SOVIET STAFF STUDY

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE USSR AND THE FALL OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

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AND
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I. INTRODUCTION

The removal of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov from his post as USSR minister of defense on 26 October 1957 was unexpected. When Zhukov left Moscow on a ceremonial visit to Yugoslavia at the beginning of the month, he appeared to be at the peak of his popularity and prestige. A distinguished wartime commander and four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Zhukov had been elevated to full membership in the party presidium following the 1957 June purge of the "antiparty group." In many Western circles it was believed at that time that Zhukov had saved Khrushchev from the machinations of the "antiparty group" by dramatically throwing his weight, and that of the four-million-man army, behind the party leader, and that this action was rewarded by his promotion to full presidium membership.

The announcement of Zhukov's release as defense minister was terse and gave no clue as to his future. Observers in Moscow differed as to whether he would be promoted to minister without portfolio, "kicked upstairs" to some honorific post, or demoted. The last was proved correct on 2 November when a central committee resolution removing Zhukov from both the party presidium and central committee was made public.

Speculation continued as to why Khrushchev had turned against his ally of June. Khrushchev's advancement to power since Stalin's death had been accompanied by Zhukov's rise in the Ministry of Defense and party hierarchy. The two appeared to be on the best of personal terms. Some observers felt that Khrushchev had not taken the initiative, but that opponents of the party leader had forced the issue in order to deprive him of one of his loci of power.

Another serious question was the timing. Why had the leadership felt it necessary to drop Zhukov from its ranks when the Syrian-Turkish crisis was at its height and on the eve of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, at which emphasis on party unity would have been most desirable?

The central committee's resolution of 3 November 1957 accused Zhukov of three serious "violations of Leninist, party principles": (1) eliminating party control and opposing the work of party organizations in the armed forces; (2) implanting a "cult of his own personality" in the Soviet Army, a
result of his loss of "party modesty" which permitted him to belittle the "tremendous efforts of the Soviet people (in World War II), the heroism of...the armed forces, the role of commanders and political workers, the military skill of the commanders of fronts, armies and fleets, and the leading and inspiring role of the Communist party of the Soviet Union"; and (3) being politically deficient and disposed to "adventurism both in his understanding of the major tasks of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and in his leadership of the Ministry of Defense."

The following re-examination of these charges against Zhukov and of the events which preceded and followed his ouster is intended to clarify some of these problems. The full story of the Zhukov case is not and probably never will be known outside the Soviet hierarchy. Therefore, it will be necessary to fill in several gaps with speculation which we shall try to keep consistent with the known facts of the case.
II. ZHU KOV AND PARTY CONTROL IN THE ARMY

Zukov's Attitude Toward Political Training in the Armed Forces Not New. The removal of Marshal Zhukov from his government and party posts in October and November 1957 focused attention more sharply on military-party relations in the Soviet Union than at any time since the end of World War II. This event has been widely interpreted as a logical climax of widespread and deeply rooted army-party policy clashes dating back to the demise of Stalin, but this explanation leaves a number of unanswered questions. The problem of maintaining political control in the armed forces without reducing military efficiency has faced the Soviet Communist party since the army was first established.

Zhukov was held personally liable in October 1957 for reducing the authority of political workers relative to that of military commanders. Yet, before Zhukov returned to prominence from the obscurity Stalin prepared for him after World War II, authoritative statements had been made which inflated the prestige of command personnel and ignored political workers, and Marshal Vasilevsky, then minister of war, spoke in the same vein at the 19th party congress in October 1952. Furthermore, the same sentiments reappeared in the party line a year after Zhukov's second fall from grace. According to the doctrine propagated in the fall of 1958, political work in the armed forces was to be directed toward raising discipline, increasing the authority of "one-man command" (yedinonachaliye), and ensuring fulfillment of the combat training mission.

Antiparty or promilitary. Zhukov never challenged the pre-eminent authority of the Communist party over the military establishment as a whole, but he wanted the same control over the work of the political organs in the armed forces that he had over all other arms and services of his Defense Ministry. His purpose appears to have been to improve the combat readiness of his command. In treating the Chief Political Directorate (GPU) of the Defense Ministry, which also functions as a department of the party central committee, as a staff organization literally subordinate to his administrative fiat, however, Zhukov in effect reached for more political power than the party was willing to allow any Communist leader who also controlled the Soviet military machine.
It does not appear that Zhukov consciously sought in this way to aggrandize his personal power position vis-a-vis his colleagues in the party presidium. Apparently he did assume, however, that the prerogatives of his ministerial rank were genuine, and after his elevation in June 1957 to full membership in the party presidium he began to assert them more strongly against the GPU. The actual power relationship between the Ministry of Defense and its technically subordinate Chief Political Directorate, which was also a department of the party apparatus, had not previously been tested: no military leader had ever risen to full membership in the party presidium and therefore been in a position to demand that the role of the GPU be clarified (Trotsky as War commissar was in Lenin's politburo, but he had been a political leader in his own right previously; Bulganin's case was similar). Zhukov's apparent feeling that as long as the GPU was in his ministry he could run it as he saw fit was to be the chief reason for his downfall.

The need to reform the inefficient, nonproductive political apparatus in the army and make it more effective appears to have been Zhukov's chief concern. He insisted time and again that the existing political apparatus in the armed forces did not seem to him to contribute anything positive to increased training efficiency, better discipline, or mastery of the new techniques of modern warfare. On the contrary, the ineffectual putterings of the political organs hamstrung his commanders in their efforts to attain the training goals assigned them by the Defense Ministry.

Neither the central committee's indictment on 2 November 1957 nor subsequent attacks by high-level party and military functionaries imputed any "antiparty" motives to Zhukov. (During the Ukrainian party congress in January 1959, Marshal Chuykov charged him with "revisionism," but this charge has not been repeated and the Zhukov case was not mentioned at the 21st all-union party congress.) Zhukov was a long-time Communist party member as well as an old soldier, and his speeches and articles were replete with references to "the wise leadership of the glorious Communist party and its central committee." By using his own position in that leadership to tighten his control of his ministry, however, Zhukov eventually antagonized all important elements within Soviet officialdom, and the summation of this hostility finally caused his downfall. By October 1957 he had lost the support of the
very people on whom he relied for professional existence—
his political deputy, the top military echelons, and finally,
Khrushchev.

Zhukov and Party Control. As already suggested, it was
not party control to which Zhukov objected, but the mechanics
of its application to the armed forces—the mechanics of troop
indoctrination. Against the charge that he sought the elimination
of party control and opposed the work of party organizations
in the armed forces must be placed extracts from the
military press and radio calling for improvement in both the
quality and method of political work. On 15 September 1955
Red Star, the Soviet Army newspaper, published an exposition
of Defense Ministry thinking on the subject of political work
under the title, "Raise the Ideological Level of Political
Information." This piece urged that political information
sessions be held "not less than three times a week" and specified
that attendance at these sessions by enlisted personnel was mandatory. The paper noted that "in many units the value
of political information is underestimated, gatherings are held infrequently, and the content of the talks is one-sided
or superficial. Political information periods should not be
used for other purposes such as current military training...."
In tone and content this item might have been extracted from
any of the hundreds of exhortations to improve political training which filled the military press after Zhukov's ouster.

Moreover, on 21 November 1955 Radio Volga, the Defense
Ministry's transmitter servicing the Group of Soviet Forces
in Germany, sharply criticized shortcomings in political
work in the army in a manner which graphically illustrated
the point that the target of the Defense Ministry's attack was
not political work per se, but the manner in which it was con-
ducted:

Political workers do not teach the great achieve-
ments of the Soviet people in matters of industry,
agronomy, or culture.... Little concern is shown
for the theoretical and methodological preparation
of political group leaders. Only very few seminars
pay attention to methodical lecturing, the individ-
ual reading of literature, the organization of
individual work with instructors, and the correct
utilization of clearly understandable visual aids.
There are still few qualified lecturers, and hardly
any lectures are given by the supervisor of political lectures (sic), especially on the questions of history, theory of the Soviet Communist party, or questions of the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet state.... The change in political training methods called for by the Defense Ministry requires all commanders and party and Komsomol organizations of units and subunits to supervise daily the political training of all personnel.

In no objective sense could this spurring of political organs to greater efforts be termed an attempt to "eliminate party control."

Another demonstration of Defense Minister Zhukov's "party-mindedness" is manifested by the conduct of political work incident to the 20th party congress held in February 1956. A month before the congress convened, all elements of the armed services began a period of intensive study and discussion of the central committee's draft of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Meetings were held at division level and higher to plan the indoctrination of troops on the announced agenda on the congress. On 13 March 1956, Zhukov and the head of the Defense Ministry's Chief Political Directorate jointly signed a detailed directive setting forth the lessons derived from the congress and how they were to be taught. This document was distributed to every major command of the Soviet armed forces. Finally, a conference of senior political officers of the armed forces was held in Moscow in early April at the height of political agitation in the defense establishment for improvement in the quality of political instruction.

The foregoing illustrates two important factors in the Zhukov case: (1) he recognized that deficiencies in political training existed, and (2) he was determined to correct them in his own way.

It is interesting to note that none of the above examples refers to the commander - political officer relationship, but it was on this crucial issue that Zhukov's fate hinged.
Zhakov vs. the GPU in Orders and Directives. Evidence of the cleavage of interest which developed between the defense minister and his Chief Political Directorate is revealed in the ministry's written orders and directives on political work during the Zhukov period. Soon after he became defense minister in February 1955, Zhukov apparently issued a secret order forbidding criticism of service duties of military commanders at party meetings. On at least two subsequent occasions commanders cited an order of this nature in quashing criticism of their actions by political officers in their commands.

The Defense Ministry directive on the results of the 20th party congress called the attention of all elements of the armed forces to the primary role of political organs in the military establishment—support and assistance for commanding officers. The document directed that "the study and preparation of the decisions and materials of the congress are to be directed to strengthening one-man leadership, to increasing military discipline, and to mastering combat technology and weapons."

Zhukov also took steps in March 1956 to subject political workers in the armed forces to additional training in purely military subjects, a project hinted at in a speech he delivered to political workers in April. A Defense Ministry order made tactical commanders personally responsible for the military training of their political workers and required a report on the status and nature of such training from each major headquarters in the armed forces. This note had been sounded earlier when Soviet Fleet, the Soviet Navy's newspaper, editorialized in May 1955 that "all political workers must be expert on naval as well as political affairs, for without such knowledge they cannot effectively assist others." The campaign to produce a well-rounded political worker—officer is also an important requirement in post-Zhukov policy.

How Much Politics for the Troops? The difference in the attitudes of Zhukov and his successor toward political indoctrination, as opposed to basic military training, is demonstrated by a comparison of two articles, published two and a half years apart, on the conduct of political studies in the army. Red Star announced on 13 October 1955 that "the subjects
of political studies have been changed. The number of themes on questions of military education, as well as the time devoted to them, is being increased significantly. The platoon leader himself will personally conduct political studies with all the soldiers of his platoon, and he will answer not only for their military education but for their political education."

Maj. Gen. N. M. Mironov, head of the propaganda and agitation department of the GPU, wrote the second article, which appeared in Red Star on 10 January 1958. Mironov wasted no words: "In this new educational year the composition and method of political instruction is being changed. The emphasis is to be on political themes...attendance at lectures is compulsory." Thus, between 1955 and 1958, the emphasis shifted sharply from military to political themes as the basis of political work in the services.

The Contrast in Political Methodology, 1956-1958. The important role of company officers in stressing the military aspects of political training was emphasized consistently in the military press throughout 1956. The term "unified process" was used increasingly in reference to military-political education and training of troops. This concept corresponded roughly to the long-established "integrated training" principle of Western armies. Subjects which formerly had been considered "political"—military courtesy and discipline, traditions of the service, Soviet patriotism—were now taught in conjunction with other purely military subjects. Simultaneously, the amount of time allotted to formal instruction in purely theoretical subjects—Marxism-Leninism, political economy, and the history of the Communist party—was reduced.

Immediately after the Zhukov ouster, however, measures were instituted to increase formal political schooling for soldiers, particularly for officers. The GPU announced in mid-November 1957, for example, that because of suggestions "from the officer corps itself," the number of hours devoted to classroom-type instruction for officers in political theory would be "more than doubled" in 1958. At the present time all officers are compelled to attend the obligatory minimum of 50 hours of political lectures yearly.
Zhukov and One-Man Command. The principle of "one-man command" (yedinonachaliye) has long been a staple of Leninist administrative theory. In 1925, this was declared to be the norm for the Red Army, although political commissars continued to conduct the political indoctrination of troops. In 1928, commanders who were bona fide party members also assumed responsibility for political training. During the purges of the late 1930s tight party controls were again imposed, and one-man command was pushed into the background. From 1942 to the present, however, despite temporary periods of stronger control measures, the clamor for more vigorous assertion of the yedinonachaliye principle has increased.

Zhukov's attitude toward one-man command was dramatically defined in a speech before a party conference of the Moscow Military District in January 1956. On this occasion he explicitly assigned political organs in the armed forces a role subordinate to commanders:

In the district there have been noted separate attempts to subject the performance of service duties (sluzhebnaya deyatelnost) of commanders to criticism at party meetings. Any such attempts deserve condemnation. Our task is to strengthen the authority of commanders in every way and to support exacting officers and generals....

Zhukov's injunction restraining political workers' criticism of commanders' "service duties" was, for practical purposes, without precedent. Neither the party statutes nor the 1951 Interior Service Regulations of the Soviet armed forces contain any suggestion that a commanding officer is to be considered immune from criticism by party organizations and political organs. Both documents stress the commander's responsibilities and his obligations in carrying them out, rather than his personal immunities.

Faced with this hazardous dichotomy in interpretation of the "one-man command" principle, the party central committee on 27 April 1957 promulgated a new set of "Instructions to the Organizations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Soviet Army and Navy." It is probable that Zhukov himself took the initiative in requesting written documentation of his position on army-party relations, and Khrushchev may have approved these instructions in an attempt to define
relations between his defense minister and the Chief Political Directorate. At any rate, the instructions seemed to grant the defense minister the essence of what he had been publicly demanding—jurisdiction over the political organs within his command. The document instructed party organs to increase their efforts to "rally" the armed forces around the Communist party and the Soviet Government, but it interpreted zedinonachal'ye as precluding criticism of "the orders and commands of commanders...at party meetings."

The fine distinction posed between Zhukov's "service duties" and the central committee's "orders and commands" involved much more than semantics. In the days immediately prior to Zhukov's removal, official party organs emphasized the point that the phrase "orders and commands" applied only to those formal written and verbal orders which a commander issued in performance of his most literal command functions. Thus the commander remained liable to criticism for deficiencies and errors of omission and commission by his unit in the course of its training. In other words, orders as enunciated by the commander were exempt from criticism, but the effects of the orders were fair game for party snipers.

A tendency to "water down" the implications of the new instructions was actually noticeable in the press shortly after the June 1957 purge of the antiparty group. Amid the welter of words aimed at the "plotters and conartists," the opinion was frequently expressed that all Communists, regardless of rank or position, shared "equal rights and responsibilities." The military press in particular stressed that commanders should not only tolerate, but actively solicit party criticism of their personal and professional shortcomings.

A single example of the new tone in the press will suffice to show which way the wind was blowing in mid-1957. Maj. Gen. A. Shmelov, chief of the Far Eastern Military District's Political Directorate, lauded party criticism of a commander in Red Star on 12 September 1957. Among other "insolences," the officer had summoned subordinates from a party meeting "without any special need for it." Retribution quickly befell the errant commander, however: "Not long ago Comrade Silantev learned a lesson. At a party meeting the Communists subjected him to sharp and just criticism for his rude attitude toward party discipline. They reminded the comrade that in the eyes of the party all are equal and that no one is permitted to violate the norms of party life."
After the October 1957 session of the party central committee, it was claimed that the instructions had been conceived as a direct result of Zhukov's excesses in shielding military personnel from party criticism and that they were designed to correct the harm done by him. For example, Red Star on 3 November 1957 reported that a speaker at the special meeting of the Moscow Military District party aktiv called to endorse the central committee's action charged, "Until the issuance of the central committee's instructions, party organizations were deprived of rights provided for in the party statutes and were pushed aside from active participation in the solution of the problems of military training."

On 5 November 1957, Radio Volga quoted a speaker at a meeting of the GSFG party aktiv as saying that "until recently, on the order of Comrade Zhukov (underlines added), former minister of defense, the role of the party and political activity in the armed forces had been reduced.... Until the publication of the instructions to party organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, approved by the party central committee, the party organizations did not in fact carry out their tasks as stipulated in the party statutes."

There was no evidence in the spring or early summer of 1957, however, that either the Defense Ministry or the party central committee interpreted the instructions as more or less than confirmation of the Zhukov doctrine on the primacy of command. The narrow interpretation of the "orders and commands" sanction came later. The immediate victory seemed to be Zhukov's.

Zhukov vs. the Chief of the GPU. Zhukov and his political deputy, Col. Gen. Aleksey Zheltov, clashed head-on over the nature of the delicate political-military relationship. Zheltov, as head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Defense Ministry, headed an organization which was technically an organic part of the parent ministry but which simultaneously functioned as a department of the party's central committee. This latter status endowed the GPU with far-reaching immunities from ministerial control. Zhukov was unhappy over this circumstance, and his public utterances leave little ground for doubting that Zhukov and Zheltov were at loggerheads as early as the beginning of 1956.
Zhukov's dissatisfaction with the GPU was evident in his speech in April 1956 before an all-union conference of political workers in the armed forces, referred to above in connection with 20th congress indoctrination. The address is a remarkable indictment of the structure and functioning of the political apparatus in the military establishment. In his opening remarks, which set the tenor of the entire speech, Zhukov attacked the GPU for not having assembled leading military-political figures during the previous seven years to discuss with them the status and problems of party-political work in the armed forces and measures to improve political work. Zhukov left the clear impression that the head of the GPU was guilty of gross indifference toward the most pressing political problems of the day in the military establishment.

As for political work, Zhukov found "serious deficiencies" in the political training of some units; these, in turn, had resulted in "intolerable laxities in the state of discipline...in the armed forces." He called for a "fundamental rebuilding of the entire system of political and military education...new and more effective methods of party-political work." Zhukov defined the goals of this reorganized system as "a high quality of military and political training, an improvement in combat readiness, organization and discipline, a superior knowledge of military equipment and armament, and the proper performance of duty by all personnel." These goals in turn were to be attained through four major steps: (1) discontinue studying the state of affairs and conditions in units from papers and reports; (2) stop bureaucratic direction of units from offices; (3) be closer to the troops, examine the command personnel, and then replace unsuitable workers with more competent persons; and (4) go to the masses, eliminate existing deficiencies, and mobilize every Communist and Komsomol, every soldier, sailor, and officer, for the active and creative solution of problems.

Current political propaganda, continued Zhukov, was "unrealistic and separated from the actual conditions of the troops and the practical problems facing every unit and formation." Reforms in both "content" and "method" of propaganda work were essential, he admonished, in order to "liberate our military thinking from that inflexible narrowmindedness which was born of the cult of the individual and to awaken creative thinking, which is based not on quotations serving the cult of the individual but on the objective analysis of reality, on the entire wealth of ideas of Marxist-Leninist theory, and on military science."
Turning to the crucial issue of the mission of political and party organs in the armed forces, Zhukov assigned them the task of "strongly supporting the commanders...to prevent the lowering of the prestige of command personnel, including noncommissioned officers."

The deficiencies noted, Zhukov said, necessitated "a major study...of the structure and staffing of the political organs in the armed forces." Specifically denouncing overstaffing of political sections, he found evidence of "great excesses in the organizational field which unnecessarily formalize a number of fields of endeavor where the party and Komsomol organizations...could apply themselves with greater creativeness."*

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*Party work and control functions in the Soviet armed forces are performed by two different groups: (1) the political officers (zampolit) and (2) the unit party organizations. The political officer is at once the unit representative of the Chief Political Directorate and the deputy commander for political affairs (zampolit) of his unit. He is appointed from above and in turn appoints the zampolit at the next lower echelon. He is ultimately responsible to the Chief Political Directorate for all political affairs in his unit, and this responsibility plus his dual subordination—to the zampolit of the next higher echelon as well as to the commanding officer of his unit—frequently leads him to interfere in the work of that commander, particularly in matters of training.

Party organizations in the armed services are roughly equivalent to those in civilian life, except that they are set up according to military units (battalion, regiment, division) instead of geographical areas (city or rayon, oblast, republic.) They "elect" secretaries—who are nominated by the zampolit—send delegates to party conferences at higher echelon levels and, under the direction of the zampolit, carry out propaganda work among the troops, strengthen discipline, care for the welfare of the soldiers, etc. Although the zampolit may encourage them to do so at times, they have no right to "check on the execution" of orders received by the commander, in contrast to party organizations in civilian enterprises which have as one of their chief tasks checking on execution by the management of party and government directives and plans. (Footnote continued, page 14)
Moreover, Zhukov scored Zheltov's administration of the GPU. "I assume," he concluded, "that the Chief Political Directorate and the political directorates of all branches of the armed forces...military districts and fleets...will close the gap which now separates the directing political organs from the groups, military districts, fleets, armies, and flotillas which they supervise."

Less than a year later, in March 1957, Zhukov again publicly censured Zheltov for undue delay in convening an important meeting, this time an all-army conference of outstanding members of the armed forces. Thus in a span of 11 months the defense minister had twice reprimanded his political deputy for inefficiency and irresponsibility, first before a basically political audience and then before a military gathering. There could be no doubt that there was conflict between the military and political wings of the ministry, nor that Zhukov had been unable, or unwilling, to settle the differences in private and had chosen to humiliate his technical subordinate publicly.

Sometime during the summer of 1957, relations between Zhukov and Zheltov became so strained that the top party leaders had to interfere. An American correspondent in Moscow was told that the two clashed in August over the manner of conducting lectures and conferences to explain the June plenum to the troops. Zhukov charged Zheltov with insubordination, and the latter complained to Khrushchev, who asked Suslov to look into the matter. Zhukov thereupon told Suslov to keep out of defense affairs. The correspondent also heard about a meeting between the party presidium and the high command at which

(Footnote continued from page 13)

Zhukov evidently felt that zampolit staffs (and their higher echelon equivalents--political sections at corps and division level and political directorates of military districts) should be cut and more responsibility given to the regular party organizations. Since party organizations themselves had neither the right nor the ability to interfere with or question command decisions, Zhukov wanted their role to be enhanced for improvement of propaganda and troop discipline, and he wished to weaken the role of the zampolit, who could question decisions of commanders. No one questioned the necessity of improving the work of party organizations. Zhukov's plans for reducing the zampolit, however, were to get him into serious disagreement with the regime, because the ultimate effect would be to make the Chief Political Directorate subordinate to the Ministry of Defense alone and to reduce its role as a department of the central party apparatus.

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Zhukov was alleged to have tartly reminded Khrushchev that he, Zhukov, knew how to run the military establishment. Zhukov apparently left for Yugoslavia before the conflict was resolved, but not without promising Zheltov that he would fire him.

Another Western correspondent has reported a variant of this story to the effect that Zhukov objected to the reading of the letter on the antiparty group to occupation troops as dangerous to morale and discipline. A high-ranking subordinate, presumably Zheltov, ordered that the letter be read. Zhukov, angered, dismissed the subordinate. The latter complained to the central committee, with Suslov handling the complaint. A scene between Zhukov and Suslov ensued. At meetings of the Moscow Military District party organization on 24 and 25 October 1957, Khrushchev charged Zhukov with having tried to remove Zheltov and with "conspiring by dishonest means" to prevent the latter's election as a candidate member of the central committee.

Once the quarrel between Zhukov and Zheltov became so bitter it had to be settled in the presidium, the outcome was almost inevitable. Old party apparatchik Zheltov had direct access to and long personal association with the party apparatchiks who comprised the bulk of the presidium. The latter, for reasons to be discussed in the next chapter, were probably having second thoughts about the marshal-minister who was taking his presidium membership too seriously and was trying to change their system of control over his military establishment. Thus the reason for Zhukov's ouster taking place when it did appears to have been the urgent need to solve the problem of a defense minister who could not work in harness with the head of the Chief Political Directorate, whose post was more significant from the party point of view. That Zheltov stayed on as GPU chief until the initial confusion had ended and then was transferred to another responsible party post indicates the leadership was not dissatisfied with the way he had conducted himself.
III. ZHUKOV AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY

The second charge against Zhukov was that he had attempted to build up a "cult" of his personality and to exaggerate the importance of his personal role during World War II. This contrasted sharply with the picture generally drawn, in the West at least, of the marshal as Stalin's victim and therefore the antithesis of dictatorship, as an apolitical career soldier interested only in military science, and as a person popular with both the public and his colleagues.

The Art of Making Enemies: Party Leaders. Prior to the events of late October 1957, Zhukov appeared to enjoy a close working alliance with Soviet leaders in general and with Nikita Khrushchev in particular. After being exiled by Stalin, Zhukov supposedly owed his rehabilitation and his lofty rank in the Soviet hierarchy to Khrushchev's intervention on his behalf. One competent Western diplomatic observer noted the fact that whenever the two appeared together, Zhukov wore a "look of pride and almost adoration" and conducted himself in a manner which clearly deferred to Khrushchev's seniority and authority.

Information on the Soviet political scene in the immediate postwar years is sketchy. Zhukov's transfer first to the Odessa and then to the Urals Military District has been attributed to Stalin's fear that the popular marshal might challenge him in prestige or even pose a threat to his power. In August 1945, however, during the victory celebrations in Moscow a friendly relationship existed between Stalin and Zhukov. General Eisenhower (in his book Crusade in Europe) described it as follows: "At that time Marshal Zhukov was patently a great favorite with Stalin .... The two spoke to each other on terms of intimacy and cordiality." Yet in less than a year, during most of which Zhukov was stationed in Germany, he was removed from the party central committee and as commander of the ground forces and sent to Odessa. The parallel between 1946 and 1957, including rumors at the latter date that he would be offered a lesser job, possibly as commander of a military district, is noteworthy. Pravda of 3 November 1957, commenting on the Zhukov removal, said that the marshal considered himself a superior Soviet leader, put his personal ambitions above the party and army, and "repeated his mistakes of 1946." Whether or not there is a parallel between Stalin's and Khrushchev's treatment of Zhukov will probably never be established. The matter is raised here merely to point out...
that relations between Soviet leaders cannot soundly be
determined by their attitudes shown toward each other in
public.

In any event, Zhukov's exile cannot be attributed to
lasting enmity on Stalin's part--although Zhukov undoubtedly
held such feelings toward Stalin--for Zhukov returned to
Moscow, probably as commander of the ground forces or in-
spector general, sometime in 1951. Furthermore, Zhukov was
elected a candidate member of the central committee at the
19th party congress in October 1952. Thus he was both mili-
tarily and politically rehabilitated during Stalin's life-
time.

There is evidence that Zhukov was considered a ruthless
and overly strict disciplinarian by his subordinates. One
effect of his removal was a reduction in the stringency of
military discipline, including the repeal of Order No. 060--
probably issued in March or April 1957--concerning disciplinary
procedures. This decree was described as being too severe.
As an example of Zhukov's arbitrariness, there is a report
that he retired a colonel on the general staff because the
latter was overweight and failed to attend physical culture
classes. After Zhukov's removal, Khrushchev restored the colonel
to duty.

There is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that
Zhukov's elevation to full membership in the presidium in June
1957 went to his head. One of his first official acts in this
capacity was to deliver speeches in Leningrad on 14 and 15
July 1957, shortly after the purge of the antiparty group. He
entered the city on the crest of a wave of spontaneous hero
worship; all strata of Leningrad society voluntarily turned out
to cheer him. Zhukov's speeches, the most politically weighted
discourses in his repertory, were hardly calculated to conciliate
either his military contemporaries or his peers in the party
presidium. On the one hand there was a conspicuous lack of
self-effacement in describing his own contributions to the Ger-
man defeat in World War II, and on the other hand he carried
his attack on the antiparty group to political extremes.

Speaking at a Leningrad factory on 15 July 1957, Zhukov
charged: "The antiparty group...stubbornly resisted the meas-
ures pursued by the party for liquidating the consequences of
the personality cult, particularly the disclosure and calling
to account of those mainly responsible for allowing the law
to be violated." He exceeded the previous limits of abuse of
the Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich clique by intimating that they should be expelled from the party. Not only had the anti-party group "lost the right to pretend to the role of leaders of the party and state," he said, "but even to the name of legitimate members of our great Communist party." It is probable that Zhukov carried his attack even further. The Soviet press, after reporting that he had delivered "a long speech," printed a relatively brief textual version conspicuously uneven in its transitions from one topic to another.

These were not the words of a military commander in chief but of a politician, and they may well have caused Khrushchev and the other presidium members to take another look at their newly acquired colleague.

Several diplomatic and press observers in Moscow commented during the summer of 1957 that Zhukov was becoming increasingly cocky and that he behaved as if he were second only to Khrushchev. During his trip to Yugoslavia he also created the impression that he was the second-ranking man in the Soviet Union.

The Art of Making Enemies: Zhukov vs. His Comrades in Arms. Zhukov was charged both at a party meeting of the Moscow Military District on 24 October 1957 and in Marshal Konev's article in Pravda on 3 November with having wished to display a portrait of himself, mounted on a white charger, in the act of liberating Berlin.

Several reports following Zhukov's downfall indicated that he had blocked appeals to the central committee by subordinates within the Defense Ministry. The Moscow correspondent of the London Daily Worker, at times an unusually well-informed source on the Soviet hierarchy, filed a story from Moscow on 29 October 1957 that political workers in particular were denied access to the central committee, and that Zheltov himself had filed a protest to that body which precipitated the special October plenum. William J. Jorden of the New York Times reported from Moscow on 9 November that "some informed sources" believed Zhukov's removal had been caused by pressure from within the military itself. Zhukov, he noted, had become unapproachable, even insulting, to old comrades. Jorden also noted accounts that Zhukov had blocked appeals to the central committee.
Marshals Malinovsky and Sokolovsky and Admiral Gorshkov were members of the central committee and could not be denied access to it, but no military-political officers had been elected to the central committee at the 20th congress. This fact would tend to support the London Daily Worker story that Zhukov had attempted to limit direct access by political officers to the leading organs of the party. At the same time, however, they did have an alternate channel—the GPU—and its chief, Zheltov, apparently used it very effectively to present his side of the case.

Additional substance was provided to the speculation on Zhukov's negative personality traits by Marshal Biryuzov, commander in chief of the USSR's antiaircraft defenses, at a meeting of the aktiv of the Moscow city party organization on 31 October 1957. Biryuzov told the aktiv that Zhukov "did not heed the opinions of others, did not consider it necessary to seek advice or to discuss suggestions from below, seldom met with military personnel, and tried to impress on each and every one that he was an outstanding man."

Whatever the actual relations of minister and subordinates had been before the October events, the military figured prominently in the ouster action itself. Western attaches noted a "large number" of senior military officers entering and leaving the Kremlin on the nights of 22, 23, and 24 October, a circumstance repeated during the central committee session after Zhukov's replacement as defense minister but before the announcement of his expulsion from the inner party circle.

The Soviet general staff seems to have adopted a remarkably sanguine attitude toward the ouster, which again suggests that Zhukov was less a "soldier's soldier" than had been generally assumed. The list of top-level officers who attacked him after the announcement of the central committee's action is striking, even if political pressure is conceded to have caused their actions. According to an article in Pravda on 3 November 1957, Marshals Malinovsky, Konev, Rokossovsky, Sokolovsky, Yeremenko, Timoshenko, and Biryuzov, Generals of the Army Batov, Zakharov, Kazakov, Admiral Gorshkov, "and others" spoke against Zhukov at the plenum, "pointed out shortcomings, sharply criticized the mistakes and distortions he had permitted, and unanimously condemned his incorrect, nonparty behavior."
Moreover, there is no evidence of protest against the ouster by any major commander at the party aktiv meetings held after the plenum in all military districts to discuss the resolution. On the contrary, careerists such as Malinovsky, Konev, Moskalenko, and Biryuzov may have taken some pleasure in heaping coals of fire on the unfortunate one. The military officers present at the central committee meeting reportedly were polled separately on the ouster motion and voted unanimously against Zhukov.

In the flood of reports received after the Zhukov ouster, from those in the press to those personally on the part of any member of the Soviet armed forces, there was surprisingly little evidence of regret or sorrow for him. A few reported that the rank and file were stunned and angered by the removal of Zhukov, whom they regarded as a "father figure," and that, after the ouster, concern for the soldiers' welfare lessened and political control increased. On the whole, however, reactions tended more in the direction of resentment at Khrushchev's methods--e.g., ousting Zhukov while he was out of the country--rather than of support for Zhukov. Similarly, the snubbing of Marshal Konev by other military leaders at the 40th October Revolution Anniversary reception seemed to reflect distaste for the vitriol and vehemence of his public denunciation of Zhukov, more than any reservoir of sympathy for the fallen. In any event, whatever sympathy there was for Zhukov was not strong enough to stand up against the pressure mobilized by the party propaganda machine in October 1957.

Zhukov's domineering personality in itself would scarcely appear sufficient ground for removing him from his posts, particularly, on the eve of the 40th October Revolution Anniversary and at a time when tension over the Turkish-Syrian crisis was still mounting. What it probably did do was to antagonize other members of the presidium and to alienate his military colleagues, thus preparing the climate for his removal.
IV. ZHUKOV AND THE CHARGE OF "ADVENTURISM"

The central committee's charge that Zhukov was politically deficient and disposed to "adventurism" in the fields of foreign policy and in the leadership of the Defense Ministry may also have had some basis in fact. In this connection, however, Zhukov's "adventurism" must be interpreted as the Soviet leaders themselves would interpret it--i.e., as advocating a political or military policy which could in any way be interpreted as leaving the USSR in an exposed position.

At an embassy reception in Moscow in July 1957, Zhukov stated that he was prepared to open up the entire Soviet Union to international inspection if such action would contribute to a genuine disarmament agreement. One observer received the impression that the defense minister's price for such a concession was opening up the rest of the world to Soviet inspection; nevertheless, no top-flight Soviet leader had ever before so much as implied that physical inspection of the USSR by outsiders would be acceptable under any circumstances.

Later in this conversation Zhukov displayed either remarkable candor or equally remarkable naivety in directly contradicting an earlier policy statement by Khrushchev. When the subject of the reduction of forces arose, Zhukov stated that the Soviet armed forces numbered far less than the four million men generally attributed to them by the West, and he added that he would like to release the actual figure but that Khrushchev and Bulganin did not agree to this.

The significance of this latter claim becomes clearer in the light of Khrushchev's diametrically opposed statement in the TV interview which he granted the Columbia Broadcasting Company for release on 28 May 1957. The party leader had declined to answer a question on the strength of Soviet forces on the grounds that he had not expected the question and "had not asked his defense minister," Zhukov, for the figure. He added, however, "We are always ready to answer this question."

Was this "adventurism"? Had Zhukov gone too far in assuming political initiative in a sensitive area of Soviet diplomacy, as well as in compromising the leaders of the Soviet Government in the bargain? A sequel to this curious pattern of point and counterpoint indicates that this may indeed have been the case. Six weeks after the Zhukov ouster
the same observer who had talked to Zhukov in July had occasion to inquire of Premier Bulganin what was meant by the term "adventurism" in the central committee's declaration on Zhukov. Bulganin chose to answer the question obliquely and launched into a long dissertation on the disarmament problem, concluding with the statement that there were those in the Soviet Union who advocated inspection and control, but that these persons were guilty of "adventurism."

Under the circumstances it is clear that Bulganin had Zhukov in mind. Even though Bulganin apparently expected that this conversation would be reported to American officials and therefore used it to reaffirm the USSR's position on inspection, it is a logical conclusion to the best evidence on what was meant by the charge of "adventurism" against Zhukov.

There is also a possibility that Zhukov opposed Khrushchev's tactics vis-a-vis the Turkish-Syrian crisis in October 1957, although he rendered lip service to them in a major speech during his visit in Albania. Zhukov may well have sought to restrain Khrushchev from taking risks in the Middle East which could have involved the USSR in war with the United States. These risks would have been considered "adventurism" in the Western sense, but, in Khrushchev's view, Zhukov's opposition within the presidium to such tactics or his failure to ready the military establishment to back up Soviet foreign policy maneuvering would have constituted "adventurism."

At an Iranian reception on 26 October, the day of Zhukov's release as defense minister, Khrushchev related a fable to a Western correspondent. The story concerned a "humble little Jew, Pinya" (Khrushchev?) who in time of danger proved more courageous than the "burly anarchist" (Zhukov?). This allegory could have referred to the general outlook on foreign policy of Khrushchev and Zhukov and/or their attitudes toward the Turkish-Syrian crisis in particular. Zhukov's remarks on inspection and control and his comments on the destructive force of nuclear war tend to support this theory. On one occasion he stated that an article he had written was censored because his graphic description of the effects of atomic weapons might frighten people. As a military commander, Zhukov may have recommended caution
in the Turkish-Syrian crisis and opposed any military postures or movements of troops, etc., which would aggravate the situation.

Against this view it might be argued that Zhukov had acted quickly in Hungary and would have liked to have done so in Poland. These cases, however, were quite different. In Hungary the authority and prestige of the USSR and the Soviet Army had been challenged by a rebellious satellite people; in Poland, there was the danger that control of the Central European Plain, the traditional invasion route to the East, would be lost. Under these more directly threatening circumstances, no commander would hesitate to respond immediately and forcefully.

Despite the fact that, from the Soviet point of view, there was a basis for the adventurism charge against Zhukov, this apparently was much less a factor contributing to his downfall than the other two accusations. Even if Zhukov had had such tendencies in the field of foreign relations, there was little he could do about them without openly challenging Khrushchev and the presidium; and he was never accused of this type of "antiparty" activity.
V. THE MECHANICS AND TIMING OF ZHUKOV'S REMOVAL

Zhukov left Moscow on 4 October 1957 on a ceremonial visit to Yugoslavia to reciprocate the June visit of Yugoslav Minister of Defense Ivan Gosnjak to the USSR. En route he stopped off at Yalta to see Khrushchev, who was vacationing there. While Zhukov may have related his side of the dispute with Zheltov, there are no clues as to whether anything came up at the meeting which made Khrushchev decide that the marshal must be removed from his ministry. On the contrary, Khrushchev on his return to Moscow granted an interview with James Reston of the New York Times, in which the Soviet leader on his own initiative expressed the USSR's disappointment that the US had rejected a visit by Zhukov. This could well have been dissimulation on Khrushchev's part, although the full story of the timing of the final decision on Zhukov is still somewhat murky.

Sometime between the Reston interview, which took place on 7 October, and 12 October, when TASS announced that Zhukov would extend his trip by visiting Albania, Khrushchev apparently became convinced that the bitter dispute between Zhukov and Zheltov had not only not been resolved but in fact had been aggravated during the party leader's vacation. Western observers reported increased traffic in the Kremlin area on 16 October, and rumors circulated in Moscow that the central committee was in session. Apparently no plenum actually took place, but there were several high-level meetings at party headquarters. At the same time, Red Star on 16 October carried an editorial which stressed the party's role in guiding and supervising the military.

Zhukov went to Albania from Belgrade on 17 October, planning to spend only one day. It is still not known why or how his visit was extended, but Zhukov eventually spent more time in Albania than he had in Yugoslavia. It is possible that because of the Turkish-Syrian crisis, the regime did not want to announce its decision on the Zhukov-Zheltov problem and notified the marshal to extend his stay in Albania during which time he gave his hard-line speech on the Near East. It is also possible that Zhukov, whose self-confidence had increased noticeably during the previous few months, extended his trip himself, refusing to return to Moscow until the final decision was reached.
By 19 October the central committee had issued a letter criticizing the leadership of the Ministry of Defense for inadequate political training in the armed forces. Zhukov's name, however, was not mentioned—a fact which suggested that a final decision as to his future had not been reached. The decision to relieve Zhukov as defense minister probably occurred immediately prior to or on 22 October. The previously mentioned report that large numbers of high military personnel were seen entering and leaving the Kremlin from 22 to 24 October would tend to confirm this date. At meetings of the Moscow Military District party organization on 24 and 25 October, Khrushchev criticized Zhukov for overvaluing the role of one-man command, for petitioning for the removal of Zheltov, for failing to inform the central committee of his activities, and for refusing to allow his subordinates to contact the central committee. Agreement on Zhukov's release as minister of defense had evidently been reached by this time, although it is possible that discussion continued as to what his new post would be. It is unlikely, in view of the seriousness of these charges, that he would have been permitted to retain his party positions.

Zhukov returned to Moscow on 26 October and went directly from the airport to the Kremlin, where he was officially informed of his release. The session apparently was a stormy one. The party leaders postponed the time of their arrival at an Iranian reception that night, originally scheduled for 1800 hours, to 1900 and actually did not arrive until 2000.

The Time Required to Remove Zhukov. The most puzzling aspect of Zhukov's final fall is that it took so long. In the interval between the 26 October announcement of Zhukov's release as defense minister and the 2 November announcement that he had lost his party posts, there was considerable speculation on the meaning of his removal.

The simplest explanation for the delay, of course, is that it took time to prepare party meetings which would have to be held to get out the authoritative line on Zhukov's ouster. The central committee meeting to discuss the Zhukov affair convened on 28 October and probably lasted through the 30th or 31st, for on 1 November the central committee issued a letter describing the plenum. The official announcement of the charges was released on 2 November.
Several other explanations, however, have been offered for Zhukov's fall and its timing. One theory was that Khrushchev, fearing a Bonapartist coup, had to eliminate Zhukov as a threat to his power. This theory was based primarily on overemphasis of Zhukov's personal role in the June purge of the "antiparty group," which was considerably exaggerated at that time, as was the amount of personal support Zhukov commanded in the armed forces. It also disregarded the extent to which the military forces are penetrated at all levels by party and state security agents for the purpose of keeping the military establishment out of politics and forestalling the possibility of a coup.

There were a number of indications that, instead of considering Zhukov a rival, Khrushchev—who is extremely conscious of the prestige of the USSR—enjoyed having an internationally recognized hero in his entourage. If this was the case, the time lag after 26 October may have resulted from Khrushchev's attempts to persuade the marshal to remain in the government in a lesser position. Such an offer would have been in accord with Soviet practice since Molotov's removal from the premiership in 1955. On 29 October, Khrushchev indicated that Zhukov would be given another post "in accordance with his qualifications and experience," echoing what had been said about Molotov in July. The TASS announcement of Zhukov's release contained no reference to "other work" for the marshal, but it is possible that one or more respectable positions were offered him and that he refused them. In its resolution of 2 November, the central committee instructed the party secretariat "to provide Zhukov with another job." It is still not clear what Zhukov has done since his removal, although rumors persist that he has retired on a pension.

Another suggestion was that the removal of Zhukov was engineered by Khrushchev's opponents in the leadership in order to isolate the party leader from a strong source of support. In this case, the time required to effect the ouster would have resulted from Khrushchev's own attempts to fight back. As has been indicated, however, events have proved that Zhukov's control of the armed forces was not so great as had been supposed. Furthermore, his successor, Marshal Malinovsky, was a strong supporter of Khrushchev.

The nature of the so-called opposition is difficult to establish. Of the full members of the presidium at that time,
Mikoyan and Suslov have shown little, if any, inclination toward involvement in a struggle for personal power; Bulganin, as has since been established, had been discredited by his association with the "antiparty group" in June; neither Voroshilov nor Shvernik were strong enough to trouble Khrushchev, and the remainder were Khrushchev protégés or members of his hand-picked secretariat.

On balance, it would appear that the removal of Zhukov from his government post was necessitated by his own arrogance and his refusal to share his command of the military with the party apparatus. While this would seem to have led automatically to loss of his party posts as well, the fact that this was not announced until a week later may indicate that the cause was Zhukov's refusal to accept a secondary job to save the leadership's face on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The Transfer of Marshal Rokossovsky. One curious event which became interwoven with the Zhukov ouster was the appointment of Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky as commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. The announcement was made by Tbilisi radio and Zarya Vostoka, the Georgian newspaper, on 23 October; the central press did not mention the appointment until 25 October, when Pravda cited the provincial paper as its source.

After Zhukov's removal was made public, speculation arose as to whether Rokossovsky had been transferred either because he supported Zhukov or because he had been embarrassed to oppose his former comrade. In fact, Rokossovsky apparently did not go to Tbilisi until 6 November, when he appeared there at October Revolution anniversary celebrations. He spoke in Moscow at the central committee plenum which began on 28 October and again at a meeting of the Moscow Oblast party aktiv on 1 November.

On balance, then, it would appear that Rokossovsky's "transfer" to Tbilisi had little, if anything, to do with the Zhukov case. Rather, it was another Kremlin tactic to keep up pressure on the Turks, along with such measures as talk of "volunteers" and increased air activity in the border areas.

In this connection, however, the timing of the Zhukov ouster and the "adventurism" charge against him may have
played a role. A smiling Khrushchev and Mikoyan unexpectedly dropped in on a Turkish Embassy reception in Moscow on 29 October and, in the presence of many Western correspondents, abruptly ended Soviet pressure on the Turkish-Syrian crisis. On 2 November the Soviet press and radio carried the charge against Zhukov of "adventurism" in foreign policy. Although no Soviet source has linked Zhukov's "adventurism" to the Near East situation, it is quite possible that, having had to support Zheltov against an adamant Zhukov and oust the latter, the party leadership decided to let Western observers infer that its adventuristic tactics in the Near East were those of Zhukov.
VI. AFTER ZHUKOV

The transfer of Zheltov. In the period between 27 December 1957 and 10 January 1958, Col. Gen. A. S. Zheltov was transferred from his post as head of the Chief Political Directorate to a corresponding position as chief of the administrative department of the party central committee. His successor in the GPU was Col. Gen. F. I. Golikov, a professional soldier not previously assigned to the upper military-political echelon.

Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain Zheltov's lateral transfer. One theory holds that the shift constituted the party's tacit recognition of Zheltov's personal unpopularity at the lower levels of military command. Another possibility is that the move was a gesture to indicate that some blame for the Zhukov affair may have lain with the political apparatus, and that the October plenum was not the herald of a general purge of career officers. The appointment of tankman Golikov would serve to strengthen this reassurance.

Still another explanation—and a combination of the above—is that Zheltov's transfer was another example of Khrushchev's pragmatic approach to organizational-jurisdictional problems. The anomalous position of the GPU, which serves two masters—the Defense Ministry and the party central committee, while ultimately responsible only to the latter—had exacerbated army-party relations acutely. The ill-defined prerogatives of political officers and line commanders at lower echelons in political matters, the murkiness of "one-man command" as it pertained to political training, were only reflections of this overlapping dualism at the top.

Zheltov and Zhukov, both strong personalities, had clashed violently over this question on which no one has ever come up with a consistent clear-cut policy. Zhukov, for a combination of the pressing reasons shown above, lost out and was retired. Zheltov may also have appeared in an unfavorable light for having failed to resolve the conflict quickly and without furor. Its timing, on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, was particularly bad. Therefore it may have been decided to appoint to the Chief Political Directorate Golikov, the highly respected head of the armored forces academy and a front-line commander in World War II—a man who could more
effectively maintain the respect of the military while carrying out the new central committee directives than could Zheltov. The latter, an apparatchik of unquestioned ability and reliability, could use his administrative talents as head of the administrative department—a very important position (it approves cadres and checks on the work of the security organs, border guards, the procuracy, etc.) but one in which there is little room for in-fighting and maneuvering—to which Zheltov had evidently resorted as head of the Chief Political Directorate in his fight with presidium member and Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov. The regime in the past had resorted to this type of personnel shift when it was unable to come up with a firm policy decision on thorny questions.

One organizational solution would have been to remove the Chief Political Directorate from the party central committee apparatus—to confine it to the Ministry of Defense and abolish the dual subordination which so complicated the relations between commanders and their political deputies. The appointment of Golikov and the transfer of Zheltov suggested initially that this may have been done and that the latter may have taken central party supervision of political work in the military into the administrative department with him.

Another theory is based on the change, made sometime between 4 and 24 October 1957 while Zhukov was out of the country, of the title of the GPU from "Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense" to "Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy." This change has been interpreted to mean that the GPU had been removed from Ministry of Defense jurisdiction, and that Zhukov's refusal to accept this fait accompli necessitated his removal. Golikov thus would have been appointed to head the GPU in order to make this transfer of jurisdiction more palatable to the armed forces. Subsequent protocol listings, however, have listed Golikov ahead of higher ranking generals and also of Zheltov, indicating that the GPU has retained its former status. This also indicates that the regime is still not ready to consider such a permanent solution as abolishing political organs in the military establishment—as was done with those in the transport ministries and the militia following the 20th party congress—and entrusting political-organizational work to the regular party organizations in military units.

Military Districts. The secret letter of 19 October 1957 of the central committee reportedly directed that the chief of the GPU be included in the composition of the Supreme Military Council of the Ministry of Defense. It appears likely...
that this took place, since—at military-district and group-of-forces level—the posts of member of the Military Council and of chief of the Political Directorate were merged approximately at the time of the Zhukov dismissal. The first identification of a "member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate" occurred on 30 October 1957, when Lt. Gen. N. M. Aleksandrov of the Kiev Military District was so described. Since then this designation has been given to the top political officers in other military districts.

During the year following the Zhukov ouster, an unusually large number of leading political officers were released from their jobs and not reappointed. Some of them may have been replaced as Zhukov supporters, but when the jobs of member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate were merged, leaving one post where two had existed before, at least half of the top political officers in the districts and groups of forces had to be relieved in any case. Since identifications of Soviet military, and particularly of political-military, personalities are spotty at best, it is impossible to determine why the generals in question were removed, but it appears this was the result of an administrative reorganization rather than of a general purge.

A large-scale turnover also occurred among Military District commanders after Zhukov's dismissal. Here the evidence points to normal replacements and rotation rather than to a shake-up. Col. Gen. Pukhov, the commander of the Siberian Military District, died. Marshal Grechko's return from Germany to assume command of the ground forces created a vacancy which set off a chain of transfers.

There is only one case in which the replacement of a district commander appears to be directly connected with Zhukov's ouster. In speeches at meetings of the Moscow Military District party organization on 24 and 25 October, Khrushchev charged that Zhukov had incorrectly influenced the attitude of other senior officers. One example given was that of the commander of "a Central Asian Military District" who refused to return from vacation to disseminate the central committee letter of 19 October and ordered his chief political officer to do nothing about it. The person in question was probably General of the Army A. A. Luchinsky, who was replaced as commander of the Turkestan Military District after Zhukov's removal.
Khrushchev also said that Col. Gen. S. M. Shtemenko, the ups and downs of whose career remain a riddle, had been relieved as chief of military intelligence because he had reported only to Zhukov.* On the whole, however, the Soviet high command has remained remarkably stable both during and after the Zhukov dismissal. This gives additional support to the theory that Zhukov did not enjoy the wholehearted support of his subordinates.

Military-party relations. During 1958 the regime once again took steps to resolve the built-in conflict between political officers and military commanders. Whereas Zhukov had been consistently critical of political workers and had generally strengthened the role of his commanders, the new line called for denunciation of both categories for past laxness in fulfilling political responsibilities. As if to warn them not to take Zhukov's fate as a carte blanche to assert their prerogatives too strongly, political officers at first bore the brunt of the sharpest attacks. Both groups, however, were castigated in the press for indifference toward ideological education and the political indoctrination of troops. Soviet Fleet, for example, on 18 February 1958 chided both "dry-land political workers" in the navy who had never been up a gangplank and negligent commanding officers who had avoided their responsibility for the political education of the sailors whom they commanded.

A series of party conferences was conducted in all military districts and fleets in January and February 1958 to discuss the results of the October plenum and to recommend ways of implementing the central committee decree on improving political work in the armed forces. In effect, the regime told political officers and commanders to stop feuding and to start working together on all problems of military and political training. The political officer should "point out shortcomings" to the commander and recommend corrective action in matters of morale, training, discipline, and the entire complex of military life. Then, ideally, commander and

*Shtemenko was identified in the DOSAAF journal Za Rulem, Number 10, September 1958, as having been a judge at a recent civilian motorcycle race in Kuybyshev.
political officer should take joint action to eliminate these deficiencies. The political officer should conduct unit party meetings to solicit the ideas of party members for correcting specific defects in training, and the commander should attend and accept justified criticism from below, as this would not undermine the principle of "one-man command."

These party organizations, however, appear to have constituted a problem in relations between commanders and political officers during this period, particularly in lower military units. While the "ideal" solution for the problem was being worked out at the center and military-district levels, it became increasingly apparent that the party organizations in some companies and battalions were going too far in asserting their rights vis-a-vis their commanders on the basis of "party responsibility." This could probably be explained partly as a reaction to the strict military discipline of the Zhukov era—which some sources have given as one explanation of why there was so little support by the military for Zhukov at the time of his ouster—and an expression of resentment by the troops against their commanders who had enforced that discipline. It is also likely that while many members of these party organizations in lower military units simply exulted in and took advantage of the post-Zhukov situation, others were still being used by their political officers as weapons against the commanders. In both cases the result was that commanders, as party members, were required to appear at party meetings, account for their activities, and be criticized on the basis of "party equality."

In the spring and summer of 1958 there were many press accounts of commanders having to submit reports to the party bureaus of their units and be criticized as party members. On 24 May 1958, for example, Red Star cited one party bureau which heard reports from a company commander on the results of his unit's gunnery practice and "decided to give him a reprimand with an annotation on his record." On 7 March the party secretary of a regiment, a major, deplored the practice of requiring unit commanders to submit general reports to party bureaus, since this constituted a trespass on the inviolable "orders and directives" of commanders which, according to the April 1957 instructions of the central committee, were not subject to criticism.

By May 1958 the regime was taking steps to clarify the situation. On 18 May, Red Star charged that party organizations
In the absence of the full text of the new instructions it is not possible to be categorical, but this "new order" apparently limits the partial veto power which military commanders had over disciplinary actions levied by party organizations against officers and noncommissioned officers who were party members. The April 1957 instructions provided that penalties prescribed by party organizations against their members for "party offenses" had to be approved by the political officer and the commander of the officer's military unit. It is not clear whether this approval is still required, but the emphasis on the "new order" suggests that it has been at least limited. If so, it would appear that party discipline within a given military unit has been strengthened, since the unit party organization can discipline for party offenses all its members except the commander and political officer.

At the same time, the commander's position and maintenance of military discipline within his unit has been strengthened by the fact that only higher party echelons can discipline him for party offenses. Furthermore, the stricture against the criticism of commanders' "orders and commands" laid down in the April 1957 instructions has not only remained unaltered but has subsequently been referred to frequently as a guide to proper army-party relations.

The ultimate product: Tactician-Politician. So far as commander and political officer are concerned, nothing released has indicated any de jure changes in their relationship. Articles written in mid-1958 by chief political officers of military districts continue to define the relations of commanders and party organizations in military units. Assuming the role of arbiters, these officers warned party organizations—and therefore the political officers who direct these party organizations—not to interfere with or usurp the functions of the commanders. They also criticized commanders who refused to accept justified criticism, avoided their party responsibilities, or pulled their military rank on party secretaries. During the latter half of 1958 a series of regulations was issued to clarify the regime's demands that commanders, political officers, and party organizations work together to strengthen both party leadership and military effectiveness.

In addition to the revision of the 1957 central committee instructions to party organizations, discussed above, there were
instructions to Komsomol organizations of the army and navy; regulations on Military Councils; regulations for Marxist-Leninist evening universities, party schools, and schools for advanced students including generals and admirals; and regulations for political organs of the army and navy. The full texts of these documents have not been published, constituting a significant "gap in intelligence." Extracts and citations in the press, however, indicate that while considerable effort has been expended to define precisely the roles of the various organizations involved in political training for the armed forces, the personal attitudes of and relationships between the individual commander and his political deputy are still all-important. To meet this problem of human relations, the successors to Zhukov and Zheltov have increasingly emphasized a new dialectical approach which suggests how they intend ultimately to solve this problem. The end product is to be a universal officer, a commander who is simultaneously a competent political officer and a political officer with the leadership traits and military skills necessary for assignment to tactical command posts.

The campaign to make political cadres militarily literate has already been referred to in connection with Zhukov's program of providing support for his commanders. The regime itself espoused this policy after Zhukov's removal—an obvious effort to preclude a repetition of army-party squabbling by eliminating potential points of friction. Zhukov tried to train political workers to an understanding of the commander's point of view; the party now seeks to merge—to synthesize—the two functions, political and military, into a single indivisible whole, a move which would for the first time give real meaning to the principle of "one-man command."

The appointment of Col. Gen. Golikov—a versatile officer who has had line, staff, diplomatic, and training experience—to Zheltov's old post as head of the Chief Political Directorate symbolized this approach, and both he and Zhukov's successor as defense minister—Marshal Malinovsky—have consistently supported it. In his first major article, "Party-Political Work in the Army and Navy," which appeared in Pravda of 29 August, Golikov wrote:

In the interest of the cause one must actively and systematically assign commanders to political work and political workers to command posts.
It is also necessary more freely to assign Communists holding command, engineering-technological, and staff posts to positions as secretaries of party bureaus.

With regard to commanders, he charged:

There are still some leaders who try to reject criticism or who accept it only in words. These comrades must be reminded once more of the fact that criticism and self-criticism is, even under army conditions, a constantly effective weapon against routine, conceit, and self-complacency --against shortcomings in work and conduct.

Turning to political workers, Golikov stated:

The central committee requires from all political workers considerable improvement of their style of work. The political department must be closely linked with the personnel, must actively influence the course of military training and skillfully delve into the tasks of combat preparedness of the units. The conditions of modern warfare require a particularly high training level of the soldiers. Special attention must be paid to questions of tactical training, to improved organization of gunnery practice, and to training under conditions of the application of the most modern type of weapons. In this connection political organs must pay considerably more attention to the field training of troops, take an active part in military-scientific work, and improve their own qualifications as specialists, to abandon for all time the bureaucratic style of work and concentrate their work in the field and on the ships at sea.

In an article in Red Star on 1 November—the anniversary of Zhukov's removal from the party central committee—Marshal Malinovsky backed up Golikov as follows:

In addition to supervising combat training, many commanders have acquired significant experience in political work. Many political
workers in turn have acquired necessary military training and experience in training and educating cadres. In this connection we must more boldly place politically trained commanders in supervisory party-political work and political workers with appropriate qualifications in command work. This work must be conducted constantly and systematically, not sporadically.

It is still too early to tell how seriously the regime is going about creating such "tactician-politicians" among its military officers. Aside from Golikov himself, no high-ranking military commanders have been named political officers and no political officers at military district level have been transferred to command posts. It would be more logical, however, to expect this to be a gradual development beginning at lower echelons.

Only time will tell whether this solution will be effective in the long run. It is likely that political officers would have more difficulty in making the shift to command posts than vice versa. It is also likely that such transfers would make political officers more sympathetic to the commanders' problems and, because of the much larger number of military as opposed to political officers, the latter would become "militarized" as a group far more quickly than commanders would become " politicized." For this very reason the regime may come to regard this as a dangerous weakening of party control of the military and call a halt before it goes that far. On the other hand, if this method of approaching the problem is pushed to the point of effectively resolving built-in commander-political officer hostility, then the role of political officer itself can be abolished as no longer necessary, and party leadership in military units will be left to the party organizations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

1. The causes of the Zhukov ouster appear to have been his devotion to his duty as he saw it, his lack of political tact, and his insistence on genuinely assuming the theoretical prerogatives of a full member of the party presidium and USSR minister. It was never alleged that he was hostile to the primacy of the Communist party, and there is no reason to believe that he was less than a convinced Communist. Moreover, there is no good evidence that Zhukov was removed because Khrushchev considered him a threat to his power or because some unnamed opposition to Khrushchev was trying to weaken the latter's position.

In retrospect, it appears that there was some basis of truth in all the charges against Zhukov. His sternness and arrogance had alienated his military and political colleagues. He probably had disagreed with Khrushchev on certain areas of foreign policy, but what probably made his removal urgently necessary was his clash with GPU chief Zheltov over political training and specifically his threat unilaterally to remove the party's top representative in the armed forces. This was a step the party could permit no minister to take—not even one who was a member of the party presidium.

2. Despite the disgrace of Zhukov and the central committee's public repudiation of his policies, a thread of continuity links his tenure with current party policy on military-political relations. Zhukov believed, as the party today maintains, that political education and indoctrination in the armed forces is an aid to the commander in improving the quality of the combat training and discipline of his command. The crux of the disagreement between Zhukov and Zheltov was their divergent approach to the methods best calculated to attain the desired end. Zhukov demanded that duty hours be devoted to practical military training, that during this time the political officers concentrate on assisting commanders by improving military discipline and morale, and that they and the party and Komsomol organizations instill Marxist-Leninist theory in troops and officers during off-duty hours. Thus he felt that unnecessarily large staffs of political organs should be pruned and more political work entrusted to unit party organizations. Zheltov, the political commissar and party apparatchik who had never had any field experience, could only regard such a policy as one which would weaken central