within individual schools, factories, and offices. The cultural revolution was to continue--transformed, not abandoned--but in a more manageable, compartmentalized fashion in order to consolidate the revolutionary committees and promote Rebel obedience to both Central and provincial authority.

B. "Rightist Reversal of Verdicts" and the Purge of Yang Cheng-wu

By mid-March, there were signs that the cultural revolution was once again moving into another, more militant phase. The desiderata listed in the preceding paragraph were not put aside, but it became clear that the Maoists felt that the emphasis on restoring order had led many to believe (or, at least, hope) that there was little to do to secure the "victory" of the cultural revolution save establish the remaining PRCs and strengthen the committees at all levels. Moreover, committee members seized upon the orders to defend and consolidate the revolutionary committees as an organ of power to attempt to secure or better their own individual fortunes. This had led to instances of imperious behavior of the same type as had permeated the Party Committees brought down by the cultural revolution. Finally, the earlier, concerted attacks on the "twin evils" of anarchism and factionalism had apparently allowed "errant" cadres to be appointed to positions of authority without having gone through the "cleansing" of sincere "struggle-criticism-transformation." Thus, the danger existed that such people were not new Maoist men, but rather were (or would become) "revisionist" apparatchiks of the Liu-Teng type.
An early public indication that the Maoists were concerned about the loss of revolutionary fervor was provided by the following statement in the bellwether Shanghai Wen Hui Pao on 15 March:

In this life and death class struggle, some comrades have relaxed their vigilance saying, "Everything is quiet now." Feelings of security and lethargy have sprung up among these comrades. Even those comrades aware of the sugar-coated bullets /personal profit, material incentives, etc./ are afraid to organize the broad masses to counterattack. They are afraid to disturb the revolutionary position and order or to destroy the all-red appearance /of the revolutionary committees/ and the seemingly secure position.

On 20 March, the authoritative People's Daily "Commentator" was effusive in his praise of the "great historical merits" of the revolutionary masses, and noted that revolutionary cadres "must adopt a correct attitude toward criticism from the masses, are obligated to accept criticism from the masses, and have absolutely no right to refuse this criticism." Observing that it was "quite obvious that many cadres are not ideologically prepared for this great /cultural/ revolution," the author warned cadres that there were only two attitudes that they could adopt with regard to their errors:

The first is a willingness to correctly and conscientiously conduct self-criticism and listen to criticism from the masses, thereby winning the understanding and confidence of the masses. The majority of our cadres have adopted this attitude. The other is to refuse to make corrections, venting one's resentment and dissatisfaction toward mass criticism, being cocky when the opportunity permits, and completely negating the mass movement. Such people, having committed mistakes but refusing to correct them, are bound to lose their revolutionary spirit and go astray.
By far the most interesting materials at the start of the new militant phase centered, as one might expect, around the person of Madame Mao. On 15 March, along with Chou En-lai, Central CRG leaders, Madame Lin Piao, and others, Madame Mao met in stormy session with leaders of the Szechwan PRC Preparatory Group (PG). The PG study class was bogged down in a continuing dispute over the present applicability of the Central Committee's 10-point decision on the Szechwan problem of 7 May 1967. The Madame (echoed by Chou) told the class that anyone who argued that the decision was out of date was actually seeking to "reverse the verdicts" on those already purged, and she warned that the "rightist reversal of verdicts is the chief danger throughout the country."

Three days later, Madame Mao made the same statement to the Chekiang "Mao-study class" on the eve of its return to Hangchow. Almost immediately, the danger of "verdict reversal" became the major theme in the Chekiang Daily and other papers. On 29 March, the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao not only condemned the "present counterrevolutionary adverse current" and demanded that its proponents be "completely crushed," but also stated that "some black cadres" of Liu Shao-chi "have returned to their old posts despite the fact that they were overthrown . . ." Thus, another (late March) directive from Mao with regard to "the basic way to build revolutionary committees":

The basic experience of revolutionary committees is this--they are three-fold: they have representatives of the revolutionary cadres, representatives of the armed forces, and representatives of the revolutionary masses. This forms a revolutionary three-way alliance. The revolutionary committees should exercise unified leadership, eliminate redundant or overlapping administrative structures, follow the policy of better troops and simpler administration, and organize a revolutionized leading group which keeps in contact with the masses.
The basic reasons why the cultural revolution moved to the left in March may well have been Mao's doubts as to the loyalty and reliability of some revolutionary committee members, as well as his fear that revolutionary fervor was on the wane. However, the proximate cause was probably an incident that occurred on the evening of 7 March and does much to explain the Madame's vituperations of the following week.

The affair was made public during the early hours of 25 March when Mao, Lin, Chou, Madame Mao, and other leaders met with PLA cadres of the division level and above. In a long, emotional speech, Lin condemned Acting PLA Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, Air Force Commissar Yu Li-chin, and Peking Garrison Commander Fu Chung-pi for a multitude of crimes--"mountain-topism, double-dealing, sectarianism, individualism, factionalism," etc.--and announced Yu's arrest and the dismissal of Yang and Fu, as well as the appointment of Kwangtung PRC head Huang Yung-sheng as the new Chief of Staff.

The full story of Yang's "crimes" is not known, but it is clear from Lin's speech that Yang ran afoul of the Madame:

Without the consent of responsible members of the CRG, he induced Fu to go to the offices of the CRG and seize people possibly staffs, possibly local or liaising Red Guards7. He opposed Chiang Ching and compiled black data concerning her... And when Madame Mao warned that "we must still seize Yang Cheng-wu's black backers," her continuing influence as one of the top leaders at the Center was demonstrated by Lin and Chou:

(Lin): "Whoever opposes Chairman Mao, the Party Central, and the Central CRG will be knocked down. Learn from Comrade Chiang Ching; show deep respect for Chiang Ching."

(Chou): "Vow your life and fresh blood to protect Comrade Chiang Ching."
The fact that no "black backers" were dragged out would seem to indicate that there were none,* and that Yang was purged for exceeding his authority (reasons unknown) by violating the Madame's bailiwick.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the 25 March meeting, precis of the several speeches were forwarded to Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups throughout the country. At the same time, the national and provincial press gave full play to smashing the "evil wind of rightist reversal of verdicts," described as the "general orientation of the current struggle," as well as emphasizing the Madame's high position in the leadership--the 7 April Peking Daily, for example, described both Lin Piao and Chiang Ching as Mao's "close comrades-in-arms."

While the "anti-rightist" campaign that began in March had the "general orientation" noted above, it was not intended to kick off another full-blown assault on authority such as had been authorized in the latter months of 1966. Rather, Mao's desire was to continue to revivify the "revolutionary Left" and selectively purge the revolutionary committees; that is, the cultural revolution was to continue, and to deepen as necessary.

An excellent example of Mao's dualistic strategy during the spring of 1968 is provided by a 10-point decision issued on 2 April by a Shantung PRC-sponsored congress of proletarian revolutionaries. Noting that "right-deviationist splittism and right-deviationist reversal of correct verdicts are the main danger at present," the resolution warned that "this complicated class struggle must not be treated as a simple matter" and praised the fact that three "counterrevolutionary double-dealers" on the PRC had been purged. This proved that the situation "in Shantung, as in the rest of the nation, is very fine."

*However, it does appear that Vice-Premier Nieh Jung-chen questioned the dismissal of Yang.

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The remainder of the document spells out the correct tactics by which to carry out Mao's "revolutionary line and latest instructions." These tactics are of interest, for they provide further evidence that Mao sought a controlled, compartmentalized revolutionary upsurge, and not another indiscriminate Leftist onslaught. Inter alia, the provisions of the decision included the following:

(1) Further consolidate and develop the revolutionary great alliance and three-way alliance. Oppose petty-bourgeois factionalism and anarchism.

(2) Do well in struggle-criticism-transformation in our own units, using Chairman Mao's revolutionary line as our weapon. This is the general orientation of the struggle in the proletarian cultural revolution.

(3) Universities, colleges, and schools must make revolution by resuming classes.

(4) Rectify Party organizations and strengthen Party building. Revolutionary committees at all levels...should create suitable conditions for the admission into the Party of advanced elements who have emerged during the proletarian cultural revolution.

(5) All renegades, special agents, capitalist-roaders, and landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists must be completely expelled from the mass organizations. These mass organizations should be concerned with the purification of only their own ranks, and let other organizations carry out their own purification. They must not poke their noses into other people's affairs, let alone arrest members of other organizations.

(6) Proletarian dictatorship must be further strengthened...Form close army-civilian unity.
(7) Speed up the revolutionization of leadership groups. Members of these groups must go deep among the masses and take part in productive labor, modestly learn from the masses and be their willing pupils, and encourage the masses to participate in the management of state affairs and to exercise supervision over the upper levels.

By late April, provincial media were giving extensive play to the theme that revolutionary mass organizations must be given meaningful representation in revolutionary committees and subject the committees to supervision from below. However, it was emphasized that such supervision must be based on "sincere concern" and that criticism be "constructive" and made with "good intentions." Mass organizations were told that they must "cherish, support, and refrain from undermining" the revolutionary committees, and that, per the 10 May Wen Hui Pao, the "greatest support" that the Rebels can give to the committees is to "resolutely overcome and oppose right-anarchist tendencies." Rebel representatives on the revolutionary committees were warned that they "must under no circumstances work for the interest of one particular group or control the political power for one small group." Rather, they "must learn from the representatives of the PLA and revolutionary cadres in the spirit of humility."

At the same time, as noted earlier, it was quite clear that Mao was not demanding the unconditional defense of all revolutionary committee members, but rather the strengthening of the committees as a revolutionary institution. Thus, Mao called on the committees to follow the principle of "better troops and simpler administration"—a formulation which would permit the removal of all those suspected of disloyalty to the new revolutionary order. The watchdog role assigned to the Rebels was emphasized, and committee members were cautioned against assuming that they were home free with their tenure assured. As the 6 May Wen Hui Pao put it:
Some comrades believe that, with the founding of the revolutionary committee, the historic tasks of the revolutionary mass organizations have been fulfilled and the organizations can be disbanded. This view is completely wrong. The historic tasks have not been completed. Revolutionary mass organizations must not be disbanded; they must be further consolidated . . . , for the path of revolution stretches far over the horizon and the work remains more difficult and more magnificent . . .

The "Three Less and One Harmony"--meaning having less talk, less expression of views, less tramping on other people's toes, and being peace-loving--are signs of rightist capitulationism. They should evoke high vigilance from us. In a class society, it is a daydream to long for peaceful days devoid of class struggle.

In short, the continuing emphasis on the necessity of revolutionary struggle, as well as the emphasis on the important role yet to be played by the revolutionary mass organizations, encouraged the renewal of factional clashes, undermined the revolutionary committees, encouraged the "outs" to take another shot at the "ins," and doubtless gave PLA commanders pause with regard to intervening, inasmuch as they were told to respect the Rebels' "revolutionary zeal." By late April, eyewitnesses reported the Peita campus to be in a state of "civil war." In Tibet, as discussed in the last chapter, the LRH and GAH were once again at each other's throats, as were the Red Flag and East Wind factions in Kwangtung. Disorders were noted throughout Szechwan during April and May.

Mo's controlled revolutionary upsurge was fast becoming a runaway vendetta.
C. Mao Cracks Down

The most ominous development to result from the "anti-rightist" campaign and the purge of Yang Cheng-wu was the conflagration in Kwangsi. In fact, it appears that the situation there was the final outrage that caused Mao to authorize the PLA to move forcefully against the warring Red Guard factions throughout the country.

By early May, the situation in Kwangsi had deteriorated to the point that, for the first time during the cultural revolution, the Chinese were required to curtail rail service to North Vietnam. Over the next month and more, Vietnam-bound freight and passenger traffic was disrupted, arms shipments raided, trains derailed, bridges blown, and passengers (including foreigners) robbed, kidnapped, or shot. The main bottleneck existed at Liuchou, where the 22 April-Rebel Army affiliate, the Workers' and Technicians' Alliance of the Liuchou Railway Administration, and the Great Alliance Command ally, the Kang Lien-chih (Steel Alliance Command?) had between them seized over 11,000 cases of ammunition and 6,000 rifles destined for North Vietnam. According to a resident, subsequent fighting "destroyed the entire city south of the Hsun River."

To the east, the city of Wuchou (a few miles from the Kwangtung border) was virtually gutted in a series of pitched battles between the Rebel Army and the Great Alliance Command, reportedly leaving some 10,000-20,000 homeless. By the second week of June, after more than three weeks of fighting, the Rebel Army had been soundly defeated. However, more than 1,300 Rebel Army survivors fled from Liuchou to Canton and other Kwangtung municipalities where they joined with their Red Flag allies against the East Wind faction, thus intensifying the fighting in that province as well. On top of it all, heavy rains caused severe flooding in several southern provinces during June.

In an attempt to stop the fighting, a five-point emergency directive on the Kwangsi situation was issued
on 13 June by the Central Committee, State Council, MAC, and Central CRG. The directive ordered an immediate halt to fighting along the railroad, all stolen ordnance to be returned, and all railway workers to return to work. The Rebels were given a chance to cooperate voluntarily, for the directive stated that "if the chiefs of the two factions carry out these orders, they will not be punished even through they have committed serious crimes." On 19 June, Chou En-lai telephoned Kwangsi authorities and demanded that rail service be normalized in Liuchou within 72 hours. Finally, on 3 July, another and still tougher Central directive (approved by Mao) was issued on the Kwangsi problem, reiterating the basic points of the 13 June order, but this time withdrawing absolution of Rebel leaders and condemning their continued "counterrevolutionary" disobedience. Nevertheless, rail outages were noted in Kwangsi as late as 25 July.*

The crackdown heralded by the 13 June directive was soon reflected in the public media. On 20 June, Wen Hui Pao called for an "anti-splittist red typhoon" against those who would engage in armed struggle and "divide, demoralize, and paralyze" the revolutionary committees. The first task in this regard, according to the authoritative Shanghai journal, was to "consolidate the revolutionary committees at all levels." Editorials in other provincial newspapers echoed the Wen Hui Pao theme; and throughout July and August gave heavy emphasis to a quote from Mao's 1939 article commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement:

How should we judge whether a youth is revolutionary? How can we tell? There can only be one criterion, namely, whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad

*On 25 July, Chou, Kang Sheng, Chen Po-ta, and other leaders met with representatives of the Kwangsi factions. Kang and Chou took the lead in condemning both factions, with the Rebel Army coming in for the most scathing denunciation because of its connections with the Canton Red Flagists as well as with the so-called "Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps." The latter is not known to have actually existed, and is probably a phantom organization that provided the leadership with a prima facie justification for drastic action against recalcitrant factions.
masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice. If he is willing to do so and actually does so, he is a revolutionary; otherwise, he is nonrevolutionary or counter-revolutionary.

Kwangtung was one of the first provinces in which the PLA moved forcefully against the warring Rebel factions on or about 8 July, a soldier was fatally stabbed in a dispute with some Canton Red Guards. Comrades of the deceased protested to the higher authorities and on 11 July, a joint directive issued by the Kwangtung PRC, Canton MRC, and the Canton PLA ordered:

(1) all faction headquarters and offices to be closed;

(2) all defenses and loudspeakers at faction strongpoints to be removed;

(3) all stolen weapons and vehicles to be returned;

(4) all relief stations set up for non-Kwangtung Red Guards to be shut down;

(5) all rural youth to leave Canton and return to the countryside;

(6) all PLA and worker control squads to be responsible for controlling traffic and restoring communications;

(7) all class enemies to be struck down;

(8) all spies to be prevented from entering Canton to cause trouble and incite violence.

Also on 11 July, the two main factions in Canton put up posters announcing their intention to square off again on 15 July. The Kwangtung PRC reported this to Peking, and a delegation from the capital arrived in Canton on 13 July with instructions from "the highest authority"
that the fight would not be tolerated and that both the PRC and the Canton MRC would be held responsible if it did occur. That same day, PLA units began to fire on Red Guards in Canton and other Kwangtung cities.

By 15 July, PLA-worker control squads were moving into close down factional headquarters. The squads were particularly aggressive against Red Flag offices and personnel, and evinced no qualms about shooting or arresting those who resisted. Red Flagist appeals to ostensible protectors in Peking went unanswered, and by 22 July, Canton residents reported that factional conflict had "on the whole died down to sporadic incidents," Rebels had been forced to return to work, and that most factories had resumed production. Students at Chungshan University who denounced the crackdown as nothing less than "suppression" were soon "welcoming" a 2,000-man "propaganda team" which had been sent to Chungshan to "give the students a clear picture of the new situation." Residents were ordered to report the whereabouts of all non-local Red Guards so that they could be deported, and the PLA crackdown on Kwangsi Red Guards and refugees was most severe. On 10 August, the Canton MRC ordered all Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel factions to dissolve and stated that no such organizations would be allowed henceforth. In the future, such Red Guard activity as was permitted would be under the aegis of the Canton Red Guard Congress.

Similar crackdowns were noted in other provinces and major cities during July and August. On 18 July, the Peking MRC ordered a halt to "rumors, street news, and counterrevolutionary demagoguery," and stated that all "revolutionary activity" must be based solely on the "platform and policies of the Party" as set forth in the People's Daily, Red Flag, and the Liberation Army Daily. On the 22nd, a People's Daily "Editor's Note" warned "college students who look down on the workers and peasants and think themselves great to throw off their affected airs." Five days later, the first worker-peasant propaganda "team" arrived on the Tsinghua campus, and Mao's 5 August presentation of the celebrated mangoes

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to the "team," as well as the publicity ad nauseam concerning the gift, provided further evidence that the working class (backed by the PLA) had replaced the Red Guards as Mao's revolutionary vanguard.

On 24 July, another Central directive (approved by Mao) was issued concerning the situation in Shensi Province, where "counterrevolutionaries" were accused of bank robberies, arson, auto theft, incessant attacks on PLA units, and refusal to carry out Central Committee and Central CRG orders. Accordingly, the directive ordered: all "bad elements" to be severely punished; armed struggle to stop immediately and "all bands formed specially for armed struggle disbanded;" all stolen monies, weapons and equipment returned and production resumed; and "all mass organizations, collectives, and individuals to thoroughly and earnestly carry out the '3 July Directive' regarding Kwangsi approved by ... Mao, and in no way violate it."

In other words, the Kwangsi directive was not meant to apply to that area alone.

Finally, on 28 July, Mao made it unmistakably clear that he would not tolerate further Red Guard excesses. In a five-hour meeting with Nieh Yuan-tzu and other Red Guard leaders, Mao criticized the young revolutionaries for engaging in armed struggle rather than "struggle-criticism-transformation" in their own units, and warned them that

*The full name of the Tsinghua group is the "Capital Worker-Peasant Thought of Mao Tse-tung Propaganda Team" (shou-tu kung-nung Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang hsuan-chuan tui). In other areas, such units are known as "Worker" Teams, "Worker-Peasant-Soldier" Teams, or "Peasant" Teams. "Team," although an accurate translation of the Chinese tui, is misleading. The size of the teams depends upon the size of the school or unit to which they are assigned, as well as the magnitude of the problems they are expected to resolve. Thus in some cases, especially the large universities, the teams have several thousand members, often armed and always with PLA support on hand or in ready reserve.
they had divorced themselves from "the majority of workers, peasants, soldiers, and students." He then enumerated four ways in which the situation could be handled:

(1) implement military control;

(2) one divide into two (i.e., two factions may split into two schools, occupying two places):

(3) struggle, criticize, and leave;

(4) continue to strike out presumably until one faction is completely victorious.

However, Mao had already demonstrated—in Tibet, Kwangtung, and with the arrival of the propaganda team at Tsinghua—that military or semi-military control was his answer to continuing disobedience.

Lastly, Mao turned to the question of the recent directives on the situation in Kwangsi and Shensi:

There are those who say, "The Kwangsi directive applies only to Kwangsi and the Shensi directive applies only to Shensi; they do not apply to us here." Thus, I now issue another nationwide directive: If anyone continues to disobey, strike at the PLA, destroy communications or set fires, he is committing a crime. If a small number of people do not heed this advice and insist on not changing, they are bandits—they are of the Kuomintang. They must be surrounded and if they continue their stubborn resistance they will be annihilated.

Lin Piao then criticized the Red Guards for "failing to see what is required . . . at each stage of the great cultural revolution" and warned them that "this time, if anyone still turns a deaf ear, it will be a very grave error." As if to emphasize the point, two days later, when a Rebel faction in Lienyang (Kwangtung) refused to stop fighting and surrender its arms, the PLA reportedly surrounded the town and destroyed it with mortar and machinegun fire, resulting in the death or injury of "about a thousand people."
Twice before, in February and September of 1967, Mao had exhorted the Rebels to reform themselves, purge their own ranks, and stop their indiscriminate attacks on the new order; they had not done so. As late as the Kwangsi directive of 13 June, Mao offered absolution even to those who had engaged in the most murderous activity of the cultural revolution; he was ignored—worse still, some called the directive a fraudulent document. The Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels, if allowed to continue as autonomous, self-seeking, and hostile factions, not only imperiled what had already been achieved, but also made it impossible for Mao to proceed with the radical restructuring of Chinese society according to his revolutionary obsession.

By early August, the impact of Mao's July directives was being felt by Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel factions throughout the country. In several provinces, mass rallies were staged at which formerly prestigious Rebel organizations—such as the Honan "7 February Commune" and the Kirin "Changchun Commune"—announced their "glorious annulment" and "voluntary disbandment," the reason being that worker, peasant, and student congresses were "better able to serve as the link between the revolutionary committees and the masses."* As stated at one Changchun rally, "When the organizational structure becomes incompatible with the needs of the struggle, the structure must be abolished." This was the case with autonomous Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations, as they cut across school, trade, and occupational lines and ran counter to the policy that demanded "struggle-criticism-transformation" in individual units.

Accordingly, August saw worker-peasant propaganda teams descend on universities and schools throughout China, as well as on all factories, institutes, and units with

*In other areas, such as Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Peking declared some of the more vicious Red Guard organizations—for example, the Red Flag and the 22 April-Rebel Army—to be "counterrevolutionary" rather than simply "annuling" them.
"old, big, and difficult problems"—that is, all units that had not effected "revolutionary great alliances" and "three-way alliances." Soon the press was replete with demands that young intellectuals and students should "act as pupils of the workers, peasants, and soldiers," that they must proceed "down to the countryside and up to the mountains" (hsia-hsiang shang-shan), "settle in rural areas where problems abound," "make revolution there all their lives," and "be the new peasants of the era of Mao Tse-tung." The young urbanites who were to be purified in the crucible of rural China would doubtless agree with the 11 September People's Daily-Red Flag editorial statement that "the great cultural revolution deepens . . . when it reaches the stage of struggle-criticism-transformation." Hundreds of thousands of university and middle-school students were and continue to be dispatched to rural areas—communes, villages, mines, and PLA farms. *Identical enforced departures have been noted in other cities, large and small.*

On 18 August, the second anniversary of the Red Guards' public debut, the national and provincial press gave scant attention to the past "achievements" of the young militants, but rather zeroed in on their defects and heaped praise on the workers and peasants as the vanguard of the cultural revolution. As the People's Daily put it:
. . . the workers and peasants have the greatest hatred for the exploiting classes, are most ready to accept Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, mount the strongest opposition to capitalist restoration, have the best understanding of the great significance of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, and possess the thoroughness and steadfastness to continue to make revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . The masses of the Red Guards can have a correct orientation and carry the current great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end only by integrating with the main force—the workers, peasants, and soldiers armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung . . . [They must] make the workers their teachers, steadily remold themselves . . ., earnestly accept the leadership of the working class . . ., [and] heartily welcome the worker-peasant-soldier . . . propaganda teams . . .

Ours is a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and it does not need intellectuals who look down on the workers and peasants . . . * The masses of revolutionary young Red Guard fighters . . . should make up their minds to become proletarian revolutionaries . . .

Other papers commented on the "great ignorance of many intellectuals," stating that such people are "absolutely useless." According to the New Anhwei Daily of 18 August:

*This is a restatement of the "advice" contained in the 22 July People's Daily "Editor's Note." As the Tsinghai Daily stated on 27 August, after condemning the Red Guards for "endless see-saw battles," "Even worse, some college students have found it difficult to swallow what was said in the important 22 July 'Editor's Note' . . . "

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In our Red Guard ranks, there are some who consider themselves as veteran rebels with meritorious deeds to their credit. Becoming self-important, they listen to nobody. They do not implement unconditionally every new instruction of Chairman Mao or every militant order of the proletarian headquarters. Instead, their attitude is based on whether or not the instruction or order is to their own advantage . . .

Similarly, the Chekiang Daily wrote, "Whoever disobeys the orders of the proletarian headquarters and stubbornly advocates the theory of 'I am the center' is disloyal to Chairman Mao and should be regarded as a renegade by the revolutionary Red Guard movement," and Hupei Provincial Radio stated, "Graduates of universities and colleges must first become ordinary peasants and workers, and the responsible persons of revolutionary mass organizations can certainly take the lead [In this regard]."

On 25 August, Yao Wen-yuan's important article, "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," appeared in Red Flag. Yao maintained that "throughout the entire process, the great proletarian cultural revolution has been solely under the leadership of one class only—the working class," condemned the "theory of many centers" (i.e., autonomous, competing mass organizations), and stated that workers and the PLA must assist in "struggle-criticism-transformation" as "it is impossible for the students and intellectuals to fulfill the task by themselves alone." Thus, Yao continued:

Chairman Mao recently pointed out: "In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education, it is essential to have working-class leadership; it is essential for the masses of workers to take part and, in cooperation with Liberation Army fighters, bring about a revolutionary three-way alliance, together with the students, teachers and workers in the schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution in education through to the end. The workers'
propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation, and they will always lead the schools. In the countryside, the schools should be managed by the poor and lower-middle peasants—the most reliable ally of the working class.

In some areas, the worker propaganda teams met with resistance,* but fractious Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels were veritably overwhelmed by the PLA-backed workers, who were armed with Mao's clear authorization to restore order and reform the militants. The teams' authority was complete; as the 27 August Inner Mongolia Daily put it, "They are absolutely not advisers, assistants, or tools which some would use to wage 'civil wars.'" Dissident Rebels were no match for the teams. In Peking, according to a 2 September NCNA dispatch, "more than 500 factories and mines are represented in the propaganda teams." In Kweichow, a 6 September PRC resolution stated that propaganda teams in the province will number "some 50,000 outstanding production workers—approximately seven percent of the province's production workers."

*However, many Rebels, sick of the turmoil and violence, undoubtedly welcomed the teams with genuine enthusiasm.
By early September, Red Guard-related violence was less than at any time since August of 1966. Mao's crackdown had been most successful, and the leadership moved quickly to establish the remaining provincial revolutionary committees, finishing up on 5 September with the installation of the committees for Tibet and Sinkiang.

At the same time, with order basically restored, official media began to caution that worker propaganda teams were not to engage in the indiscriminate suppression of Red Guards and intellectuals. A 5 September Red Flag "Editor's Note," commenting on the reeducation of university and middle-school graduates and their integration with the workers and peasants, stated:

Some of them are sure to make a success of this integration and achieve something with regard to inventions and innovations. Mention should be made of these people as encouragement. Those who are really impossible, that is, the diehard capitalist
roaders and bourgeois technical authorities who have incurred the extreme wrath of the masses and therefore must be overthrown, are very few in number. Even they should be given a way out. To do otherwise is not the policy of the proletariat.

On the 11th, Mao's "latest instruction" reiterated the main points of the "Editor's Note,"* and a joint People's Daily-Red Flag article of the same date argued that "most" intellectuals are good and still have a role to play; moreover, "reeducation" was necessary for cadres as well as intellectuals.

The most explicit defense of the Red Guards was made by Madame Mao at a 7 September Peking rally celebrating the establishment of the revolutionary committees for Tibet and Sinkiang. In her speech, the Madame warned, "We must not forget that the revolutionary youths and the young Red Guard fighters have made tremendous contributions at the initial and middle stages of the revolution." Allowing that "a small number of young fighters have committed mistakes of this kind or that," she said "we have the duty to help them correct these mistakes," and maintained that, although clashes between Red Guard factions are wrong, nevertheless "a bad thing can be turned into a good thing—that is, lessons can be drawn, young revolutionary fighters tempered, and enemies exposed." She then ordered

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*The instruction read: "The majority or the vast majority of the students trained in the old schools and colleges can integrate themselves with the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and some have made inventions or innovations; they must, however, be reeducated by the workers, peasants, and soldiers under the guidance of the correct line and thoroughly change their old ideology. Such intellectuals will be welcomed by the workers, peasants, and soldiers."
the Red Guards to obey the worker propaganda teams, "wel-
come this act of the working class, and closely follow its
leadership." At the same time, the Madame stated that the
working class "should do well to protect the young Red
Guard fighters, help them, and educate them," and called
for "earnest study" of the aforementioned Red Flag
"Editor's Note" of 5 September. In sum, the Red Guards
were to be rectified, not repudiated.

Provincial authorities were quick to demonstrate
that they got the message. On 10 September, the Kweichow
PRC and Military District issued a joint notice "in accord-
ance with the spirit" of the speeches by the Madame and
Chou at the 7 September rally.* Calling for a "new upsurge
of struggle-criticism-transformation," the notice praised
the Red Guards for their "tremendous achievements during
the initial and middle stages" of the cultural revolution
(the Madame's exact words), and stated that "revolutionary
committees at all levels, Party committees of the PLA
units, and the revolutionary masses must cherish and pro-
tect them." On 12 September, Hangchow (Chekiang) Radio
called on propaganda teams and intellectuals to maintain
a proper attitude toward each other, and Peking Domestic
Service of the 26th stated that the teams must "strengthen
the revolutionization of their own thought before reedu-
cating the intellectuals," as well as "learn from the
great and abundant achievements of the Red Guards during
the great proletarian cultural revolution." Other
examples could be cited.

*Chou only mentioned the Red Guards once during his
speech—a "Long live!" at the end. However, he transmitted
another of Mao's instructions: "The struggle-criticism-
transformation in a factory, on the whole, goes through
the following stages: establishing a revolutionary commit-
tee of the three-way alliance, mass criticism and repudiation,
purifying the class ranks, rectifying the Party organization,
simplifying organizational structure, changing unreasonable
rules and regulations, and sending people who work in of-
fices to lower levels." Chou's statement that "struggle-
criticism-transformation" in "all units should also go
through these stages" suggests Mao's radical reforms are
only beginning with the establishment of the revolutionary
committees.
Events during October provided further signs that Mao continues to envisage a role in the cultural revolution for a streamlined, revolutionary, and responsive Red Guard organization. Red Guards were prominent in the Peking National Day festivities on 1 October—a worker addressed the rally and promised to "follow Comrade Chiang Ching's instruction to cherish and help the Red Guards," and Red Guard contingents marched in the parade past Tienanmen with (but preceded by) PLA and worker propaganda teams. At the National Day rally in Hohai, Anhwei PRC Chairman Li Te-sheng praised the Red Guards for their "revolutionary actions"—"I firmly support you"—and called on all to "pay attention to protecting them." Similar support was voiced by speakers at rallies in other provinces, but not all. In Fukien, for example, PRC Chairman Han Hsien-chu did not mention the young Rebels, save in his opening salutation, possibly because Red Guard-related violence continued in some areas of the province.

October also saw the continuing transfer or deportation of hundreds of thousands of urban Red Guards to rural areas. By the beginning of the month, according to the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, over 200,000 college graduates had left Peking to "work on the farms and in factories and mines." On 8 October, 20,000 Harbin Red Guards were sent out to "settle in the countryside and mountain regions," and their departure was described (nobody truthfully) by a Harbin MRC official as "a major happy event." In Canton according to travelers' reports, some 170,000 youths were sent to the farms after the close of the trade fair on 15 October, with "reportedly half of them... dispatched under duress and showing every indication of returning as soon as possible." Other sources indicate that the arrival of huge contingents of young urbanites in the rural areas has been a bane to host and deportee alike. The peasants tend to regard the students as "rice buckets"—unproductive, unwelcome additions to communities already hard-pressed to provide the necessities of life. For their part, most Red Guards view their summary dispatch to the boondocks as equivalent to a life sentence at hard labor, are embittered by their loss of vanguard status, and feel superior to their new and alien environment. As the 24 October Kirin Daily put it, "Young intellectuals who have gone to the countryside to settle down... should get rid of their silly airs of superiority and humbly accept reeducation..."
by the poor and lower-middle peasants."

The Red Guards, however, are not the only targets for Maoist rectification at the present time. On 6 October, another instruction from the Chairman stated, "Sending the masses of cadres to do manual work gives them an excellent opportunity to study once again; this should be done by all cadres except those who are too old, weak, ill, or disabled."

What appears to be a major vehicle used in carrying out this rectification is the so-called "7 May Cadre School," described by Heilungkiang Provincial Service on 8 October as "revolutionized schools designed to train a new generation of communists who can handle both military and civilian affairs, engage in both industry and agriculture, work at both higher or lower levels, and hold official posts while remaining ordinary people."

Such schools are being established throughout the country, and provide further evidence (at least to this analyst) that the cultural revolution is not being turned off, albeit in Mao's name, by a moderate Chou En-lai/PLA coalition. On the contrary, the revolution is deepening, for Mao has turned his attention to purging the lower levels of the Party. In sum, the schools are nothing less than a new anvil on which Mao is attempting to pound out the new Party cadre, in much the same way that the worker propaganda teams and the "down to the countryside and up to the mountains" campaign are to revolutionize the youth.
XI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In August 1966, Mao Tse-tung unleashed his Red Guard blitzkrieg against the Party apparatus throughout China. Egged on by Madame Mao and her Cultural Revolution Group (CRG) lieutenants, the young students were given a carte blanche to purge "anti-Party and anti-socialist bourgeois authorities" and to "drag out" and "struggle" any provincial Party leader who "stands in the way of the great cultural revolution." Assured that all of their actions in defense of Mao and the cultural revolution were correct, the Red Guards vowed to "turn the old world upside down, smash it to pieces, pulverize it, create chaos and make a tremendous mess, the bigger the better!"

They kept their word. During the latter months of 1966, China was convulsed by a frenzy of Red Guard activity. Some nine million provincial youths liaised to Peking, caught a glimpse of Mao at one of the mass rallies, and received "instructions" that they were to "make revolution" upon returning home. At the same time, elite Red Guard units from Peking University, Tsinghua, Peking Aviation Institute, and other institutions in the capital fanned out into the provinces where they attempted to organize local militants for an assault on the Party apparatus.

Serious difficulties plagued the Red Guard movement from the start. First, the "instructions" given the young fanatics by Central leaders were purposely vague and all-inclusive (only Mao and his coterie were immune from attack). Indeed, they were nothing less than strident exhortations to "rebel" against anyone or anything that the Red Guards believed to be antithetical to the new Maoist order. As a result, when Mao later desired to stop the indiscriminate Red Guard onslaught, he had great difficulty in doing so.
Second, many Peking Red Guards who liaised to other cities attempted to exercise control over local cultural revolution activities. In at least two provinces, Party leaders were pre-targeted by the Maoists and, as such, were attacked by the outsiders as soon as the latter arrived on the scene. At minimum, the imperious behavior was resisted, for local Red Guards, even if they agreed concerning the targets, felt quite able to "struggle" them without being told what to do by outsiders. In other areas, local Red Guards did not agree with the outsiders' black lists and came to the defense of those under attack. In still other provinces, officials organized Red Guards for the specific purpose of defending the Party apparatus against the non-locals' onslaughts. Added to this was the innate hostility of some Chinese (such as the Cantonese) toward their fellows from other parts of the country.

Finally, given the effusive praise showered upon them by Central leaders and official media during the period following the first mass rally on 18 August 1966, many Red Guards did not realize—and many more did not accept—the fact that while they were the instrument of the purge, Mao never empowered them to determine which officials were to survive as "revolutionary cadres." Although open to advice, often conflicting, Mao, Lin Piao, and the Central CRG reserved the right to make the final determination.

By early October (1966), it was clear that the cultural revolution was not going according to plan. In many areas, the violent Red Guard assaults on the Party apparatus during the previous month and more had produced little save increased resistance on the part of those under attack. If Mao had expected a relatively easy victory, with provincial leaders enduring the young fanatics' outrages, debasing their persons and their careers with "self-criticisms," and then passively awaiting the Chairman's verdict as to whether or not they had passed the test, he had been proven wrong. Certain correctives were required, and Mao approached the problem on two levels—proffering "forgiveness" (at the October Work Conference) to those who corrected their "errors," while at the same time sharpening the weapon that would cut down those who continued to oppose his cultural revolution.
After the conclusion of the Work Conference, the Maoists turned their attention to the establishment of Revolutionary Rebel organizations consisting primarily of workers in industrial, mining, Party, and governmental organs throughout the country in order to bolster the Red Guards and erode the bases of support for local authorities. In one important sense, the newly-formed Revolutionary Rebel organizations succeeded all too well. The Rebels proved that they could tear down established structures very effectively, but they were incapable of working together to build a new order. Nowhere was this demonstrated more clearly than in Shanghai, regarded by Mao as second in importance only to Peking itself, for by the end of December, China's largest city was in chaos. The old Party and governmental apparatus was moribund; public security and military forces were powerless to control competing Rebel groups; production and essential services ground to a halt.

By early January 1967, the mess in Shanghai had become so serious as to require a "power-seizure" for which, it soon became clear, the Maoists were poorly prepared. In effect, the "power-seizure" was a rescue operation, and Mao's new team in Shanghai--headed by two members of the Central CRG--faced the formidable task of pacifying a city and re-establishing central authority over a populace whose desires were often in conflict with Mao's objectives in the purge.

Almost immediately, revolutionaries throughout China were told to emulate their Shanghai counterparts, thereby leading to a series of "power-seizures," accompanied by much bloodshed and violence, in almost every province and major city. Although the Maoists had stated repeatedly that there were only a "handful" of "capitalist-roaders" to be dealt with, the Revolutionary Rebels and Red Guards heard only the call to "seize power," and thus subjected to severe attacks nearly all officials, a number of whom were later declared to be "good comrades" and retained by Mao in positions of considerable responsibility. This led to a deep-seated and continuing hostility on the part of many Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel organizations toward those appointed to the Revolutionary
Committees—the new organs of power—established (often with great difficulty) since January of 1967, for those who have survived the purge have, by and large, been assigned to posts in the same province where they had been under attack.

A major reason for the failure of many "power-seizures" was the fact that a given Rebel faction or alliance usually attempted to seize power only for itself. This often led to a second round in which the excluded faction(s) would attempt to wrest control away from those who had carried out the initial seizure.

A second problem centered around just what Mao meant by "power-seizure." It may be that he really believed that the young toughs, armed with his "thought," could seize and exercise power in an effective manner. If so, Mao couldn't have been more wrong. On the other hand, he may have meant only for the militants to supervise the work of Party and government cadres and keep them at their posts until a determination was made (by the Chairman, not by the Red Guards) with regard to their loyalty. If this was what Mao had in mind, and it seems the more likely alternative, he must have been rudely shaken by the self-seeking behavior of his "revolutionary young generals." The Revolutionary Rebels had failed, as had the Red Guards before them.

Accordingly, on 23 January 1967, Peking ordered the PLA to restore order and end the increasingly severe conflicts between rival Rebel organizations. It is not known what criteria were supposed to be employed in determining which mass organizations were to be supported and which were to be suppressed. However, it appears that local PLA commanders were given considerable latitude in this regard, and that their decisions were almost certainly influenced by the attitudes which the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels had displayed already toward the military authorities.

Unfortunately for some military commanders, much of the violence was perpetrated or, at least, initiated by the more militant Red Guard groups. Thus, when a
number of organizations that had been suppressed by the PLA were later restored to favor by Mao and the Central CRG, the responsible military commanders had to pay for their earlier "errors," although there is good evidence that at the time even Mao and his inner circle did not know which group or groups to support in some areas.

It soon became apparent that the PLA, from Mao's point of view, had carried out the 23 January directive too well. In other words, too much order had been restored; too many Red Guards had been muscled around by the military; too many Party and government officials had been confirmed in their posts (conversely, too few "revolutionaries" had seized and retained power). To correct this situation, the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels were again given the go-ahead in mid-March. This time around, the initial target was the so-called "adverse current of counterrevolutionary restoration" -- that is, the phenomenon of "false power-seizures" in a number of provinces, whereby the attempt was made to reinstate large numbers of Party officials, even though many, if not most, of them had not gone through the prerequisites of "rehabilitation" (being "struggled," composing abject self-criticisms, and willingly accepting "supervision" by the "revolutionary masses"). The next step was to order the PLA to construct "three-way alliances" of Revolutionary Rebels, PLA, and revolutionary cadres as a prerequisite for a second, genuine "power-seizure" at all levels.

At the same time, official media intensified the attack on Liu Shao-chi ("China's Khrushchev") in an attempt to provide a specific enemy against which the entire revolutionary Left could unite in opposition. However, the hatreds that had been generated during the "seize-power" period were too deep-seated to be erased or assuaged in most cases, and the PLA had been rendered incapable of firmly channeling the Revolutionary Rebels and Red Guards in the correct direction and against the correct targets. Thus, the rival revolutionary groups fell almost immediately to fighting among themselves, and several of the recently rehabilitated organizations turned their energies to settling accounts with those
military commanders who had outlawed their units and arrested some of their members earlier on.

As a result of the deteriorating situation, a directive was issued on 6 June, which stated that all those who continued to engage in armed struggles would be dealt with severely, but did not authorize the PLA to open fire on groups that disregarded the order. As a result, the order was largely disregarded, as few groups were willing to stop fighting before they had defeated their rivals, thereby (they hoped) securing for themselves a place in the new order.

The basic problem appears to have been Mao's reluctance to acknowledge that much of the fighting was the result of the deep split within the ranks of the "revolutionary Left" itself. Thus, instead of ordering the PLA to move effectively against the troublemakers, Mao's policy throughout June and most of July was (a) to summon representatives of hostile factions to Peking where--it was hoped--they would work out their differences, and (b) to dispatch delegations of Central leaders to settle disputes and promote "revolutionary great alliances" among competing Revolutionary Rebel and Red Guard organizations, a prerequisite for the establishment of "three-way alliances" of Revolutionary Rebels, PLA, and revolutionary cadres, thus making possible the formation of a new revolutionary organ of power.

One such delegation was sent to Wuhan, and it was there that events transpired which moved the cultural revolution into its most leftist stage to date. With regard to the two competing alliances there, the Central CRG opted for one side and declared that the other, the so-called "Million Heroes," was a "conservative" organization that had been erroneously supported by the Military Region commander and his subordinates. The delegation was to see to it that the Central CRG decision was carried out, and that the Military Region leaders confess their earlier "mistake." At least one of the PLA commanders refused, and this emboldened the "Million Heroes" to mount a protest against the decision, culminating in an assault on the leaders of the delegation and their detention.
As soon as the news reached Peking, several vessels of the East China Sea Fleet were ordered up river, and Chou En-lai arrived in Wuhan to secure the release of the prisoners. He was successful, and accompanied the battered delegation back to Peking the following day.

The Maoists' reaction to the Wuhan Incident was swift. The Military Region commander was immediately ordered to Peking, struggled, and busted, and the "Million Heroes" was condemned as a "counterrevolutionary" organization. At the same time, the reaction was extreme. On the day the delegation returned, for example, Madame Mao declared that the "revolutionary masses can use weapons in self-defense." Her statement was followed by a series of press attacks on the PLA, culminating in a Red Flag editorial on 1 August which stated that the movement to "overthrow and discredit...the handful of top persons in authority taking the capitalist road in the Party and the Army" now "represents the general orientation of the struggle." Finally, on 9 August, Lin Piao ordered PLA commanders to "seek instructions from and report to...Mao, the Central Committee, and the Central CRG" before acting on "any matter, large or small..."

The call to overthrow the "handful" in the Party and the PLA, together with the constraints placed upon the army by Lin's directive, reduced China to a state of near chaos, and the Maoists moved quickly to redress the balance in accordance with what came to be known as the Chairman's "great strategic plan." This major pronouncement, probably delivered in late August, is extremely important to an understanding of the course of the cultural revolution since September 1967, for several of Mao's major concerns in the summer of 1968 were identical with the key points set down in his "plan" a year earlier.

According to Mao, the first order of business in the fall of 1966 had been criticism of the "bourgeois reactionary line," and the Red Guards had been the first to recognize this. In January 1967, however, heeding the call to seize power, the "workers of the whole country rose;" thus, "the principal force [now] lies with the workers and peasants," and the Red Guards must "recede to the subordinate position."
After the "power-seizures" of early 1967, Mao stated, the hope had been for a "prompt great alliance;" but this had not been achieved because of the self-seeking activities of "intellectuals and young students" with their "petty-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas." And Mao warned the Red Guards, "Unless they strive to reform their world outlook, things will run counter to their wishes."

Mao clearly stated that his "plan" did not signal the end of the cultural revolution, but rather that the movement must re-direct the attacks against "correct" targets, organize "revolutionary great alliances" and "three-way alliances," point out "bad persons and devils," and "rehabilitate Party organizations" and "convene Party congresses at all levels." He also made it plain that his call for further attacks against "capitalist-roaders" did not authorize the Rebels to attack the new revolutionary committees that were being established with such difficulty, and called for careful political and ideological training to eliminate factionalism from the ranks of the "revolutionary Left."

Numerous directives were soon promulgated in an attempt to lower the level of violence and hasten the realization of Mao's "plan." Most important of all, the PLA was authorized to open fire on Rebels attempting to seize additional weapons, and empowered to compel them to return all ordnance seized previously. In some provinces, public trials were held and criminal elements--including "juvenile delinquents" and "hoodlums using the names of revolutionary mass organizations"--were imprisoned or executed. In Peking, Madame Mao informed the Red Guards that "troops will be assigned to your schools to conduct military training"--that is, to shape up the young fanatics.

Finally, representatives of the contending factions, PLA commanders, and revolutionary cadres from various provinces were ordered to attend "Mao-study" classes in Peking. At these classes Chou En-lai and the Central CRG saw to it that the participants engaged in criticism and self-criticism, tried to secure their voluntary compliance with Mao's "plan," and attempted to hammer out compromises and "revolutionary great alliances" among the rival mass organizations.
The study classes, the deployment of additional army units, reopening the schools, the crackdown on all unauthorized revolutionary liaison, the directives ordering the dissolution of mass organizations that cut across functional or occupational lines, and the dispatching of urban Red Guards for resettlement in rural areas—these and other measures were instrumental in restoring relative calm by the end of 1967 to a number of areas where large scale violence had been the rule during July and August.

As a result of the negotiations in Peking, 12 more revolutionary committees were set up at the provincial level during the first four months of 1968, thereby bringing the total to 21 and leaving eight yet to be established. Concurrently, the campaign against the "twin evils" of anarchism and factionalism was greatly intensified, the purpose being to get on with the business of forming "revolutionary great alliances," reaching agreements on which cadres were "revolutionary" and thus eligible for inclusion in "three-way alliances," and defending and consolidating the revolutionary committees at all levels.

However, it must again be emphasized that when the Maoists called for the defense and consolidation of revolutionary committees, they did not (nor do they now) mean that the cultural revolution was nearing an end. Although anarchism and factionalism were roundly condemned, so were other "evils," including the fact that "bad elements" were still hidden within the ranks of the Party (thus indicating more purges). In sum, the Maoists wanted: (1) to terminate indiscriminate mass attacks on the revolutionary committees; (2) as required, to purge and streamline the committees, either directly from Peking or through continual personnel screenings by the committees themselves; (3) to put an end to factional clashes; (4) to stimulate revolutionary strain by further attacks on those already in disgrace; and (5) by means of the "Mao-study" classes, conducted in some areas by worker-soldier-cadre propaganda teams, to carry out "struggle-criticism-transformation" (criticism, self-criticism, reform) in a "penetrating way" within individual schools, factories, and offices. The cultural revolution was to continue—transformed,
not abandoned—but in a more manageable, compartmentalized fashion in order to consolidate the revolutionary committees and promote Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel obedience to both Central and provincial authority.

By mid-March, however, it became clear that the Maoists felt that the emphasis on restoring order had led to a loss of revolutionary fervor, thereby (in Mao's eyes) casting doubt on the loyalty and reliability of some revolutionary committee members, and had caused many people to believe that the cultural revolution would "victoriously" conclude with the establishment and consolidation of the committees. Accordingly, another militant phase was initiated, accelerated by the purge of Acting PLA Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu and two other high-ranking officers who exceeded their authority and ran afoul of the venomous Madame Mao and the Central CRG.

As the "anti-rightist" campaign began, emphasis was placed upon the important role yet to be played by the mass organizations as watchdogs of the performance of revolutionary committee members. However, this emphasis encouraged the Rebels to renew their factional clashes and undermined the already tenuous stability of the revolutionary committees. The result, in short, was not the controlled revolutionary upsurge that Mao desired.

The conflagration in Kwangsi—where Vietnam-bound rail service was disrupted, arms shipments raided, trains derailed, and cities gutted—was the most ominous development of the "anti-rightist" campaign, and appears to have been the final outrage that caused Mao to authorize the PLA to move forcefully against the Red Guards throughout the country. Central directives of 13 June and 3 July ordered an immediate halt to the fighting, but rail outrages were noted in Kwangsi as late as 25 July.

Finally, on 28 July, Mao made it absolutely clear that he was fed up with the Red Guard outrages. In a five-hour meeting with Red Guard leaders in Peking, he warned them that military control was his answer to continuing disobedience and stated:
I now issue another nationwide directive: If anyone continues to disobey, strike at the PLA, destroy communications or set fires, he is committing a crime. If a small number of people do not heed this advice, they are bandits—they are of the Kuomintang. They must be surrounded, and if they continue their stubborn resistance they will be annihilated.

The Revolutionary Rebels and Red Guards, if allowed to continue as autonomous, self-seeking, and hostile factions, not only imperiled what had already been achieved, but also made it impossible for Mao to proceed with the cultural revolution and the radical restructuring of Chinese society according to his revolutionary obsession.

Events during August provided further confirmation that the working class had replaced the Red Guards as Mao's revolutionary vanguard. Worker-peasant propaganda teams, some with several thousand members and often armed, descended on universities and schools throughout the country. In some areas, the teams met with resistance, but the Rebels were overwhelmed by the PLA-backed workers, who were armed with Mao's clear authorization to restore order and reform the young militants. Some Rebel organizations began to announce their "voluntary" disbandment, others were outlawed, and it became clear that such Red Guard activity as was permitted would henceforth be under the aegis of Red Guard congresses responsible to the revolutionary committees and not left to autonomous factions. Finally, hundreds of thousands of university and middle-school students were and continue to be dispatched forcibly for rectification in rural areas—communes, villages, mines, and PLA farms.

By early September, Red Guard-related violence was less than at any time since August of 1966. At the same time, with order basically restored, official media and Central leaders began to caution that worker propaganda teams were not to engage in the indiscriminate suppression of Red Guards and intellectuals. Events during October provided further indications that Mao continues
to envisage an essential but much diminished role in the cultural revolution for a streamlined, revolutionary, and responsive Red Guard organization.

Twenty-six years ago, in his address at the Yenan Conference of Writers and Artists in May of 1942, Mao had declared:

Whenever I compare unreformed intellectuals with workers, peasants, and soldiers, I feel that not only are there many unclean things in the minds of the intellectuals but also that their bodies are unclean. The cleanest people are the workers and peasants, even though their hands may be soiled and their feet smeared with cow dung. Anyway, they are still cleaner than the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.

Later events intensified Mao's distrust of China's intellectuals. In 1957, during the short-lived liberalization of the "Hundred Flowers" Movement, some of the most outspoken criticism of Party policy came from students and faculty of the China People's University, a "model university" established in February 1950 for the specific purpose of training "revolutionary" intellectuals of worker-peasant background to become cadres for national construction.

In 1964, in an extended conversation with a visiting Mao demonstrated quite clearly that his suspicions had not been dispelled. He evinced particular displeasure with regard to Peking University (Peita)--"It is not a good university"--and when the stated that he had visited Peita and round the faculty and students "were enthusiastic and had a civic spirit," Mao replied, "They told you so, but what they say does not necessarily correspond to what
they do. It is not a good university." Another member of the delegation then volunteered that he had been quite impressed by the students at a certain polytechnical institute. Mao responded, "Naturally, they spoke well in front of you. That is why you must not necessarily believe everything they say. Whether the students are good or not, this is what we will see in the future."

Mao's longstanding views with regard to the intellectuals' strengths and weaknesses were reinforced by the performance of the Red Guards during the course of the cultural revolution to date. In the initial, destructive phase, Mao exploited the young students' revolutionary zeal and used the Red Guards as a unique extra-Party instrument to subject the elite to an ordeal by fire—a test to determine whether or not high-ranking members of the Party were worthy to be declared revolutionary successors and hence eligible for positions of responsibility in the new revolutionary order.

While it would be too much to say that the cultural revolution has followed a predetermined master plan—there have been too many tactical adjustments and shifts along the way—it is clear that Mao envisaged two distinct phases from the start: destructive and constructive. The Red Guards were Mao's vanguard during the destructive phase; however, they proved to be a woefully defective instrument during the constructive phase.

Mao's disillusionment with the Red Guards became apparent after their dismal, self-seeking performance during the initial "power-seizures" of early 1967, and was intensified by their indiscriminate, internecine warfare during the following summer. Time and again, Mao ordered the young students to rectify themselves voluntarily. They did not do so, thereby confirming in Mao's mind his assessment of the negative qualities of China's intellectuals.

As early as 1939, Mao had written that the sole criterion by which to judge whether or not a youth is revolutionary is if he is "willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does
so in practice." The Red Guards had not been willing to do so. Thus, Mao replaced them with a new vanguard—the working class—when he decided that the time had come to start building and consolidating his new revolutionary order, and forcibly dispatched the young intellectuals to rural areas by the hundreds of thousands for further "revolutionary purification." The Red Guards as a terrorist device had outlived their usefulness.