KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

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This is a working paper, an interim report on recent developments in Soviet strategic thought and military planning. A more comprehensive treatment of the subject is planned, but must await the acquisition of more substantial evidence.

This report focuses on the relationship between the controversy over resource allocations and the dialogue on military doctrine in a period in which the military and economic choices facing the USSR have been acute. In the process of tracing developments in the Soviet economic-defense sphere since the Cuban crisis, we have sought to discover Khrushchev's objectives and scheme of political maneuver, and to gauge his progress in putting his program across. On this basis we have tried to determine the main direction of Soviet defense-economic policy.

Although the writer has benefited from the suggestions and research findings of colleagues, he is solely responsible for the paper as a whole. The DD/I Research Staff would welcome comment on the paper, addressed to Irwin P. Halpern, who wrote it, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff.
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SUMMARY

Since the Cuban crisis, which nurtured the cause of the advocates of greater defense spending, Khrushchev's basic plan has been to keep up the present pace of growth of Soviet armed strength without further impairing the country's economic growth. To his way of thinking, further serious retreats in the economic process of "building Communism" could be as disastrous for Soviet foreign policy and prestige as faltering in the arms race. Khrushchev's method of dealing with the military-economic dilemma has been to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in the resource allocations equation. Since last November, he has argued that a radical redistribution of resources is not needed to vitalize the economy and meet the country's military objectives; great resources could be found, he has said repeatedly, if "hidden reserves" were exploited, inefficiency in production reduced, and economic management streamlined.

In addition, Khrushchev appears to be campaigning behind the scenes for another substantial reduction in conventional forces—which do not figure importantly in his conception of the requirements for deterrence and waging nuclear war. While he has not yet explicitly called for new cuts, his scheme has been reflected in his recent deprecations of conventional forces; in his likely success in obtaining a troop cut in the Bulgarian army (reportedly made possible by its acquisition of "newer weapons"); in his depiction of future war as lasting one day; in the transformation of his "one-day war" formula into military doctrine in some military forums; in the new emphasis given the doctrinal importance of his January 1960 (troop cut) speech; and in the studied assertion of the prerogatives of the party leadership in the sphere of defense policy and military doctrine, as well as the propaganda effort to build up the image of Khrushchev personally as a military authority.
In short, we have found Khrushchev to be successful in resisting the efforts of others to shift more of the country's strained resources from the consumer to the defense sector. That his position in the inner sanctum policy disputes has been appreciably strengthened since his gloomy economic forecast of last February is seen in the sustained propaganda emphasis since March on improving consumer welfare. (In this regard, the most notable developments have been an increase in March in the planned capital investment in light industry and the publication in June of Khrushchev's guidelines for the 1964-65 economic plan that give priority to the chemical industry explicitly in support of agriculture and consumer goods.) On the other hand, Khrushchev thus far has been thwarted in his own efforts to cut back Soviet conventional forces, by a somewhat weakened but still unyielding and articulate conservative military element (which, in turn, evidently has important backing in higher party circles.).
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The collapse last fall of the Soviet strategy to put missiles in Cuba seems in retrospect to have generated a strong current of opinion in favor of increasing the defense establishment's share of the country's limited resources. Both the deployment in and the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba were tacit admissions of Soviet strategic inferiority. As Soviet prestige dipped low in the wake of the crisis, the remaining dynamism went out of Soviet foreign policy in much the same way that air escapes from a tire and with the same resultant immobility. The Chinese and their cohorts used the occasion to discredit the Soviet leaders with charges of "adventurism and capitulation." Soviet military morale seemed to slip to its lowest level since the announcement in January 1960 of a drastic unilateral troop-cut. Indirect evidence suggests that there was dissatisfaction among the military over Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban operation.* Under such circumstances, the need to improve the relative strategic position of the USSR with genuine increments to the military became a politically irrefutable argument, and the position of the advocates of greater defense spending was consequently strengthened.

That the Soviet leadership would give greater impetus to defense was further suggested by the declaration of

*As a counter, the regime launched a propaganda campaign asserting the wisdom of the party leaders and their prerogatives in the planning of the country's defenses. For example, in RED STAR on 7 November, Marshal Chuikov cited a hitherto unpublished exchange of messages between Stalin and Lenin in 1920 to refute the notion that "our diplomacy sometimes very effectively spoils the results achieved by our military victories." Stressing the dominant role of the party in military affairs, Chuikov criticized unnamed officers for failing to "maintain proper attitudes and opinions."
military superiority as a goal of Soviet policy soon after the curtain fell on Cuba. In an important pamphlet on Soviet military policy and doctrine published in November, the Soviet Defense Minister wrote: "The most characteristic feature of the present state of the development of Soviet military doctrine is the fact that it bases itself on the superiority of the armed forces of the USSR over the armies of the most powerful countries of capitalism, with respect to military-technological means and moral-combat qualities." Along the same lines, the 30 March CPSU letter to the Chicom Party introduced a new slogan: "As long as there is no disarmament, the socialist commonwealth must always have superiority in armed forces over the imperialists."* Since Cuba, Soviet propagandists have also proclaimed current military superiority—at times qualified and at times not—over the West. Boasts of military superiority had dropped out of the propaganda in early 1961, and until last fall the Soviets were content to assert military parity with the West. Among the reasons for reintroducing boasts of current superiority, evidently, were the Soviet need to salvage some of the prestige lost in the wreckage of the Cuban operation, and, in the case of some Soviet leaders, to play down the strategic deficiencies of the USSR in order to draw off some of the urgency that other Soviet leaders attached to the problem of improving the Soviet strategic posture.

Despite the strong motivation to improve the country's strategic position in the aftermath of the Cuban debacle, the USSR has apparently not radically stepped up its military program. It does not appear on the basis of available evidence.

*This slogan was subsequently reiterated by Marshal Grechko in IZVESTIYA on 8 May and by RED STAR in an article on the Warsaw Pact anniversary on 14 May. It has been made clear in these and other Soviet materials, however, that the effective military organization protecting the socialist commonwealth is the Soviet controlled Warsaw Pact, in which China is neither a member nor an observer. A thoughtful article in the FBIS Bloc Survey of 31 May 1963 "Military Superiority Declared Basis of Bloc Policy," expands on the subject.
that there has been a substantial shift in resources from the consumer to the defense sector. On the contrary, from all indications measures taken have tended to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in economic priorities. (In fact, there have been indications in recent months of a decision to increase the rate of expansion of consumer programs beyond previous plan figures. Thus an article in the March KOMMUNIST, claiming that the "correct proportions" between heavy and light industry are being maintained, changed the figure for the increase in investment in light industry in 1963 from 22.3 percent to 37 percent. However, the possibility that there has been a shift in some consumer residuals to the defense sector cannot be ruled out.)

That the resource allocations equation has not been changed, it seems, is largely the result of Khrushchev's determination (backed by hard campaigning in ruling circles) not to lose more ground in the economic competition with the West. For in the taut economic situation in which the USSR found itself, that would be the penalty of further sizeable shifts in allocations to defense. Khrushchev has consistently regarded the growth rate of the Soviet economy, the improvement of the living standards of the Soviet people, as important an index of the growing power of the Soviet cause as Soviet military might. He has been willing to live with long periods of strategic inferiority so as to promote the country's economic growth. For example, between 1955-1958 he had secured a decline of two billion rubles in military spending, with the savings diverted into investment and consumption, and thereby enabled the Soviet GNP to increase annually by seven percent. This is not to say that Khrushchev has neglected the defense sector; he has in fact led the pack of reformers in remodeling the Soviet armed forces for nuclear warfare. But modernization was only one side of his military program; cutting back the conventional arms of service to offset the great cost of advanced weapons and to nourish the economy was the other part of his scheme.

At the height of Khrushchev's power in 1958, the upward trend in production and investment was reversed as the pace of military procurement, R&D and space costs rapidly increased. These trends were the main reason for the slowdown in Soviet economic growth (the rate of GNP increase
dropped to 4-5 percent) in recent years. Faced with a diminishing economic growth rate and rising costs of new weapons, Khrushchev in January 1960 took steps to moderate the high total defense spending by drastically cutting back (by one-third) the older arms of service and diverting the savings in rubles, materiel and manpower resources to the exotic weapons program and the economy. Once again he was willing to live with real strategic inferiority while basing the Soviet strategic posture to a large extent on deceptive propaganda claims about Soviet ICBM strength. After initial success in getting his troop cut program adopted, Khrushchev saw his program founder as a result of a combination of internal and external circumstances. And he himself rendered it the coup de grace in announcing the "temporary" suspension of the troop cut in July 1961. Again in early 1962, in making the decision to place strategic weapons in Cuba, Khrushchev and his colleagues seem to have been partially motivated by economic considerations. The venture offered the opportunity for a relatively inexpensive way to meet the felt need for a trans-oceanic strategic attack capability. The fact that the risks involved in the operation were unusually high, as Soviet foreign policy initiatives go, underscored the desperation felt in Moscow to find a solution to the dilemma of meeting military and economic requirements, as well as to reverse the falling momentum in their foreign policy.

Khrushchev began to unfold his strategy for dealing with the great dilemma of meeting the demands of the economy and the military at the Central Committee Plenum in November 1962, where he acknowledged the continued primacy of defense-heavy industry in the organization of the country's resources. But he also made it clear that he would not accept an "either-or" proposition: he wanted the USSR to stay in both the arms race (to bolster the country's strategic position) and the economic competition (to score important political points).
For to his way of thinking, to drop back seriously in either competition would have disastrous results for Soviet foreign policy and prestige. Khrushchev's strategy, hence, was to fight a holding action on the allocation of resources. "Although heavy industry has priority, flexible proportions should be maintained," Khrushchev said; "consumer goods are not a second-rate matter." That Khrushchev won the first round of the controversy is seen in the fact that the 30,000-word plenum report contained only one reference to defense. Stating the need to "maintain" national defenses at the "due and proper level," the phrase was much weaker than the version in the budget for 1962 that called upon the country to "increase in every possible way" its defenses.

Khrushchev again plainly declared for both the arms race and economic competition in his 27 February speech at Kalinin. When assessing available resources, he said, "we must soberly take into account the needs of peace-time economy and the requirements of defense. We must balance both sides so as to prevent one side from being overemphasized." In the speech, Khrushchev painted a gloomy picture of the future, lamenting that the high cost of defense preparedness would not permit a serious improvement in the consumers' lot in the foreseeable future. Thus he forthrightly confirmed what he had indicated in the previous November at the Central Committee plenum—that he had shelved for an indefinite time his long-standing proposals for substantially increasing allocations to agriculture and light industry. This alone could have been sufficient reason for the pessimistic tone of the speech: Khrushchev was apologizing to the Soviet people for not being able to fulfill earlier promises of a change in favor of the consumer by, say, lifting the policies of restraint brought to bear on the consumer earlier in the year as a result of over-committed resources. (In 1962, meat prices were raised by 30 percent, private housing construction was cut back further, and a promised reduction in the personal income tax was "postponed.") On the other hand, Khrushchev's uncharacteristically pessimistic tone may also have reflected the period of greatest weakness in his struggle to resist further inroads by the insatiable military machine into economic
investment.* There have probably been starts and stops in a number of directions in the defense-economic sphere over the past half year, as various elements in the military and civilian bureaucracies competed for the country's strained resources. But as subsequent events have shown, Khrushchev succeeded in beating down all attempts to divert more resources from the consumer sector. (This was made clear by the end of March when KOMMUNIST, as mentioned earlier, raised the planned figure for the increase in light industry investment in 1963 from 22.3 percent to 37 percent.)

We are also inclined to view the appointment in March of the former defense industry boss Ustinov to the chairmanship of the Supreme Economic Council not as an indication of a shift in the allocation of resources toward defense, but as an effort to apply the more efficient methods used in the defense industry to other industries. (At the November plenum, Khrushchev had singled out the defense industry as a model of efficiency. Even in his 24 April speech, in which he voiced dissatisfaction with the high cost of weapons in the past, he said that the former defense chief was selected for the new post because "he deserves it." Also, Rudnev, the Chairman of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research privately gave that explanation of Ustinov's appointment to Ambassador Kohler in April.) Such an interpretation is fully in keeping with the march of other developments in Soviet economic policy.

Still more recently, in late May, Khrushchev again made plain his scheme for dealing with the economic-defense dilemma. With high confidence he told the electorate in Kalinin, Kozlov was delivering a much more optimistic speech—in which he called for new "huge" investment in heavy machine building enterprises (i.e., defense industry)—in Leningrad.

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on 23 May, he told the Soviet people at a rally for Castro that while the USSR ranks second in the world in volume of production, this is only for "the time being," and that "in five or seven years we shall say: move over and give us first place! And we will unfailingly be first."

This fresh injection of optimism, in contrast to the gloomy speech of last February, undoubtedly reflected Khrushchev's considerable success in getting Castro, during his stay in the USSR, to declare strong sympathy for the Soviet cause in the Sino-Soviet polemics. But the new optimism may also have mirrored Khrushchev's improved situation in the inner sanctum policy disputes. Perhaps the best testimonial of his success was the announcement on 3 June, of the government "guidelines" for the 1964-65 economic plan. Following the general lines of Khrushchev's program set forth at last November's Central Committee plenum, the guidelines reflect his personal concern over the lack of progress in agriculture and his awareness of the need for further improvements in consumer incentives to spark the overall economic program. Significantly the guidelines—a planning innovation—give priority to the chemical industry explicitly in support of agriculture, consumer goods, and chemical substitutes for certain metals. But there was no mention of military priorities in the announcement.

Thus far, we have discussed Khrushchev's program in terms of his objectives—which have become official policy—of keeping the USSR in both the armed and peaceful competitions. We have also discussed his method of dealing with the military-economic dilemma in terms of his efforts to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in the resource allocations equation (in which defense already had primacy). Let us next consider how Khrushchev has been trying to meet his principal objectives in a very tight economic situation without making bold changes in the allocation of resources.

Khrushchev, it seems to us, intends to find the wherewithal to accomplish the difficult tasks facing the country in two ways:

(a) save by streamlining economic management, reducing inefficiency and exploiting untapped reserves; and
(b) cut back the conventional—in his view obsolescent—arms of service.

He has voiced confidence that the savings to be had from reducing inefficiency in all sectors of the economy will be considerable. That economic productivity can be raised without new major shifts in resources has been his battle hymn since the termination of the Cuban crisis. But he evidently does not calculate that those savings will be sufficient to meet the rising costs of advanced weapons R&D, production and deployment. Although he has not yet made explicit in a public forum his intention to make further savings by cutting back conventional forces, he has done much short of that to prepare the ground for eventually bringing the issue to a head.

At the November plenum, Khrushchev revealed that a major ingredient in his remedy for the chronic ailments of the Soviet economy was another sweeping administrative reorganization. In his November speech, he called for the bifurcation of the party into two separate organizations, one to control industry and the other to control agriculture; the establishment of five new Central Committee bureaus; the creation of a single agency to be responsible for management of the economy; and a party-state committee to oversee the fulfillment of directives at all levels. By mid-March 1963, these proposals—which amounted to a reinstatement of stringent, centralized control—were adopted with some modifications. However, the effect of the reorganization on productivity remains as yet a question.

A second ingredient in Khrushchev's remedy, it was made clear, was a radical increase in the efficiency of production. Thus, Khrushchev's 24 April speech was entirely devoted to the problem of utilizing "hidden reserves" in all programs, from military to consumer. Repudiating recommendations (made earlier by Kozlov inter alia) for huge increases in investment in machine-building, Khrushchev called for a campaign to reduce the "waste" in that industry, which amounted to almost one-fifth of the metal it consumed or 10 million tons. He insisted that there were "great reserves in light and food industry" as well as in the machine building. But most significant was his assault on the defense
industry. He complained about the high cost of weapons production in the past—under Ustinov's aegis—and argued that with better organization military costs can be lowered. "The defense industry has many reserves for increased production," he said, that are "not being used sufficiently." The new defense chief, Smirnov, is younger, Khrushchev said, and "we shall be able to shake him just as we used to shake Ustinov." And before leaving the subject, Khrushchev announced that a careful study of how production capacities are being used in the defense industry will be made by Ustinov’s Supreme Sovnarkhoz.

As suggested earlier, it does not appear that Khrushchev is counting on increased productivity alone to satisfy the financial, resource and manpower increments demanded by the Soviet military-space R&D effort. It is becoming increasingly clear that he is also campaigning behind the scenes to win acceptance for another troop cut. Khrushchev, it seems in retrospect, never gave up the idea of drastically cutting back the older arms of service which do not figure importantly in his concept of deterrence and war. Even before the 1960 troop cut was much underway, he spoke of further reductions as well as the possible eventual conversion of the standing army into a territorial army ("if a disarmament agreement is not reached"). When a combination of circumstances—most notably opposition from the military—brought him to announce the suspension of the troop cut in 1961, he made it clear that he regarded the measure as "temporary." Even after the scuttling of his troop cut program, Khrushchev occasionally indicated that he did not endorse the military's deeply-entrenched position on the need for a large standing army irrespective
of the international political atmosphere.* And once again, after the Cuban debacle, Khrushchev could be seen maneuvering against a strong vested interest to cut back the size of the large conventional forces. His urging the military to absorb as much of the higher costs of weapons as possible is one indication of his intent. But there are also other, less ambiguous manifestations of his scheming.

One lever that Khrushchev may be using in his campaign to effect new cuts in conventional forces in the Soviet army is a loyal satellite—Bulgaria. There is strong, but as yet inconclusive, evidence that the Bulgarian armed forces are being reduced. (That a reduction may already be underway is also suggested by the publication on 23 April of a decree of the Bulgarian presidium amending previous legislation and establishing civilian equivalents for some military specialities.) did not state the size of the reduction or give any indication how a cut might be distributed among the armed forces components, other less authoritative sources have said that the cut might amount to as much as 20 percent of the present estimated strength of 164,000.

*Thus in a message to President Kennedy on disarmament problems, evidently timed to coincide with the celebration of Soviet Army-Navy Day in February 1962, Khrushchev said:

In the nuclear rocket weapons age—and we have entered this age—the numerical strength of the forces does not by a long way have the importance it had in World Wars I and II. War now would at once become total, worldwide; and its outcome would depend not on the actions of troops stationed along the line dividing the combatants but on the use of nuclear rocket weapons, with which the decisive blow can be struck even before vast armies can be mobilized and thrown into battle.
The reported justification given for the cut is the receipt of newer weapons,* the same rationale used by Khrushchev for the Soviet troop cut in 1960. Tight budgetary problems in Bulgaria also bear comparison with the USSR. Moreover, any major change in the Bulgarian forces would have to be engineered in Moscow. The Bulgarian armed forces are regulated in large part by the Soviet high command as a result of their inclusion in the Warsaw Pact. And that organization since 1960 has assumed growing importance in Soviet military planning. Also, the Bulgarian Party chief Zhivkov owes his political life to Khrushchev. In early February, according to reports reached here on the Bulgarian troop cut decision. In short, it would seem that a decision to reduce the size of the Bulgarian army would mean that the traditional officers in the Soviet high command had ceded ground in the controversy over whether massive land armies are essential for the bloc's defenses. (On the other hand, the ground-oriented officers could probably be expected to spring back with the argument that the cuts in the Bulgarian forces make it imperative that no new reductions be made in Soviet conventional forces.)

Khrushchev gave further evidence of his interest in early March 1963, when he told that the USSR would not increase its ground forces irrespective of Western increases in their ground forces. (Khrushchev made similar statements in 1960 in defense of his troop cut program.) To meet such a Western move, Khrushchev said, the USSR would increase its rockets. (He also said that the USSR, at the urging of Soviet scientists, is setting up a new nuclear rocket system despite the cost.) He went on to belittle the U.S. calls for building up NATO

*Bulgaria has recently received new-generation Soviet fighters and surface-to-air missiles and may have received short range surface-to-surface missiles.
conventional forces, saying that the McNamara thesis of conventional war was a fairytale since nuclear weapons would be used from the outset.* (Later, on 10 June, he would again belittle conventional weapons. In a meeting with Khrushchev reportedly said that the USSR had stopped making strategic bombers and surface warships because of their "total vulnerability.")

We interpret as further evidence of Khrushchev's effort to cut back conventional forces the two unprecedented references in his 27 February speech to a "one-day war." First he said, "if a new war is unleashed, it will end with the full collapse of those who launch it on the very first day of the war." Later in the speech he said: "The imperialists must know that if they start a war our armed forces will deal a crushing blow to the enemy in order to topple him and crush him on the very first day of the war."

Khrushchev may have taken his cue from a statement, in the form of a warning to the West, made only four days earlier by Marshal Malinovsky in a RED STAR article celebrating armed forces day: "The power of our counterstrike is more than sufficient to burn the aggressors in the first hours of war." Both Khrushchev and Malinovsky thus portray a war in which the main enemy is consumed in a nuclear holocaust with the first missile salvos. But Malinovsky is more ambiguous than Khrushchev on the finality of the nuclear exchange for the war. While all three statements are obviously intended for the West, they also figure in the internal dialogue on military doctrine and policy. In the latter context, they lay the basis for a forceful argument against the need to maintain large conventional forces for general nuclear war. Moreover, the statements of the two Soviet leaders have since turned up in the military literature. Thus far, only one senior military figure has

*Shortly, we shall see how the traditionalist spokesman Marshal Rotmistrov makes a contrary statement on the subject of conventional war in order to justify the maintenance of large conventional forces.
alluded to the one-day war prediction in a public pronouncement; that, surprisingly, is Marshal Konev; who apparently had left his number two post in the defense establishment in Spring 1960 because of his opposition to Khrushchev's troop cut plan. (The ways of Soviet military leaders are unpredictable: Marshal Rotmistrov, who led the reformers of Soviet military doctrine in 1954-55, has in recent years been a leader of the conservative group in the military.) The fact that more of the top military leaders have not mouthed the one-day war slogan seems to us to point up its polemical nature.

More remarkable still is the transformation of Khrushchev's passing references to one-day war in his 27 February speech into "military doctrinal positions" in recent issues of Kommunist of the Armed Forces, organ of the Main Political Administration. Thus, in an article in the No. 8 issue of the journal (signed to press 4 April 1963), a slight paraphrase of one of Khrushchev's statements on one-day war—with the conspicuous addition of the Russian word for "blitzkrieg"—was included in a list of the "most important positions of Soviet military doctrine." The article as a whole, in terms of the dialogue on military doctrine, is strongly "modernist" or pro-Khrushchev. The authors, two colonels, (1) stressed the party's exclusive capability to decide the complex questions connected with the "complicated tasks in the sphere of military construction"; (2) took potshots at Zhukov, a symbol of military professionalism and autonomy, thereby helping to scotch recent rumors of an impending rehabilitation of the officer whom Khrushchev fired in October 1957; (3) emphasized the contribution of Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech to the military doctrine; (4) but made no reference to Malinovsky's 1961 22nd CPSU Congress speech in which he set forth the "tenets of military doctrine" that departed in some important respects from Khrushchev's January 1960 speech; (5) claimed Soviet superiority in the "means of armed struggle" over the armies of the West, showing the adequacy of the party's policy toward the army and deflating the urgency of a rapid military build-up; (6) made no mention of the "traditionalist" catchword "multi-million man armies"; (7) did however, acknowledge the weaker "traditionalist" tenet on the need for combined forces to conclude victory; (8) stressed the
dependence of military strategy on politics; (9) mentioned the importance of civil defense:

In addition to eclipsing the military's contribution to military doctrine, the article gave greater direct recognition to Khrushchev's January 1960 speech than has been the case since the suspension of the troop cut. Whereas previous articles acknowledged that Khrushchev's speech had "laid the foundations" of Soviet military doctrine, the present article states flatly that Khrushchev's speech presented the "most important positions of Soviet military doctrine worked out by the Central Committee." Among these "positions"—strongly implied to have been stated by Khrushchev in January 1960—were included the references to the blitz one-day war and the need to be able to pre-empt an enemy surprise attack. Khrushchev in January 1960, far from stressing the importance of a surprise attack against the Soviet Union, denied that such an attack could be decisive. It was Malinovsky, in his speech at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, who first presented the problem of preparedness for an enemy surprise attack as the most important task before the Soviet armed forces. In doing so, however, Malinovsky invoked the authority of the CPSU Presidium.

An ancillary development is the renewed effort being made in some quarters to portray Khrushchev as a seasoned military leader. Of late, he has once again been identified in the press as the "Supreme High Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces." (4 May 1963 RED STAR, in an unsigned account of the May Day Parade.) The last previous public references to him as military chieftain, to our knowledge, appeared in the fall of 1961.* Also, a recent IZVESTIYA (8 May) featured a 1942 picture of Khrushchev in uniform with members of an anti-aircraft crew at the front. And last March, some

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*The 1962 Defense Ministry book "Soviet Strategy" noted that in time of war, the functions of Supreme High Commander will be vested in the "First Secretary of the Central Committee and Head of Government," but did not say that Khrushchev holds the supreme military post in peacetime as well.
commemorative articles on the Battle of Stalingrad played up Khrushchev's wartime role as a military leader, while others subtly detracted from it. (More will be said on the detractors later.) There have also been occasional references in the military literature in recent months to Khrushchev's other wartime experiences, such as the Kursk battle, in various military publications.*

* A recent visitor to the USSR, Fidel Castro, also sang praises of Khrushchev's World War II experience and military prowess in a marathon television interview in Havana on 5 June. Note how he characterized Khrushchev's role in the defense policy fights—which seem to bear on his present as well as past activities—in the following passage:

We must keep in mind one thing: The fact that the Soviet Government, the Soviet leadership, and Comrade Khrushchev have shown great interest—I had a special opportunity to see it in my talks with the Soviet officers on strategic matters—in the decision to build rockets. This was a decision in which Khrushchev contributed with his leadership. He defended this policy consistently, that is, the development of rocketry—a weapon that has made it possible for the USSR to face, from a military point of view, the danger of an imperialist aggression. Part of the technical equipment of the Soviet armed forces has included rockets in the past few years, and the number of rockets is increasing. This is the situation. Aside from Khrushchev's preoccupation with peace, I was constantly aware of his determination to be in a position to resist and of his determination to maintain a firm policy. We must realize that Khrushchev has participated in wars: in the civil war and in the most decisive battles of war. He has participated in war; he has taken part in the most difficult battles, and he showed great audacity in those difficult moments. He was also bold in politics and it is admitted that he is a bold politician. This is the conclusion I drew.

PRAVDA carried this passage in its coverage of the Castro interview.
Also, since the Cuban crisis, there has been a spate of articles in the military press asserting the prerogatives of the party leadership in the military sphere and rebuking the military for their presumptions in national defense matters. The KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES article discussed above is a good example of the party leadership's claim to exclusive authority in deciding basic defense questions. Another notable example is the widely circulated pamphlet released last November under the signature of Marshal Malinovsky. Entitled "Vigilantly They Stand in Defense of Peace" and issued by the Ministry of Defense, the pamphlet went to some length to ascribe the credit for Soviet military doctrine to the political leadership and to inflate the role of Khrushchev personally in the development of the doctrine. But the pamphlet ignored the contributions of military thinkers to the doctrine, omitting any reference to Malinovsky's own speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress in which he set forth the "tenets" of military doctrine.

In part, the reassertion of party prerogatives is no doubt intended as an answer to military critics of Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban affair. But it also seems to answer those who may question the authority and wisdom of the party leaders in deciding on other issues pertaining to the nation's defense. By the same token, the recent tendency to put fresh paint on Khrushchev's portrait as a military theorist and to present his January 1960 speech (in which he announced the troop cut) as the principal embodiment of Soviet military doctrine may be designed to strengthen Khrushchev's authority in arguing for changes in military policy.

What we have presented thus far is only one side of a continuing dialogue between Khrushchev and his supporters on the one hand, and those who oppose his military-economic policy views, on the other. Let us next consider the "opposition's" side of the dialogue. Khrushchev's "opposition" in the sphere of national defense-economic questions, from our perch, is a changing, amorphous body of military and political leaders, of whom we can identify only a small number by name. We have been able to deduce the existence of elements in the Soviet civilian and military bureaucracies that (1) desire to maintain or even strengthen the conventional
forces of the Soviet Union while moving ahead in the advanced weapons field; and (2) consequently urge a shift in resources from the consumer to the defense sector. We can also gauge the relative strength of these elements in terms of the observed trends in Soviet defense-economic policy. Thus far, as maintained earlier in this paper, Khrushchev has, since last October, been able to thwart the efforts of the champions of a shift in resources to defense. In doing so, he has had to make concessions in their direction—he has shelved his own long-standing proposals for a major change in priorities in favor of the consumer; he has given in on some political-ideological questions such as the "economics over politics" issue, after deflating them of much of their policy significance. Moreover, he has not as yet been able to put across his program for a reduction in the conventional arms of service. And until he does, the USSR will be at an important policy impasse—with an evidently generally accepted policy of forging ahead with the expensive development of advanced weapons, but evidently without sufficient wherewithal to support it.

The entrenched ground-oriented opposition among the military elite have used a variety of verbal weapons to resist further cuts into the conventional forces. Last fall, two defense ministry books were published that stressed the need for multi-million man armies, the likelihood that the war would be long and drawn out, and that the economy would play a vital role throughout the war. On 11 January, RED STAR ran three articles defending the retention of a large standing army. One of the items stressed the need to be ready for protracted war with "mass, multi-million man armies." Another emphasized that only a regular cadre army can meet the country's defense requirements. And the third article concluded that military science "has profoundly substantiated the doctrine that under present conditions the waging of war requires mass armies."
In February, Marshal Rotmistrov—an outspoken leader of the traditionalist group—made a strong case for conventional forces in his article in the No. 2 issue of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES. In that article, he attacked the notion, which he ascribed to the imperialists, that a nuclear war will be a "push-button war." While acknowledging the established doctrine that strategic missile troops will play a "decisive role" in a future war, he went on to assert the continuing importance of other types and branches of the armed forces. To show the compatibility of these ideas, he portrayed

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*In another journal in February, PROBLEMS OF HISTORY OF THE CPSU (No. 2), General Yepishev—whom Khrushchev last year appointed to head the Main Political Administration, a Central Committee department—made a statement that appeared to be at odds with Khrushchev's way of thinking about the size of the armed forces. Yepishev wrote that the "views of some theoreticians about the need to stop developing mass armies, but instead replacing manpower by technology, have proved unfounded," and that, in fact, "the role of mass armies has grown with the increased importance of technology in modern war." (Yepishev made these points after stressing the leadership of the party in developing military doctrine and policy.) We are admittedly mystified by these remarks by Khrushchev's political watchdog for the military. They may have signalled a low point in Khrushchev's fight in party circles to cut back the size of the army; it will be recalled that he was very pessimistic in his February election speech about the burden of defense costs. On the other hand, Yepishev's remarks may have been intended to strengthen Khrushchev's position by dissociating him from the most radical proposals such as the complete scrapping of the standing army (Khrushchev had hinted at this in 1960 in proposing a territorial militia system) or the paring down of the ground forces to some 30-40 combat divisions (which Gen. Gastilovich had proposed in 1960); the net effect of these remarks could make Khrushchev seem more moderately disposed toward the force-size issue. Yepishev, it should be noted, spoke of "mass", not of "multi-million man armies."

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nuclear war in terms of two wars to be fought in basically different ways. "If all the weight of war with a trans-oceanic enemy is placed on the strategic missile troops," he said "nevertheless on the continent the missile troops will operate in close coordination with land troops, the main striking force of which will be composed of tank units and formations." Rotmistov was thus willing to concede that the ground forces will not play a combat role in the war against territorial United States. The standard formula on the need for combined forces to secure final victory makes no such distinction, but implies universal applicability of the formula.*

More recently, in the English language MOSCOW NEWS of 11 May 1963, Rotmistrov authored a highly unorthodox statement which, irrespective of its foreign propaganda purpose, provided strong justification for the maintenance of large, versatile armed forces:

The Soviet Army has at its command an absolutely new arsenal of weapons, with well trained men able to wage both atomic and conventional warfare, on a large scale or small scale, in any climate and on any territory.

*The USSR, of course, has no serious capability for a trans-oceanic landing of troops--and a Soviet military planner Admiral Bogolepov—was very pessimistic about attaining such a capability within the next decade or two. Yet, military spokesmen occasionally talk as if such a capability exists. Thus, a naval journal (MORSKIY SBORNIK, No. 1, 1963) review of the Soviet book Military Strategy notes agreement with the book's statement on the need to occupy strategically important areas on the enemy's territory, but takes the book to task for ignoring the role of the navy in carrying out an "offensive on the territory of an enemy across a sea barrier." The naval journal, in making this point, may be lobbying for the acquisition by the navy of such a capability.
The standard doctrinal-propaganda position, rarely departed from in the Soviet press, virtually precludes the involvement of the Soviet armed forces in a large or small conventional war with U.S. forces. Any direct clash between Soviet and U.S. troops in a local war, according to the established doctrine, will inevitably develop into a general nuclear war. Neither open nor classified Soviet literature reveals the existence of a large-scale conventional war or local war doctrine, although some open literature in recent years has stressed the need for Soviet military strategy to take account of the problem of local war in the nuclear age.* Moreover, previous explicit arguments for maintaining strong conventional forces have been in terms of nuclear battlefield requirements. Now Rotmistrov has for the first time in open or available classified Soviet literature extended the grounds for justifying the maintenance of large conventional forces to the realm of non-nuclear warfare. (The irregularity of this position may explain why it was presented in a very obscure propaganda organ, MOSCOW NEWS, that is not intended for a domestic audience and not even available in the Russian language. MOSCOW NEWS, it might be said, is a poor excuse for "equal time" for the traditionalist viewpoint.)

Khrushchev's military "opposition" also tends to question the Party's claim to exclusive authority in the determination of military doctrine and policy. They gently protest the tendency of Khrushchev's supporters to eclipse the military's role in the sphere of doctrine and defense policy. Thus, Marshal Rotmistrov in his KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES last February acknowledged that Khrushchev's January 1960 speech was a "major contribution to Marxist-Leninist science on war and the army"—but went on to assert as few military spokesmen do nowadays the contribution of
the military leaders themselves: "We find a detailed development and exposition of the essence of Soviet military doctrine in reports and speeches by the Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky and other military figures."

Another possible manifestation of the "opposition's" effort to press the military's prerogatives in the defense sphere is the attempt of some to detract from Khrushchev's prestige as a military savant. Thus, on the occasion of the last Stalingrad battle anniversary earlier in the year, one group of Marshals--Yeremenko, Chuikov and Biryuzov--placed the main credit for the victory with the local command, meaning Khrushchev among others. A second group of Marshals--Voronov, Rotmistrov, and Malinovsky--singled out officers of the high command in Moscow as the main architects of the Stalingrad war plan. Of the latter group, Voronov is on the retired list and is eager to uphold his own World War II record as Supreme Command Headquarters officer. That Rotmistrov was among Khrushchev's implicit detractors is consistent with his steadfast support of the traditionalist position. But it is difficult to say just where Malinovsky stands on basic military questions. In debates among the military, he usually straddles the fence, taking a centrist position which more often than not turns out to be an expression of the current stage of official military doctrine. At the same time, in his relationship with Khrushchev, he has alternated between the roles of grovelling sycophant and stalwart spokesman for the prevailing military viewpoint, even when that conflicts with Khrushchev's expressed views. The fact that Malinovsky in his PRAVDA article on 2 February named Marshal Zhukov as one of the Supreme Headquarters officers who played a key role in planning the Stalingrad operation tends to support the political imputations of the article.

That some influential people were trying to rehabilitate Zhukov, who has been a symbol of military professionalism, was made evident when, on 10 April, a Soviet military liaison officer suggested to U.S. military attaches that Zhukov be invited to the U.S. Armed Forces Day celebration. The Soviet functionary stated that "as far as we know" Zhukov's only difficulty was that he ignored political training in the armed forces five years ago. Yet, only a few days earlier,
General Yepishev's journal KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES lambasted Zhukov in a lead editorial and in an inside article for his responsibility for early defeats in World War II. This difference over Zhukov's status, it seems to us, is another expression of the clash of views among the Soviet leaders over such fundamental policy questions as Khrushchev's efforts to economize on conventional forces. As it turned out, Zhukov has not been rehabilitated; and neither he nor any other Marshal attended the U.S. reception.

Whether or not a substantial reduction in conventional forces will be forthcoming will mostly depend upon Khrushchev's ability to dislodge the strong traditionalist-minded faction that still holds sway in the military establishment, as well as to overcome the important civilian supporters of that group in the higher party bodies. He has already carried his fight to the military academies and barracks, propagandizing his preferred conception of the nature of future war and the country's requirements for both preventing it and fighting it. But he has not as yet explicitly called for another force reduction; so as not to place his prestige at stake, he may not do this until he has actually won the policy fight. He may also have made his first major move since Cuba to replace ground-oriented officers in the military high command with people more sympathetic to his own philosophy of deterrence and war. In this respect, in late February or early March he replaced Marshal Zakharov with Marshal Biryuzov as Chief of the General Staff. Zakharov, who served in World War II as chief of staff of Malinovsky's Second and Third Ukrainian Front and Trans-Baikal Front (1943-45), authored a "swan song" article in the March issue of MASTER SERGEANT in which he made a strong argument for maintaining large ground forces. (According to the U.S. Army attache in Moscow, some 20 Soviet Marshals and Generals attending a Finnish Armed Forces Day Reception in Moscow on 4 June greeted Marshal Zakharov with "unusual warmth" in a blatant show of sympathy over Zakharov's demotion.) Biryuzov, who headed up the anti-air defense of the country before his appointment in 1962 to succeed Moskalenko, comes to the General Staff with a strong background in strategic warfare. The appointment may have signalled a new effort to reorganize the General Staff--the "laboratory" of Soviet military science--the leaders of which up until now have been disinclined to break with the tested, traditional concepts of war which accord the conventional arms of service a very important role.